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Abstract 
A long standing open question asks: "When is an intensional logic determined 
by its canonical frame?" Certainly the canonical frame will invalidate all non-
theses of the logic, however, we can never be sure that the canonical frame 
itself actually verifies the logic. 
This is the starting point for this thesis and we will have in our mind the 
famous conjecture resulting from KIT FINE's paper [22]: 
Conjecture 0.1. A logic is elementary if it is canonical. 
While we will not decide this conjecture we will make many points that 
may be important in its eventual solution. 
This thesis starts by introducing our notation and by alluding to the under-
lying body of research that is used. Apart from a few elementary results the 
thesis is reasonably self contained and any result that is used yet not specifi-
cally derived or cited earlier is either trivial or a well known result of the field 
of modal logic. All the proofs presented here are worked out in exacting detail 
and do not presuppose much beyond basic modal logic. 
The thesis then moves on to a consideration of neighborhood semantics 
and discusses the notion of canonicity there. With the thought of how this 
type of canonicity can be derived without reference to an accessibility relation 
and its relationship to the more usual sort of canonicity, we look at how we 
can provide canonicity for a large class of classical logics-the non-iterative 
logics and a new class of 'even' logics that have the finite model property. One 
consequence of this work is that the McKinsey logic, recently found to be non-
canonical by ROBERT GOLDBLATT [34] and not strongly complete by XIAOP-
ING WANG [101], is neighborhood canonical and so neighborhood strongly 
complete. The success we experience here will highlight the depth of mystery 
surrounding the questions of the canonicity of certain iterative logics-these 
questions still remain open and our techniques cannot be extended. We will 
highlight a particular example, EK4, and in Appendix A we will indicate some 
of the results about the nature of the logic that may be helpful in answering 
the question of its canonicity / finite model property. 
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Also introduced in this thesis is a novel way of looking at canonicity for 
normal modal systems without looking at the elementary properties of the 
canonical accessibility relation. While this technique, known as ultrafilter se-
mantics, does the same job as earlier work such as BJARNI JONSSON's [43], 
it does provide a new and hopefully more intuitive way of looking at the 
canonicity question. The chapter on ultrafilter semantics is accompanied by 
a discussion of how it relates to the more general work already present in the 
literature. 
The thesis concludes with two chapters on the relationships between 
canonical frames. This part of the work is based around the question of how 
canonical frames over different cardinalities are related and, in turn, this ques-
tion came from the observation that if the above conjecture held then the fol-
lowing one must certainly hold: 
Conjecture 0.2. If the canonical frame for a normal modal logic L in one in-
finite cardinality satisfies L then the canonical frame in all cardinalities must 
satisfy L. 
Pruning back the problem to this apparently weaker conjecture does not 
help matters and the relationships between canonical frames examined in the 
last two chapters are ones that may be important to this conjecture's closure. 
The first of these two chapters examines the kind of accessibility preserving 
maps that exist between canonical frames of different cardinality and shows 
that, when dealing with logics of bounded alternative, we are able to use them 
to tell a full story. The second of these chapters looks at the types of isomor-
phisms that exist between canonical frames. It does this by introducing and 
studying the concept of 'non-standard' automorphisms/isomorphisms and 
shows that, for some logics, there can be no hope of finding such a map. On 
the other hand, other logics like the logics of bounded alternative are shown 
to have no shortage of non-standard isomorphisms and automorphisms. 
The thesis is followed by a number of unrelated articles that were written 
during the author's time as a Ph.D. student at the Australian National Univer-
sity. Included are two papers (one written with KOJI TANAKA and GRAHAM 
PRIEST) on ADAM GROVE' s analysis of two modelings for theory change, and 
a paper on the use of semantically constrained condensed detachment in au-
tomated reasoning (written with JOHN SLANEY). 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
This thesis is a projection of a personal journey through the questions raised by 
the notions of canonicity. As an undergraduate, I was amazed by the way that 
canonical frames for intensional logics readily gave rise to the completeness 
of their logics. When presented with a new logical system such as KRISTER 
SEGERBERG's logic of action [74] and his associated logic of imperatives [75] 
it was quite simple to provide completeness through the usual methods. Un-
fortunately the usual methods, while reasonably reliable, did not always work 
and we had to sometimes consider deeper mechanisms for obtaining com-
pleteness, as I found when I considered the canonical structures for the logics 
of action in my paper [83]. 
The natural hope then was: If only we understood canonicity better so that 
when we are given a new logical system we can have a reasonably effective 
way of determining if a logic is satisfied by its canonical frames. 
With this as a hope I started looking into the nature of canonical frames and 
found that the literature was already populated with results about when logics 
are canonical and even a result of striking generality about how elementarity 
implies canonicity-this was a result by KIT FINE [22] . Naturally, I echoed the 
literature in asking "what about the converse?" 
Conjecture 1.1. A canonical logic is elementary. 
If we could answer this then we would have a two way bridge between the 
impervious canonical systems that are used by logicians to prove complete-
ness and the eloquent first order conditions that are used by logicians to draw 
conclusions about the underlying logic. 
This question was obviously a difficult one to answer but then two results 
turned up which pointed even more to its truth and energised me in my quest 
to understand these strange structures and, perhaps, answer this question. 
Both results were due to ROBERT GOLDBLATT, with the first being a result that 
1 
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disqualified a leading candidate counter-example: while JOHAN VAN BEN-
THEM showed [98] that the McKinsey logic was not elementary GOLDBLATT 
was able to show [34] that the McKinsey logic was also not canonical. Then 
in [32] he gave his second result which was that if a logic is determined by an 
elementary class then the elementary class defined by the canonical frame also 
determines the logic. Having proven this, GOLDBLATT concludes his book [32] 
by "placing [a] challenge in front of" his readers: determine whether canonic-
ity implies elementarity. 
There is no doubt that this is a difficult problem so the natural way to at-
tack it is to break it down into simpler sub-problems and simpler analyses and 
to continue to investigate, along GOLDBLATT's lines, the properties of canon-
icity. Indeed one clear problem due to GOLDBLATT is the question of whether 
the cardinality of the sets of propositional letters, out of which the canonical 
frames are constructed, have any relevance to the canonicity of a logic: 
Conjecture 1.2. If a normal modal logic L is verified by its canonical frame 
constructed from A ~ w many propositional variables, then it is verified by 
its canonical frame constructed out of K many propositional variables for all 
K > A. 
Clearly if a canonical logic (in some cardinal) is elementary then it is canon-
ical in all cardinals by FINE's result, so this conjecture is in some sense1 weaker 
than Conjecture 1.1. Even so, this is still also a difficult problem and must be 
attacked in little pieces, so, taken by the set theoretic language with which 
this problem was stated, I wondered if we could use set theoretic tricks to 
look at the relations between canonical frames of two different cardinalities. 
While the results along this avenue of investigation still leave many questions 
open, they do show that interesting things can be said about the relationship 
between logic, cardinality, and canonicity. 
Another avenue for investigation was opened up by my interest in non-
normal logics. While normal logics usually have an accessibility relation asso-
ciated with them, classical logics are less constrained and are usually thought 
of in terms of their neighborhood or Montague-Scott semantics. In this type of 
semantics there is no such thing as the canonical frame, but, following BRIAN 
CHELLAS [13] we are able to define canonicity in terms of what ROY A. BEN-
TON calls [ 6] candidate canonical frames: A classical logic is canonical iff it has a 
frame that 'conservatively extends' the frame given by the logic and also sat-
isfies the logic. Here we have a conception of canonicity that is independent 
1 While Conjecture 1.1 does not presuppose that we have canonicity in only one infinite car-
dinal the tone of the conjecture suggests that the cardinality of the underlying set of proposi-
tional letters is irrelevan t. 
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of an accessibility relation and so by investigating this concept we may get a 
better idea of what is important to canonicity and what is not. My interest in 
canonicity for classical logics came about because I was asked, by SEGERBERG 
and CHELLAS, about the canonicity, or the strong completeness, of the clas-
sical system EK. This thesis looks at the problems of canonicity for classical 
systems and produces additional anecdotal evidence for the complexity of the 
problems associated with canonicity. 
Because of these streams of attack on the problems of canonicity, this thesis 
will only be concerned, on the one hand, with the most general form of clas-
sical logics, and, on the other hand, with normal modal logics which have ac-
cessibility relations attached to them. As we will see in Section 2.4, this means 
that we will have multi-modal multi-arity logics for our classical case, and for 
the normal case we will simply have multi-modal, uni-arity logics. This will 
exclude from direct consideration a large class of logics for which the modal 
operators are multi-arity and additive in each coordinate (they distribute over 
'and'). At times we will compare our results to those existing in the literature 
for these additive systems yet we will not consider them as a direct component 
of our development. 
1.2 Thesis Outline 
This thesis is divided up so that the initial chapters set the scene and pin down 
our notation and basic theory. The later chapters each consider a result on 
canonicity within the two basic thrusts of canonicity for classical logics and 
cardinality considerations. In the middle of the thesis there is a chapter show-
ing that our approach for neighborhood canonicity can be unified with the 
normal approach for relational canonicity, at least as far as the Sahlqvist logics 
are concerned. Appendix A looks at some results on a particular classical logic 
that, while not solving that logic's canonicity problem, would be of interest to 
anyone attempting to do so. The other appendices are simply papers which 
were prepared during the period of my doctoral study and so are included 
here for completeness. 
We will look at each major chapter in turn: 
Basic Theory of Boolean Algebras and Intensional Logic 
In this chapter we will introduce most of the logical preliminaries that the 
rest of the work will assume, mostly, without reference . The chapter intro-
duces our basic logical language, it looks at particular logics to which we will 
occasionally refer, it will discuss the simplification from multi-arity modal op-
erators to uni-arity modal operators for our conception of normal logics, it 
B 
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will introduce the algebraic preliminaries such as boolean and intensional al-
gebras, and it will talk about ultrafilters, both in boolean algebras and over sets 
in general. Also, the chapter discusses the powerful mathematical technique 
of ultrapowers. 
Relational Semantics 
The standard relational semantics for normal modal logics are discussed. 
This leads to the introduction of the notions of canonicity and the chapter 
makes clear the history and exact statements of the two large questions which 
motivated this thesis. 
Neighborhood Semantics 
This chapter looks at the algebraic semantics for intensional logics and lo-
cates within this class a subclass based on powerset boolean algebras. It uses 
this to define a new semantics, which is then shown to be what is traditionally 
referred to as the neighborhood semantics. The chapter also goes on to dis-
cuss the nature of canonicity for these systems and the relationship between 
neighborhood and relational frames. 
Non-iterative Logics and Canonicity 
The question of the canonicity of EK is answered here in full generality: 
All non-iterative classical logics are shown to be canonical. This tells us that 
canonicity is natural, and does not depend on any accessibility relation that 
may be around, at least for these simple logics. We close that chapter by noting 
that we can find canonical frames for normal systems that are as far away from 
neighborhood equivalents of relational frames as we can care to imagine. 
Canonici ty £or Even Logics 
This chapter introduces a new class of logics. These are the even logics 
y\rhich generalise FINE's uniform normal logics and we show that all even log-
ics with the finite model property are canonical. Again, canonicity is shown to 
be in some sense natural for these logics. An exciting, yet perhaps disappoint-
ing conclusion of this work is that all uniform normal modal logics, and the 
McKinsey logic is among them, are neighborhood canonical. This is exciting 
because it is a counterpoint to the results of WANG (101] and GOLDBLATT (34] 
which show that relational strong completeness and canonicity do not hold, 
and it is disappointing because it shows that we cannot hope to say too much 
about relational canonicity by looking at neighborhood canonicity. 
Ultrafilter Semantics and Sahlqvist Logics 
The results on the McKinsey Axiom not withstanding, it would be nice if 
I 
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we could show that there is a relationship between canonicity proofs given for 
the classical logics and proofs given for more traditional normal modal logics, 
in particular the Sahlqvist logics. In this chapter we present a unifying ap-
proach to canonicity that can handle the classical and normal logics and can 
also, in the case of relational semantics, deal with their attendant accessibil-
ity relations. While the ultrafilter semantics technique developed here does 
not manage to go beyond the full swathe of logics that modern algebraic tech-
niques can manage, it does present yet another new way of looking at the 
canonicity question and it does this by relating it to the 'realisation in a model' 
approach familiar to logicians. 
A Non-standard Injection Between Canonical Frames 
This is the first of two chapters which take up the investigation of the re-
lationship between canonical frames formed over sets of propositional letters 
of different cardinalities. A new type of map, based on ultrafilters and closely 
aligned to the ultrafilter semantics of the previous chapter, is defined which, 
while not a frame homomorphism, relates canonical frames of different cardi-
nality. The chapter will devote some effort to showing that every point in the 
larger frame can be hit by an appropriate map from the smaller frame. It will 
also point out that this is sometimes the best we can hope for, yet for logics of 
bounded alternative we get a nice frame homomorphic relationship . 
Isomorphisms Between Canonical Frames 
The question of the relationship between canonical frames of different car-
dinalities could be refined to a question about the nature of isomorphisms and 
automorphisms that may exist between them. This chapter takes up this ques-
tion and manages to give a full answer for some particular logics and a few 
hints about what can happen in general. 
EK4: A Case Study 
This appendix looks at a problem left over from Chapter 5 of whether EK4 
is neighborhood canonical. While by the results of Chapter 6 it would follow 
if EK4 had the finite model property, this thesis cannot answer the canonicity 
question for EK4. This appendix details some of the results that I have been 
able to obtain that may be useful to anyone wishing to take up this question. 
1.3 Publication History 
As is increasingly the custom these days, the bulk of the contents of this thesis 
have appeared earlier. The chapters which introduce our logical preliminaries 
6 Introduction 
have, of course, not appeared before, however parts of them have been taken 
from the preliminaries sections of the papers which pre-released the later chap-
ters. 
Chapter 5 first appeared as an ARP technical report [84] and was later pre-
sented at the 1995 Australasian Association for Logic Conference held at the 
University of New England in Armadale, New South Wales, Australia (and 
it subsequently appeared as an abstract in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic [91]). 
After revisions which related the central proof to the wider area of logical en-
deavour, this paper was accepted for publication in the Journal of Philosophical 
Logic [93]. Due to the more discursive nature of this thesis a section high-
lighting the extent of the difference between the relational and neighborhood 
approach to canonicity was added in its appearance here. 
Chapter 6 contains the most recent of the papers which combine to form 
this thesis. It was completed recently when I made one final attempt to solve 
the problem of the canonicity of EK4. Even though the canonicity of EK4 is 
still open, the techniques developed here did lead to a solution dependent on 
EK4 having the finite model property. Also, it did solve a problem about the 
neighborhood canonicity of the McKinsey Logic which was left open by [93]. 
This paper has only appeared as an ARP technical report: [92]. 
Chapter 7 originally appeared spread out over two ARP technical reports, 
[88] and [87] where the first of these was a general discussion of the impor-
tance of neighborhood semantics and the problems around which this thesis is 
based. It provided an introduction to the conceptually interesting method of 
"Ultrafilter Semantics" and it showed how this method can be used to prove, 
in a unified way, both that very simple normal modal logics are canonical and 
that non-iterative classical logics are canonical. This paper was used as the 
basis of talks presented at the Australian National University, The University 
of Liege, and Uppsala University (all in October 1996). The second techni-
cal report [87] showed that ultrafilter semantics are able to handle a larger 
class of logics, namely the Sahlqvist logics, whose relational semantics are 
characterised by natural elementary conditions. Chapter 7 brings the proof of 
canonicity for non-iterative and Sahlqvist logics into the one document, mak-
ing their relationship clearer and also presents the work in the generality of 
multi-modal logics. Also, the chapter now includes a discussion of the ex-
isting literature that deals with the question of proving Sahlqvist's theorem 
without referring to the underlying accessibility relations. 
Chapter 8 first appeared as the technical report [86] and then appeared, 
without much modification, in the Journal of the Interest Group in Pure and Ap-
plied Logic [89]. In its incarnation in this thesis some results have been added 
on the implications of this work to the logics of bounded alternative (originally 
part of [90] , the predecessor of the next chapter, but more at home here). Also, 
§ 1.4 Ma thema ti cal Preliminaries 7 
Chapter 8 now presents the work for multi-modal operators. 
The technical report [90] was the predecessor of Chapter 9. Apart from the 
material on homomorphisms between canonical frames for logics of bounded 
alternative, which was moved to Chapter 8 and the change to multi-modal 
logics, this chapter essentially follows the form and substance of the origi-
nal technical report. This work was presented at the conference, Advances in 
Modal Logic '96 held at the Freie Universitat Berlin, October 8-10, 1996 and sub-
sequently appeared in the proceedings volume, [94]. 
Appendix A has not previously appeared. Since this work is only a cata-
logue of interesting results that may have bearing on the finite model prop-
erty/ canonicity question for EK4, it is unlikely to see print and is only pre-
sented here as an aid to any researchers who may want to take up this cause. 
Again this is to help answer a question first posed in [84] and later asked of 
a wide audience in the Symbolic Reasoning Systems Workshop III (appearing 
in its proceedings [85]). 
Appendices B, C, and D appeared as the technical reports [65], [95], and 
[80] respectively. Of these, only the last has been presented at the International 
Workshop on the Frontiers of Combining Systems in Munich and saw print in 
the proceedings' volume, [81]. 
1.4 Mathematical Preliminaries 
To appreciate the mathematical content of this work, the reader should have 
a solid understanding of the basics of ordinal and cardinal arithmetic and an 
appreciation of basic independence results. An excellent test is to see if you un-
derstand the statement: "'2w == 2w 1 " is independent of ZFC'. There is absolutely 
no requirement that the reader be able to derive this, or even understand the 
mathematics in which this can be derived. 
The reader should also have an understanding of basic modal logic with 
a thorough understanding of the production of canonical models and frames. 
There is no doubt that an advanced knowledge would be helpful, however no 
results are imported out of thin air that are beyond the very basic properties 
of canonical frames-at least not without explicit comment on what the result 
is and where it comes from. 
An excellent reference for basic modal logic is BRIAN CHELLAS' s book 
Modal Logic: An Introduction [13], and a good text for advanced mathemati-
cal modal logic is MARCUS KRACHT' s Tools and Techniques in Modal Logic [50]. 
ROBERT GOLDBLATT' s book Mathematics of Modality is a significant reference in 
this work, however all individual results from that work are separately cited. 
A very advanced survey of modern modal logic can be found in MICHAEL 
8 Introduction 
ZAKHARYASCHEV, FRANK WOLTER and ALEXANDER CHAGR0V's book Ad-
vanced Modal Logic [107]. 
Having completed the scholastic preliminaries to this thesis, we must now 
move on to the mathematical ones where we fully ground the theoretical in-
vestigations of this work. Let us start our mathematical work by fixing our 
metalanguage and metatheory. 
First we will naturally and without question use the full force of classi-
cal logic in our reasoning and all mathematical reasoning will be carried out 
within the domain of ZFC until the later part of this work when any extra-ZFC 
assumptions will be clearly noted. 
When dealing with simple sets we will try to use upper-case roman letters 
such as ./Y, Y, Z etc. If the sets are given some structure, such as algebras, we 
will use typographical conventions which will be laid out when we first en-
counter a new type of structure. We use E for the element relation and C for 
the subset relation. Ordinals will be denoted by a, {3,, etc., cardinals will be 
denoted by A,"" etc., and card (X) will be used to denote the cardinality of the 
set_)(. 
Fairly often, this work will refer to some results of elementary model the-
ory, and only in extreme cases will they be of sufficient significance or difficulty 
that they will warrant comment. We will represent first-order formulae with 
the emboldened greek symbols <.p , 'lj; , x etc., free variables will be represented 
by the same variables we use in our proofs (e.g. x 0 , ... , Xn-l or a 0 , ... , an-i 
which usually represent elements in a canonical frame, and elements in a 
boolean algebra respectively), and we will use a modified turnstyle relation 
symbol ~ to relate a model structure to the formulae it satisfies. Thus 
(A, I) ~ cp 
for <.p a first order formula, will mean that the structure (A, I) satisfies, in the 
first order sense, the first order formula <.p. 
In contrast to this, we have the more common (in this thesis) notion of sat-
isfaction F which will mean satisfaction with respect to intensional formulae. 
The first order formulae themselves are constructed in the usual way out 
of function and relation symbols together with the connectives /\ , V, •, H, 
-,, T, 1- and the quantifiers V, and 3. We play a trick of 'overloading', and 
these particular symbols will be overloaded to an almost universal degree with 
the connectives /\ , V, •, H, -,, T, 1- also used in intensional formulae, and 
as operations on boolean algebras. While the overloading here may appear 
excessive, their similar meanings make it natural and it is my expectation that 
this will significantly diminish confusion. 
We do make the exception of using different connectives in our meta-
I 
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language. While V and ~ will be overloaded to have meaning in our meta-
language, we will use ¢=:}, ===>, and, or, and not to represent our meta-logical 
notions of 'if and only if', 'implies', 'and', 'or', and 'not'. 
The presentation of this dissertation will follow the usual standards 
adopted by the American Mathematical Society-indeed, the standard to 
which this dissertation is typeset. Theorems, Lemmas, Definitions, Conjec-
tures, etc., will be distinguished in the text and, where relevant, proofs will 
follow immediately, initiated with the word 'Proof' and ended with the now 
standard delimiter •. In an effort to make proofs clearer, easy to follow, and 
for their structure to be transparent, we will highlight the part of a proof we 
are in by the following typographical conventions: 
• Claimlines: If we have a metalogical statement we wish to prove, we will 
often make it clear that this is our goal, underline it and then proceed to 
provide a proof of this statement. For example 
(V x, y , z E A) [ x == y and y == z ===> x == z]. 
Suppose that x , y, z E A, x == y, and y == z . Then x == y == z, so x == z . 
The indentation will indicate where a subproof begins and ends. 
• Claims: Sometimes the proof will be interrupted for a more major claim 
and these will be indicated as follows 
Claim: Statement of the claim. 
Proof of claim: 
Proof of the claim. End of proof of clai1n. 
Again, the typographical appearance will indicate the stage of the proof 
that we are in. 
• Cases: When a proof becomes case ridden it is necessary to indicate 
exactly which case is being considered. We do this by explicitly high-
lighting the statement of the case and then carrying out the discussion 
of that case within an indented environment making it clear where one 
case starts and the next one ends. Cases will have subcases and in one in-
stance it will have subsubcases. These will all be clearly marked and the 
level of indentation will make it clear to the reader which case a subcase 
belongs to and so the stage of the proof that we are in. For example: 
Case First case. 
Discussion of the first case 
Case Second case. 
Discussion of the second case which is broken up into two subcases: 
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Subcase First subcase 
Discussion of the first subcase for the second case. 
Subcase Second subcase 
Subsubcase . . . 
Subsubcase ... 
• Inductive Proofs: In all but the most simple of inductive proofs we will 
indicate clearly what stage of the inductive proof we are in and make it 
quite clear what the inductive hypothesis is. 
We will use a number of other conventions which, while widely used, are 
nowhere near universally adopted by practitioners of modern mathematics. 
These are: 
• Sequences of elements of any particular set will be denoted by x and 
we will always assume such a sequence to be finite. By x E _,,y we will 
mean that each of the terms in the sequence x resides within .,Y, however 
by x E .,\' we mean that xi E _,,y i for all i < length (x) . As is usual, 
if J : _,,y --t }/ and x E _,,y then we take f ( x) to be the sequence y 
where each Yi == J (xi)- Given two sequences x, y E X (not necessar-
ily of the same length), we will use x "' y to denote their concatenation 
(that is, the sequence (x0 , . .. , Xn-l , y0 , ... , Ym-i ) where n == length (x) and 
m == length (y) ). 
• If we have n elements in a set _,,y we will enumerate them as (xi I i < n ) 
and so our enumerations will always start at O and go to n - 1 for n the 
number of items. 
• For X a set we will use P ()() to represent the powerset of X, that is, the 
set of subsets of X. 
• To denote that a function J has domain vV and codomain Z we will write 
J : W --t Z. The set of all functions from W to Z will often be written 
{!: vV --t Z}, but sometimes also written w Z. If f E w Zand Y C W 
then we use f n/ to represent the restriction of f to Y. If a is an ordinal 
and Z is a set, we define <ex Z to be the set LJ { ,a Z I {3 < a }. 
• If J : .,\' --t Y and Z C X then J[Z ] == {J (x) I x E Z}, the image of Z 
under J, and if W c Y then 1- 1[vV] == {x E X I f (x) E vV} , the inverse 
image of W. 
,j· 
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• The notation':=' is shorthand for 'equal by definition' and we use it to 
define objects. For instance the statement 
"We prove that m := 2n + 1 is odd." 
can be read as 
"Let m = 2n + 1. We prove that m is odd." 

Chapter 2 
Intensional Logics and Algebras 
2.1 Introduction 
Before we immerse ourselves in the difficult problems of canonicity let us 
pause to review the basic theory of intensional logics, their algebraic model 
structures, and other essential results of mathematics that we exploit in this 
thesis. This will enable us to pin down our definitions and provide a consis-
tent approach throughout the whole work. Also, the reader should be given a 
greater sense of where the specialist area of this work departs from the stan-
dard theoretical core of intensional logic. 
2.2 Propositional Logics and Tautologies 
At its most basic level, this work concerns itself with propositional calculi 
which we consider, after Hilbert, to be constructed out of well formed for-
mulae. Well formed formulae are strings over an alphabet of connectives ( of 
various arity) and primitive elements which we will call propositional vari-
ables. 
Before we make these concepts exact, let us take a moment to explain the 
approach we take to propositional variables. In most work on propositional 
logics, the set P of propositional variables is held fixed as a ( usually denumer-
able) collection of sets so that when they are adjoined into strings using the 
connectives, no possible confusion will result. Since one of our principle foci 
of investigation will be how particular structures for the logic change when 
we admit P of different cardinalities, we must be a little more precise. So 
throughout this work we will take propositional letters to be ordinals and if 
P is just given as a "set of propositional variables" we will take this to mean 
that P C ORD-the class of all ordinals. In particular, this will allow us to 
immediately talk about a language over a where a is any ordinal-remember 
that an ordinal is itself a set of ordinals-and we will often take such an a to 
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be a cardinal. 
Whenever not constrained otherwise, we will always take P to be a set of 
propositional variables. An element of P will usually be denoted by p, q, r, ... 
or q0 , q1 , q2 , .... Sometimes we may wish to identify each a E P with a nota-
tional variant Po: E P which we take to be indistinguishable from a . We make 
the notational distinction in the hope of avoiding confusion when the ordinal 
nature of propositional variables is irrelevant to our discussion. We will re-
serve the right to denote the element Po: E P by a whenever this seems more 
suggestive. 
In a similar manner we must constrain the notion of connective. We will 
require a set of connectives to include a few basic ones and beyond that we 
will not be concerned about their exact number and make up. 
Unless otherwise restricted, we take our set of connectives to be: 
Cnct = {/\, V, •, H , , , T, _L} U {• iii E Idx}. 
We do demand that our set of connectives is chosen to ensure that no non-
empty string1 over the alphabet Pu Cnct will end up back in P u Cnct. 2 
In addition to this, we will assume that each set of connectives carries with 
it a function which assigns to each C E Cnct a natural number arity ( C) rep-
resenting the arity of the connective C. Moreover, we shall require that the 
arity function gives unsurprising values to the boolean connectives /\ , V, •, 
H, ,, T, _l, namely 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 0, 0 respectively. Whenever appropriate and 
when there is no confusion we shall denote arity (Di) by ni. 
We are now able to define the set of all well formed formulae over the 
connectives Cnct and the propositional variables P. 
Definition 2.1. S (Cnct , P) is the smallest set satisfying the following condi-
tions: 
1. P C S (Cnct, P), and 
2. if cp, .. . , cpn-l E S ( Cnct , P) and C E Cnct with arity ( C) = n then 
(C, cpo, ... , cpn-1) E S (Cnct , P). 
When the set Cnct of connectives is constrained by context we will omit 
reference to it and write S (P) for S (Cnct, P ). 
1 We take a string over an alphabet ~ to simply be a finite sequence over ~- That is, the 
strings over ~ are precisely <w ~-
21£ we did not have this restriction we might end up in the embarrasing situation where 
the 'formula' p /\ q is indistinguishable from the propositional variable r. This would cause no 
end of confusion. 
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Here we will usually write Di ( ipo, ... , IPn- 1) ( or Di ( cp ) ) , ipo H 1P1, • ipo, 
etc., instead of the more cumbersome (Di , ipo, ... , IPn-1 ), (+--+ , ipo, 1P1), (· , cpo), 
etc. By cp • 'ljJ ( cp I\ 'ljJ , etc.), we will mean the sequence of formulae con-
structed by applying the connectives componentwise. That is, the sequence of 
formulae ( ipo • 'l/Jo, ... , IPn-1 • 'l/Jn-1) ( ( ipo I\ 'l/Jo, ... , IPn-1 I\ 'l/Jn-1), etc.) where 
n == dom ( cp) == dom ( 'ljJ ). Also, for unary or nullary connectives we will drop 
the brackets where unambiguous, as we will for boolean combinations where 
we assume each Di and , bind more strongly than /\ and V, and that these in 
turn bind more strongly than • and H. 
The set S (P) is called a language and its elements are called well formed 
formulae or simply formulae. Unless otherwise specified we will take cp, 'l/;, x to 
be such intensional formulae. 
In a usual way, we are able to import the notion of a subformula cp of a 
formula 'l/; , which we will write as cp < subf 'lj) , and so we also have the notion of 
recursive definitions over formulae. 
Since any well formed formula defines how its component propositional 
variables are linked up, we can define a substitution in the usual way: 
Definition 2.2. Given two sets of propositional variables P and Q we say that 
a is a substitution if a: P ~ S (Q). We can extend a to ci : S (P ) ---+ S (Q) in 
a unique way that respects connectives by requiring that 
l. ci(p) == a(p) for p E P, and 
2. ci (C (cp)) == C (& (cp)) for CE Cnct. 
Since this extension is unique, we will suppress the """". If cp E S ( P ), 
'l/; E S ( Q) and cp == a( 'ljJ ) we say that cp is a substitution instance of 'lj) . 
Unless otherwise constrained, we will take a, T to be substitutions and, of-
ten but not exclusively, we will write 'l/;a for a( 'ljJ ). Given that we wish a sub-
stitution a to satisfy a(qj) == ip j for j < n we will take [qo/ lPo, . . . , qn-1/cpn-d 
to represent the substitution defined as above for p == qj and by a(p) == p for 
p -:j::. ql, · · · ,qn. 
Each formula has a depth of nesting of intensional connectives and we 
will find it very useful to look at classes of formulae that have bounds on this 
depth: 
Definition 2.3. We define depth ( cp ), the depth of a formula cp E S (P ), as follows: 
dept h (p) == 0 for p E P , 
depth ( cp I\ 'ljJ ) == max ( { depth ( cp) , depth ( 'l/;) } ) , etc., and 
depth (Diep) == 1 + max ( { depth ( IPj) \ j < length ( cp)}). 
16 Intensional Logics and Algebras 
Definition 2.4. For P a set of propositional letters and n E w we define Sn ( P), 
the collection of formulae of intensional depth at most n over P, as follows: 
Sn ( P) = { cp E S ( P) I depth ( cp) ~ n} . 
Having fixed our language we are able to introduce the concept of a the-
ory and the notion of a logic itself. Again, we must exercise some care. Most 
authors define a logic as being a specialised type of subset of a fixed language 
S ( P) but we need to be more specific as we wish a logic to be an object which 
captures deductive essence without making a commitment to a particular lan-
guage. 
We do not have this restriction with a theory as it does not necessarily ex-
hibit uniformity, so we can get its definition out of the way. 
Definition 2.5. A theory over S ( P) is a set T C S ( P) which is closed under 
modus ponens, i.e., if cp and cp -+ 'ljJ E T then 'ljJ E T. 
A logic is a special type of theory, however. As it does not exist with respect 
to a particular set P, two options present themselves. The first is that we define 
a logic as a proper subclass of the class of all well formed formulae over all the 
ordinals, but this is unsatisfying as it shifts a logic to somewhere outside the 
immediate domain of our set theoretic machinery, so we will adopt the second 
approach of defining a logic with respect to a specified set, which we choose 
to be w. Since a propositional letter in w could represent any arbitrary propo-
sitional letter in ORD, and since logics view propositional letters as stand-ins 
for arbitrary formulae, we take a logic to be closed under substitution. 
Definition 2.6. A logic is a theory L over S ( w) which is closed under substi-
tution, i.e., if cp E Land a : w ---+ S (w) then cpa E L. For any P C ORD, and 
cp E S (P) we say~ L cp iff there is a a : P ---+ w, one-one on the variables in cp, 
such that cpa E L. Any formula cp which satisfies~ L cp is said to be a theorem or 
thesis of L. 
Where convenient we will often write " cp EL" when cp ES (P) -S (w ) and 
~ L cp . The context of such an expression will clarify the interpretation of" E." 
Given this definition, we get the usual definitions of a consistent set of 
formulae, and a maximal consistent set of formulae-which, of course, will be 
maximal with respect to a particular S ( P). Also, let L( P), for L a logic, be the 
set { cp ES (P) I ~ L cp }. 
Definition 2.7. If a theory Tin the language S (P) includes L(P) then it is said 
to be an L-theory. 
With very little work, we are now able to acquire the standard definitions 
of inference rules and axiomatisations. 
' 
111 
I•· 
§2.2 Propositional Logics and Tautologies 17 
Definition 2.8. An inference rule is a set R C S (n+ 1w) . 
The rule of modus ponens, { (p, p--+ q, q)} is so central that by definition we 
require that all logics satisfy it. 
Definition 2.9. Let Ax C S (w) and Rules a collection of inference rules, then 
the logic axiomatised by Ax over Rules is the smallest set L c S (w) such that 
l. Ax CL, 
2. (Vcp E L , CJ : w ---+ S (w)) [cp<7 E L], 
3. (Vn < w) (V (cpo, ... , (f)n) E LJ Rules ) (VCJ: w---+ S (w)) 
[(Vj < n) [cpjCJ E L] ===> (f)nCJ E L], and 
4. (V cp, 1/J E S ( w)) [ cp, cp --+ 1/J E L ===> 1/J E L ]. 
Of course, we can then import the usual notions and machinery of proof 
theory. Also, expressions such as "L is recursively axiomatisable" and "L is 
recursive", now take on their usual meaning. 
We can then introduce, in the usual way, the set Taut of all tautologies over 
S (w) which, we know, is itself a logic and has a recursive set of axioms (over 
no rules). So if Ax is the result of joining a recursive set with Taut we end up 
with a logic which is recursively axiomatisable. 
Note that Taut, like S (w ), is dependent on our choice of Cnct, and repre-
sents all truth functional tautologies over the set S (w) where /\ , V, --+, H, -,, T, 
_l_ are taken to have their standard truth functional meaning. 
We will tacitly assume that Taut is present in all of our axiomatisations. 
Definition 2.10. A logic is equivalential iff it is closed under the following rule 
(replacement by provable equivalents): 
If w[q/cpo] E Land (f)o H (() 1 E L then ?J; [q/cp1] E L. 
This is a central condition in our logical investigation so we will require 
that every logic satisfy it. Fortunately it has a nicer form which we refer to as 
' the equivalence rule'. 
Theorem 2.11. A logic is equivalential if! for each i E Idx it is closed under the 
equivalence rule: 
(.Po H Xo, ... '(f)ni -l H Xn,-l, Diep H Dix)' 
·where 0, x E S (w ). 
Proof We prove the if and only if parts separately. 
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(===;>) We prove that each component can be replaced by its equivalent and 
then induction will give that all components can be replaced. Let i E Idx 
and let 
1P = Di (q, cp1, • • •, cpni- 1) H Di (cpo, cpl, ··· , cpni- 1) · 
Then 'l/;[ q / cp0 ] is a trivial equivalence so it is in L. Thus by the equivalen-
tial property 
'l/J[q/xo] = Di (xo, cpl, ··· , cpni -1) H Di (cpo, cpl, ··· , cpni-1) EL. 
({==) We prove the following by induction on the complexity of 'l/; , which will 
give our result. 
cpo H cp1 EL===;> 'l/J [q/ cpo ] H 'l/J[q/cp1] . 
The base case of this induction is immediate. The Inductive Hypothesis 
is that the result holds for all 'l/J ' <subf 'ljJ and all cp0 , cp1, and q. Th~ boolean 
cases are equally easy. This leaves the intensional case: 'ljJ = Di'l/J '. Now 
(Vj < ni) ['l/J;[q/cpo] H 'l/J;[q/cp1]] E L 
by the inductive hypothesis, so the result holds by the hypothesis of the 
theorem. 
D 
We will refer to such logics as intensional logics, a term which comes from the 
reference to the Di as intensional operators, and the language as an intensional 
language. 
We will take all logics of this work to be equivalential (or "classical" as they 
are sometimes known), to contain Taut,3 and we will take modus ponens and 
replacement by provable equivalents as our only rules of inference. 
2.3 Particular Logics 
Now that we have the notion of a logic we should look at some of the par-
ticular logics that are discussed in this thesis. This will set a backdrop for the 
investigation of this work. Firstly the particular logics discussed in this section 
will all be modal logics which we will take to mean that they are equivalential, 
Idx has cardinality 1, and that Di = D is a unary operator with its dual, -,•-,, 
written as O. 
3If a logic is axiomatised then the inclusion of Taut in the axiom list is tacitly assumed. 
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The common logics that we will deal with are built up out of collections 
of axioms. Before we start adding axioms together, it is helpful to have an 
identifying list of these axioms together with their designators (a bold letter or 
string of letters to act as a shorthand for the axiom); see Table 2.1. 
When naming a logic constructed from these axioms we simply provide a 
string of designators for the included axioms starting with E which represents 
the fact that it includes all the tautologies and that it is closed under modus 
ponens and the equivalence rule. Thus ENKT4 is the equivalential logic with 
axioms • T, D(p -+ q) -+ (• p -+ • q), • p -+ p, • p -+ •• p and represents the 
system more commonly referred to as S4. The logics we form will be analysed 
with respect to two classes which we tend to deal with individually. 
It should be noted here that we could extend our analysis to include logics 
which are defined using different rules (for example, rule forms of the axiomst 
however we will restrict ourselves to axiomatisations /logics which have as 
their only rules, modus ponens and the equivalence rule. 
All the logics here are known as classical logics, and the simplest classical 
system is the logic E which is axiomatised by the (classical) tautologies only 
hence the name. 
A logic which extends ENK is said to be normal and the designators for 
such logics will start with K and omit E and N. Thus KT45 represents the 
sys tem ENKT45 which is more commonly known as S5. 
This thesis will concern itself with either unrestricted classical logics or the 
smaller class of normal modal logics. 
We ·will not directly consider logics ·which include N but lack K. 
2.4 For Us Normal Logics Are Effectively Unary 
Due to the character of the results in the last two chapters of this thesis vve 
will take a rather restricted view of normal modal logics. We could continue 
our analysis of intensional operators in their greatest generality even when 
looking at logics which turn out to be based on accessibility relations, however, 
as most of normal modal logic is carried out with intensional operators of arity 
one-± and since the geometric arguments of chapters 8 and 9 will be severely 
obscured by multi-arity considerations, we wilt likewise, restrict our normal 
modal logics to only have operators of arity one. 
To create a clear demarcation line between the logics which we consider to 
be normal and those which v,.,re consider non-normat we will define normal-
itv for logics for arbitrary arity. From this specialised definition we will then 
4See, e.g. , KRACHT' S [50] for an example of a recent surv ey of modal logic based on pol "-
modal svsterns whose operators are of aritv one. 
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Designator Axiom 
M • (p /\ q) -t (• p /\ • q) 
C (Op/\ • q) -+ • (p /\ q) 
R • (p /\ q) f-+ ( • p /\ • q) 
K • (p -t q) -t (• p -t • q) 
N OT 
D • p-+ • P 
T • p-+ p 
B P-+ • Op 
4 • p -t •• p 
-
5 • P-+ D• p 
McK • Op-+ • Op 
Table 2.1: Some common axioms and their designators 
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demonstrate that these logics have intensional operators which can be decom-
posed into new operators of arity one; that is we will show that these logics are 
11 effectively unary. 11 So in subsequent chapters1 by taking a logic to be normat 
we will be tacitly assuming that its operators are all of arity one. 
Definition 2.12. A logic L is normal iff for all i E Idx1 
1. Di (p • q) • (Dip • Diq) E Land 
2. DiT EL. 
where p = \Po, ... ,Pni-1) 1 q = (qo , ... , qni-1) 1 and T = (T, ... , T). 
Again we must stress that this is not the standard definition that will be 
found in the literature. For instance, if we translate the definitions used in 
JONSSON and TARSK(s [44] to our setting, we would define a logic L to be 
normal iff L includes the following formulae 1 for each j < arity (Di) , r 0 , r1 E 
S (w) , length (r 0 ) = j, length (ri) = arity (Di) - j - 1: 
1. Di(ro"' ((p • q) ) "' ri) • (Di(r0"' (p) "'ri) • Di(r 0"' (q) "' ri)) and 
2. Di(ro"' (T ) "'r1), 
This different view of normality would require that the axiom K 'holds in each 
component' rather than 'uniformly'. While this approach is much more gen-
eral and even though it allows for the extensive and sensitive analysis given 
in [ 44t it does lumber us with a difficult and largely unfamiliar relational se-
mantics and so this thesis will choose the path of avoiding the complications 
of true generality. 
We will now close this section by showing how our limited and perhaps 
peculiar notion of normality lead-s to connectives which are essentially unary. 
Theorem 2.13. Di (p I\ q) H Dip/\ Diq is in any normal logic L. 
Proof First note that (p/\q • p) HT EL so by the equivalence rule Di(p /\q • 
p) H DiT EL. Thus Di(p/\q • p) EL. Henceby(l)aboveDi(p/\q) • Dip EL. 
An analogous argument will then give us that Di(P /\ q) • Diq E L, giving 
Di(P I\ q) • Dip I\ Diq E L. 
Now, (p • (q • p I\ q)) H T E L which allows us to conclude, 
(through a derivation sequence which can be summarised as: an applica-
tion of the equivalence rule, (2t Modus Ponens, (1), and propositional logic 
twice) that Dip • (Diq • Di(P /\ q)) E L . But this is just equivalent to 
Dip I\ Diq • Di(P I\ q) E L. This gives us the theorem. D 
Definition 2.14. The set of connectives Cnct is said to be unary iff each Di E 
Cnct is unary. 
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Definition 2.15. Given Idx the index set of Cnct a set of connectives, we set 
their unarisations to be 
Idxu = { (i, j) / i E Idx , j < ni} and 
Cnctu = {D(i,j ) / (i, j) E Idxu} 
respectively. We choose each D(i,j) to be a new connective distinct from any 
already in Cnct and we take n(i,j ) = 1, i.e., each D(i,j ) is a unary connective. 
Definition 2.16. Given Cnct a set of connectives define the translation operator 
tru: S (Cnc t, ORD) ---t S (Cnctu, ORD) by 
trup = p, 
tru ( cp I\ 1/J ) = tru cp I\ tru 1/J, etc., and 
tru (Diep) = D (i,O) tru cpo I\ ··· I\ D (i,n;-1) tru cpni-1· 
Definition 2.17. Given a logic Lover S (Cnct , w) define Lu, the unarisation of 
L to be the logic with axioms { tru cp/cp E L} U Tautu. Here we take Tautu to be 
the set of tautologies in S ( Cnctu , w). 
Theorem 2.18. Let L be a logic over S ( Cnct , w) . 
1. L is a normal logic only if Lu is. 
2. If Lis a normal logic axiomatized by Ax (which includes the normality axioms) 
then Lu is axiomatised by tru[Ax] and 
(\/cp ES (Cnct, w)) [cp EL<===> tru cp E Lu]. 
Proof We prove (1) and (2) separately. 
(1) Suppose that L is a normal logic. Now, Lu is an equivalential logic so it 
just remains to show the following: 
D (i,j ) T E Lu for all (i, j) E Idxu. 
Let i E Idx, thus Di (T) E L. Hence tru (Di (T)) = /\j <ni D (i,j) T E 
Lu so (\/j < ni) [D(i,j) T E Lu]. 
D(i,j) (p • q) • (D(i,j)P • D(i,j) Q) E Lu for all ( i, j) E Idxu. 
Let (i, j 0 ) E Idxu. Let p = (T , ... , p, ... , T), pin the j 0 th coordinate. 
Let q = (T, ... , q, ... , T), q in the j 0 th coordinate. Thus Di (p • q) • 
j 
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(Dip -+ • iq) E L. So its uniform translation must be in. Lu-, that is, 
(\ • (i,j) (T -+ T) /\ • (i,jo) (p -+ q) I\ (\ • (i,j) T /\ • (i,jo) P 
j<ni,J-:P]O j<ni,jfjo 
-+ (\ • (i,j) T /\ • (i,jo)q E Lu. 
j<ni,j fj o 
Smee • (i,j)(T -+ T) and • (i,j) T are both in. Lu we have that 
D (i,jo) (p-+ q) I\ • (i,jo) P -+ • (i,jo) q as required. 
(2) Suppose that L is a normal logic axiomatised by Ax (which in.elude the 
normality axioms). We wish to show that if <p 1 , ... , cpk is a proof sequence 
for L over Ax then tru <po, ... , tru Vk - l is a proof sequence over tru(Ax) . 
We proceed by induction on the length k . Suppose the above result holds 
fork and suppose cp0 , ... , vk-l i cpk is a proof sequence over tru (Ax). The 
formula f..Pk can be in. the proof sequence for a number of possible reasons, 
and we examine each reason separately: 
Case 0k is an axiom. 
Then tru 0k E tru fAx] and we are done. 
Case 0k is a substitution instance of vk 1 • 
But tru (cpk' a ) = tru ("-Pk') o a1 where a1(p) == tru (a (p)) and we are 
done . 
Case (J)k arises from cpk' = Yk'' -+ '-Pk · 
Thus tru ( <f'k) arises from tru (<-Pk') == tru ( cpk") -+ tru (<-Pk). 
Case (J)k = • i (;;; H x) and uj H Xj == <-Pkj , kj < k, for all j < ni. 
Thus tru ( cpki) = tru ( Uj) H tru (Xj) and so 
tru ( -Pk) = Di ( tru (v;) H tru (x) ) . 
This establishes that any valid proof sequence for L can be translated into an-
other valid proof sequence for Lu. • 
OJUr conclusion from all this is that we can define operators of arity greater 
than one within systems consisting of operators of arity one. 
So,, from now on assume that by requiring a logic to be normal we are also 
requiring all its intensional operators to be unary. 
2.5 Boolean Algebras 
e now move tovvards the first type of semantics for our logics. We start by 
looking at boolean algebras 1rvhich are the logical semantics for the proposi-
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tional calculus. Formally: 
Definition 2.19. A boolean algebra is a structure A = (A, I\, V, -, , T , 1-) where 
A is a set, /\, V are binary operations on A, -, is a unary operation on A, and 
T, 1- E A. Further, the operations and constants satisfy the following algebraic 
laws: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
XI\ X = X, 
XI\ y = y I\ X , 
xi\ (yl\z) = (xl\y) l\z, 
X (\ (x Vy) = XV (x /\ y) = x , 
X I\ (y V Z) = ( X I\ y) V ( X I\ Z) , 
X (\ -,x = l_, X V -,x = T / 
-,(x I\ y) = -,x V -,y, and 
XV X = x , 
x Vy = y V x , 
X V (y V z) = ( X V y) V z I 
xv (yl\z) = (xvy) I\ (xv z ), 
-,-,X = X , 
-, ( X V y) = -,x I\ -,y. 
Again, we should emphasise that we are overloading the symbols /\ , V, -,, 
T, and 1- to have meaning both as connectives in our language and as opera-
tors in boolean algebras. We will even go further and suppose that --+ and H 
also have direct meanings in boolean algebras. We will indicate that an object 
is a boolean algebra by placing an underscore,-' underneath it. Thus A is a 
boolean algebra with an underlying set A and boolean operations which we 
represent by /\ , V, -,, T, and 1-. 
Each boolean algebra has a natural partial order on it which is induced by 
the boolean operations: 
Definition 2.20. For a boolean algebra £!J we define :::; and ?:- , relations on A, 
as follows: 
a :::; b ¢==} a I\ b = a and a ?:- b ¢==} a V b = a. 
Again, we are overloading, and we use context to tell us whether :::; rep-
resents a numerical or a boolean algebraic comparison. Also, context will 
always make it clear which boolean algebra the :::; comes from. Note that 
a :::; b ¢==} -, b :::; -, a and a :::; b ¢==} b ?:- a. 
Definition 2.21. Given a set X, we define the powerset algebra of )(_ to be the 
boolean algebra · 
P (X) = (P (X), n, u, 1'/ , X, 0) 
where n, u, and 1'/ are intersection, union, and ..1Y-complementation5 respec-
tively. 
A boolean algebra A is called a powerset boolean algebra iff it is isomorphic 
to P (_;Y) for some set X. 
5For Y E P (.,\'"), the X-comp lement, or simply complement, of Y is the se t "'} 
{ X E .X I X rt }·'" }. 
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To avoid clutter, we will often not use rv to represent complementation, but 
rather we overload , to take its place, and again, we rely on context to tell us 
its meaning. 
One particular boolean algebra that we will deal with is the two element 
boolean algebra 2. 
Definition 2.22. The two element boolean algebra 2 is the algebra 
( {T, _l_}, /\, V, ,, T, _1_) 
where for all x, y E {T , J_} x I\ y = T ¢::=? x = y = T, x Vy = J_ ¢::=? x = y = _1_, 
and ,x = T ¢::=? x = J__ 
If we think of 2 = {O, 1} as being the underlying set then T = 1, J_ = 0. 
There are certain elements which are of special interest in a boolean algebra 
and these are the elements which behave like singleton sets. Formally: 
Definition 2.23. Let A be a boolean algebra. Then an atom of A is an element 
a E A. which satisfies: 
(\/ b E A ) [ b < a ====} b = J_] . 
The collection of all atoms in A is denoted by At A. 
So in P ( .. ~) each element {x}, for x E ./Y, is an atom because the only way 
to reduce the size of { x} is to make it empty and the atoms are only of this form 
since a set of size greater than one can be made non-trivially smaller. Hence){ 
can be put in one-one correspondence with At P (_\ ). 
A comprehensive reference for the study of boolean algebras are the books 
in the Handbook of Boolean Algebras series which starts with [ 48]. 
2.6 Ultrafilters 
Boolean algebras have associated with them the concept of ultrafilters-
mathematical objects which are almost ubiquitous in this thesis. 
Take A= (A,/\, V, , , T , _1_) to be a fixed boolean algebra. 
Definition 2.24. A filter in A is a set V C A such that for all a , b E A, 
1. a,bE V====}a /\ bEV,and 
2. a E V and a ~ b ====? b E V. 
A filter V in A is called a proper filter iff V # A. 
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Then there are special types of filters called ultrafilters. 
Definition 2.25. A proper filter V C A is called an ultrafilter in ~4 iff 
V £: A and (Va E A) [ a E V or -,a E V] . 
Proposition 2.26. A filter V in A is an ultrafilter if! 
1. it is prime, i.e., if a Vb E V then a E V orb E V, and 
2. T E V, 1- rf_ V. 
In order to use ultrafilters we need to be able to generate them, and the 
following condition is useful in this endeavour. 
Definition 2.27. A set I: C A is said to have the finite meet property iff 
(V n < w) (V ao , ... , an- 1 E I:) [ ao /\ · · · /\ an-1 # 1-] . 
Proposition 2.28. If a set I: C A has the finite 1neet property then there is an ultra-
filter V => I:. 
This gives us a means of constructing ultrafilters: We start with a set that 
has most of the properties we need and show that it can be extended to an 
ultrafilter by showing that it has the finite meet property. 
When we are just dealing with the term algebra for our logical systems-
that is the set S (P) for some set P-we do not have ultrafilters but we have 
their natural analogs: 
Definition 2.29. Let L be a logic. A set x C S (P) is called maximal L-consistent 
(with respect to S (P)) iff it satisfies: 
1. The set x is an L-theory, and 
2. for all cp E S ( Pt either cp E x or --, cp E x . 
In Section 2.7 it will become obvious that these maximal consistent sets 
actually correspond to ultrafilters in the Lindenbaum or canonical algebra. 
Ultrafilters are more commonly seen in their set theoretic rather than alge-
braic setting. 
Definition 2.30. By an ultrafilter over a set Y we mean an ultrafilter in the 
boolean algebra P (Y) == (P (Y) , n , u, ""' , Y, 0 ). 
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We use caligraphic uppercase characters (we choose characters around 'U' 
in the alphabet) to denote this kind of ultrafilter. There will be an ultrafilter 
extending any set D C P ()() iff D has the finite intersection property (fip) 
which is the powerset algebra analog of the finite meet property. 
Suppose that we have an ultrafilter U on a set }r and suppose that Pr(y) is 
some property of elements of ·v. We then write 
Pr(y) U a.e. 
to denote that the set {y E Y I Pr (y)} is actually in U, and this is read as" Pr(y) 
holds U almost everywhere. " We often leave out mention of the U if it is 
fixed or unambiguous. The following results follow directly from the ultra-
filter properties. 
Proposition 2.31. Suppose that rr is a set, that U is an ultrafilter on 1 r, and suppose 
that Pr0 , ... , Pr n- i are properties that can be assigned to elements of }/ , then the 
following hold. 
1. not [Pr1(Y) U a.e.] ¢==} [not Pr1(y)] U a.e., 
2. [Pro(Y) or··· or Prn_ 1(y )] U a.e. ¢==} (3i < n) [Pri(Y) U a.e. ], and 
3. If [Pro (Y) ===} Pr1(Y)] U a.e. and [Pr0 (y) U a.e. ] then [P , 1 (y) U a.e. ]. 
We will make use of these properties throughout this work. 
2.7 Stone Spaces 
STONE proved that every boolean algebra, while not necessarily a powerset 
boolean algebra, can be thought of as a subalgebra of a powerset boolean al-
gebra over the space of ultrafilters. 
Definition 2.32. Let A be a boolean algebra. We define the collection of ultra-
filters to be 
ult (A) == { u C .A. I u is an ultrafilter in A} . 
While we use ult to identify the ultrafilters over a boolean algebra we will 
keep this operator conceptually different from the one that induces the topo-
logical space of ultrafilters: 
Definition 2.33. The Stone space of a boolean algebra A. is the space ):_-l 
ult (.--1. ) together with the topology which has as an open basis: 
{ll al l I a EA} where ll all == {x E _,yA I a E x}. 
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The study of Stone spaces can get quite involved, as a quick glance through 
the book Stone Spaces [41] will reveal. However, we will restrict ourselves to 
some basic properties of the Stone space: 
Proposition 2.34. The Stone space of a boolean algebra A is a totally separated com-
pact space. 
Totally separated means that any two distinct points are each contained in 
different members of a disjoint pair of open sets whose union is the whole 
space. 
Any element llall of the basis of the Stone space is both open and closed6 
(because its complement is, llall = 11,all which is in the open basis) and such 
elements of a topological space are called clopen. The basis elements are, in 
fact, the only sets that are clopen. 
Proposition 2.35. A subset ·v of .. XA, the Stone space of the boolean algebra A, is 
clopen if! it is of the Jann llall for some a E A. 
Proof The set rr is open so it is the union of a collection of basic open sets. Say 
1-"r = UaEE llall for some set E C A. Since ·v is also closed, it is a closed subset 
of a compact space and hence compact. This means that there is an n E w and 
a collection {aj I j < n} C E such that Y = llaoll U · · · U llan-ill - This tells us 
that 
}/ = I I ao V · · · V an- 1 11 
as desired. • 
We do not often overtly use these properties, rather we mostly see their 
expression through the behaviour of the underlying boolean algebra, or, more 
commonly in this investigation, the underlying canonical space. 
Definition 2.36. Let L be a logic and Pa set of propositional letters. We define 
the canonical space of L over P to be the set 
Xfe = {x C S (P) Ix is maximal L-consistent in P} 
together with the topology which has an open basis 
{ ll<t?II~ I rp E S (P)}, where ll<t?II~ = { x EX* I rp Ex}. 
Where unambiguous we will drop either or both of the superscript L or 
subscript P. 
This is essentially a Stone space, as it is isomorphic to the Stone space for 
the Lindenbaum algebra of L and so Proposition 2.34 will apply to it also. 
6 A set is closed if£ its complement is open. 
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Proposition 2.37. Suppose that card (P) = K ? max ( {w, card (Idx )} ). Then the 
cardinality of _)C fe , for a consistent logic L, is 2K. 
Proof By simple cardinal arithmetic we have that 
card (S (P)) = max ( {w, card (Idx ), K} ) = K . 
Since each x E )(fe is a subset of S (P) we can conclude that card (.;\ fe ) ~ 2K . 
For the reverse inequality note that every .6. c P gives rise to a set ~( .6. ) C 
S ( P) defined by 
~ (.6) = .6 u { ,p I p E p - .6} 
which is L-consistent because Lis itself consistent. The set ~ (.6. ) can in turn 
be expanded into a maximal L-consistent set y(.6. ). The y : P (P ) --+ )( fe so 
defined is then a one-one function and hence 2K ~ card ( )( fe) as desired . • 
We do not directly introduce the traditional notion of a Lindenbaum alge-
bra here but rather introduce it as an object constructed out of the canonical 
space; due to Stone's theorem, this algebra is isomorphic to the algebra ob-
tained through traditional means. 
Definition 2.38. The Lindenbaum boolean algebra of Lis A~, the boolean algebra 
which has an underlying set {Jlcpll ~ lcp E S (P )} and is considered as a boolean 
sub-algebra of the canonical boolean algebra for L over P, B ~ = P ( .,\ fe) . 
Each x E )( fe corresponds directly to a member of ult ( ~-1.~) via the maps 
0
: XL--+ ult (il~) and its inverse*: ult (A~) --+ )(_L, where for x E )( fe and 
u E ult (A.~), 
x
0 = { llcpll I cp E x } and 
u* = { <p I llcpll E u} . 
On the canonical space for L we have closed sets which are defined, as 
usual, to be complements of open sets. Since open sets are the unions of basic 
open sets and since the complement of a basic open set is also basic open we 
get the following result: 
Proposition 2.39. A set is closed in Xfe if! there is a~ C S (P ) such that the closed 
set is of the Jann 
·where~ c S (P ). 
11 ~11 ~ = n { 11'P11~ 1 y E ~ } 
n llcpll~ 
E~ 
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Each set IIEII~ can be thought of as representing the theory generated by E 
since the set 
{ 1P ES (P) I (Vx E Xfe) [x E 11~11;, =? 1P Ex]} 
is actually { 1j; I E f- L 1jJ }. So the closed sets in _)( fe are, in effect, the theories of 
L. 
2.8 Intensional Algebras 
We now turn to the full notion of algebraic semantics for intensional logics. 
Again, let us assume that Cnct has already been given. 
Definition 2.40. By an S-algebra, we mean a structure of the form A = (.A., I ) 
where A is a boolean algebra and I = (Ii Ii E Idx ) is a sequence of operators on 
A with arity (Ii ) = arity (Di) for each i E Idx. 
We will use A , B , C, ... to represent S-algebras, A, B , C, ... for their 
boolean substructures, and A , B , C, ... for their underlying set. 
In the event that Idx consists of one element we will write I for I in the hope 
of keeping our notation uniform. Each of the Ii is referred to as an interior, and 
has a dual, r, referred to as a closure, defined by r (a) = --,I (-,a). Please note 
V 
that these interiors Ii and closures Ii are distinct from the interiors and closures 
induced by the Stone topologies. 
We will use lowercase roman a, b, c, . . . to represent elements of an S-
algebra. 
These structures are sometimes called expanded boolean algebras (see 
MARCUS KRACHT's [50, p. 46]). Some specialised forms of these algebras are 
called boolean algebras with operators [44] and other special forms are called 
cylindric algebras [38]. When the operations are all unary and the algebra A 
satisfies Ii(T) = T and Ii(a I\ b) = Ii(a) I\ Ii(b) for all a, b E A, we call this a 
normal modal algebra. KRACHT refers to it as a poly-modal algebra [50, p. 47]. 
We can now power up the whole machinery of universal algebra for use 
when needed. For the most part though, we will be making use of simple con-
cepts such as homomorphisms (which we will usually denote by f , g , h, . . . ), 
subalgebras (which we will call "S-subalgebras" and where we will write 
11 A < B" for II A is an S-subalgebra of B"), products ( x for typographically 
small products and TI for typographically large products), free algebras, etc. 
Definition 2.41. An algebraic model for S ( P ) is a structure of the form Jvf = 
(A, v) where A is an S-algebra and v : P --+ A, called a valuation. We define 
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F, a satisfaction relation between algebraic models and members of S (P) such 
that when v is extended to S (P) by 
v ( cp /\ 'ljJ) == v ( cp) /\ v ( 'ljJ) etc., and 
v(Di(cp)) == I i(v(cp)), 
we have (A, v) F cp <¢::==? v(cp) == T. We say the theory of Jvl is the set Th (lvi) == 
{ cp E s (P ) I MF cp }. 
Definition 2.42. We define a satisfaction relation F between an S-algebra A 
and and a member of S ( P) as follows: 
A F cp <¢::==? (Vv : P -t A) [ ( A, v) F cp] 
and we say the logic defined by A is£ (A) == { cp ES (w) I i l F cp }. 
- - -
Notice how Th (Alf) and£ (4) satisfy our definitions of a theory and of a 
logic respectively. 
Because A has a boolean algebra underneath it, we are guaranteed that 
£ (A) is equivalential. The boolean nature of our algebras also shows us that 
the formulae of S ( w) can be put in a one-one correspondence with particular 
equations in the first order theory of A (A F cp iff the equation c( cp ) == T holds 
in A where c(pi) == xi and c(Di) == Ci etc.) and each equation, corresponds to 
elements of S (w) (t1 == t2 f----+ E- 1 (ti) H E- 1(t2)). 
So, we have the following result from either universal algebra or logic. 
Theorem 2.43 (Lindenbaum). Any equivalential logic L has a characteristic alge-
bra~ i.e.,£ (.A) == L. 
While this, so called, Lindenbaum algebra is important, we follow Section 
2.7 and define our notion of a Lindenbaum algebra in terms of the underlying 
Stone spaces. 
Definition 2.44. The Lindenbainn algebra of an equivalential logic is the struc-
ture A~ == (A.~ , IL) where A~ is as given in Definition 2.38, and where IF 
are operations defined by IF (JlcpJJ) == !!Di (cp)JJ . The canonical valuation is 
v~: P -t A with v~(p) == IIPII - The canonical model is lvlfe == (A~ , v~). 
We note that the equivalential nature of L guarantees that our algebra is 
well defined. 
Again, we stress that this is not the usual Lindenbaum algebra which is 
constructed out of equivalence classes of formulae, but rather is an algebra 
isomorphic to it. Because of our future predilection for analysing ,,\ fe it is a 
more natural structure to use. 
The usual result about canonical models holds, namely that when v~ is 
extended, v~(cp) == IJcpJJ showing that T h (A1fe) == L(P). 
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2.9 Completeness· and Decidability 
We now look at completeness, the finite model property, and decidability. 
These concepts will turn out, in places, to be related to the concepts of canonic-
ity-see sections 3.3 and 4.2. 
If we are given a class of models NI7 we may ask whether this class both 
satisfies some logic Land is "enough to fully describe" L, i.e., that it is sound 
and complete. 
Definition 2.45. Let M be a class of models of the language S (w). We say that 
M is sound with respect to a logic L iff 
(\/1\II EM) [MF L] 
and we say that M is complete with respect to L iff 
(\/ cp E S ( w) - L) ( 3 NI E M) [ M ;z: cp] . 
If M is both sound and complete with respect to L we say that M characterises 
L. We say that L is complete with respect to M iff { M E M I NI F L} charac-
terises L. 
In the next chapter we will introduce the first of our specific modelings, or 
frames, which give rise to a particular subclass of models and we will wonder 
whether these subclasses are good enough for the logics we have in mind. 
Thus we need a slightly different notion of completeness. 
Definition 2.46. Suppose that JC is a class of structures and suppose that each 
F E JC has a class m(F) of models associated with it. We then say that Fis a 
frame for a formula cp E S (P) iff for all NI E m(F) such that NI is a model for 
the language S (P), Jvf F cp . We write FF cp in this case. We say that JC is sound 
[complete] with respect to a logic Liff the class LJFEK m(F) is sound [complete] 
with respect to L. We say that logic Lis complete with respect to JC iff the class 
{ F E JC I F F L} is complete with respect to L. · 
We can now relate these concepts of soundness and completeness to purely 
syntactic concepts and considerations. 
Definition 2.47. A logic L C S (w) is decidable iff there is an effective procedure 
for deciding whether an arbitrary cp E S ( w) is in or is not in L. 
7Here we mean a model over an intensional algebra however it will become clear that 
models over any of the semantic structures we consider are equivalent. 
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By effective procedure we mean, of course, a procedure that can be car-
ried out by a Turir:ig machine. This does require that our set of connectives 
is somehow constrained and for our purposes whenever we refer to a logic 
as being decidable, we have the sufficiently strong restriction that the set of 
connectives is finite. If we restrict connectives in this way, we can have a map 
gn : S (w) ---+ w which naturally translates each formula into its Godel number. 
Then our definition of decidability becomes: 
Definition 2.48. A logic L C S (w) is decidable iff gn[L] is a recursive subset of 
w . 
Definition 2.49. A logic L is recursively axiomatized iff L is the logic axioma-
tized by Ax over Rules, and both gn[Ax] C w and {gn ( cp) lcp E LJ Rules} C <ww 
are recursive. 
Under such conditions gn[L] is recursively enumerable, since all proofs can 
be easily enumerated and then recursively checked. Thus, we can demonstrate 
that a logic is decidable if we can show that w - gn[ L] is recursively enumerable 
and that L has the finite model property. 
Definition 2.50. A logic L has the finite model property (£mp) iff for each cp E 
S (w) - L there is a finite model (that is, the underlying algebra is finite) Af F L 
such that JV! F cp . 
Note that this is essentially saying that L is complete with respect to the 
class { M I NJ is finite}. 
Theorem 2.51. If L is recursively axiomatisable, has the fmp, and we can decide if 
M F L for an arbitrary finite model NJ then L is decidable. 
Proof Enumerate all finite models. Decide of each model NJ whether A1 F L 
and if so, start enumerating all the formulae invalid on NJ. In such a way, we 
are guaranteed to enumerate all of S (w) - L. • 
It may be difficult to determine if any arbitrary finite model satisfies L, par-
ticularly when the set of axioms is infinite or there are weird rules in Rules. 
However, if we are in a situation where finite counter models can be of a par-
ticular type that guarantees that the finite models satisfy the bulk of the axioms 
and most of the rules, we only have a small amount of work to do to check that 
JV! FL. 
Definition 2.52. A logic L C S (w) is finitely axiomatisable iff it is the logic ax-
iomatised by Ax over the rules of modus ponens and replacement by provable 
equivalents and Ax - Taut is finite. 
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Theorem 2.53. Let L be a finitely axiomatisable logic with the finite model property. 
Then L is decidable. 
Proof The logic Lis clearly recursively enumerable and checking models now 
consists of simply checking a finite list of axioms. • 
Establishing that certain logics are decidable is no simple matter, however 
for most common logics it is undertaken by the method of filtrations. In 
this method, the Stone space is partitioned up into finitely many equivalence 
classes (usually the equivalence is with respect to a particular finite set of for-
mulae somehow derived from the cp (/:_ L we wish to refute), and it is then 
shown that the Ii operators can be redefined appropriately. 
Using this technique a number of common modal logics can be shown to 
have the finite model property. In particular, EK, K, S4, S5, KO, KT. 
It is important to note that the converse of Theorem 2.53 does not hold: 
decidability does not imply the finite model property (see e.g., Dov M. GAB-
BAY's [25, pp. 258-265]). 
Certain logics are guaranteed to have the finite model property, and this is 
when they are characterised by a one element class {A} where A is a finite. 
Definition 2.54. Any logic of the form .C (A) for A finite is called a tabular 
logic. 
This name is probably due to the fact that L effectively has a finite table 
( the algebra) which defines its behaviour. An interesting class of tabular logics 
is the class of logics which properly extend S5-see SCROGGS' s [71]. 
2.10 Standard Maps 
This thesis will make make much of the relationship between different in-
stances of what we will later call canonical frames, but which are for the mo-
ment, Stone spaces. "Standard maps" provide a near-immediate relationship 
between canonical frames over different languages. 
Definition 2.55. Suppose that we have a homomorphism f : A ---+ B. Then f 
induces a map f + : );_ 8 ---+ X A defined by: 
f +(x ) == {a EA I /(a) E x}. 
Proposition 2.56. For f and f + as given in the previous definition, f + really is a 
map fro m XB to )(_A· 
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Proof All we need to show is that U := { a E A I J(a) E x} is an ultrafilter in 
the boolean algebra A. 
(Va E U, b E A) [ a :S; b ===;, b E U]. 
Let a E U, b E A and suppose that a :S; b. Since f is a homomorphism, 
f (a) :S; J(b), so by J(a) E x we conclude that J(b) E x and hence that 
b EU. 
(Va EA) [a E U or -,a E U]. 
Let a E A and assume that a (/:. U. Thus J(a) (/:. x and hence -,J (a) E x 
which tells us that J(-,a) Ex, so -,a E U. 
l_ (/:. u. 
Otherwise 1- = f (1-) Ex and so x is not a proper filter. 
• 
Definition 2.57. A map f : XB --+ XA is called standard iff there is a homo-
morphism g : A --+ B such that f = g+. We say that f is non-standard iff it is 
not standard. 
Definition 2.58. We say that a map f : S (P) --+ S ( Q) respects connectives iff 
for all cp, x, 'ljJ E S (P), it satisfies 
1. f (1-) = 1-, f (T) = T, 
2. f (cp /\ 1/J) = J(cp) /\ f (1/J), etc., and 
3. (Vi E Idx) [!(• ix) = • if (x)]. 
This is pretty much to say that f is a homomorphism in the term algebra-
the free algebra over P without any constraints. Note though, that if cp (p) E L 
then f ( cp(p)) = cp(f (p)) E L by L being closed under substitution. 
Suppose that f : P --+ S ( Q). Then f extends to a connective respecting 
map which we shall also denote by f. We even use f to represent the map 
between the canonical algebras defined as follows: 8 
f (llcpll) = llf(cp)II -
This induces a map f +: X~ rv XA~ --+ 1Yfe rv XA~ which can be defined more 
succinctly by: 
f+(x) = {cp E S(P) I J (cp) Ex}. 
8Note that if llcpll = ll?J;II then cp tt ?j; EL so 1 (cp) tt 1 (?j;) EL so Ill (cp)II = Ill (?J; )II-
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One consequence of this is that if P and Qare of the same size then there 
is a bijection J between P and Q which extends to a bijection between S ( P) 
and S ( Q) and this in turn extends to a bijection between ./y~ and ./y fe which is 
really an isomorphism between the Stone spaces. 
Conversely if P and Q have different infinite cardinalities and card (Idx) ~ 
card (P) then there can be no bijection between A~ and A~. While this does 
not mean that there is no Stone space isomorphism between X fe and .Ly~ ( as we 
will see in Chapter 9), it does mean that there will be no standard isomorphism 
between Xfe and X~. 
2.11 Ultrapowers 
In this section we will introduce the notation associated with ultrapowers. 
This is an important mathematical construction which we use in Chapter 5 
to expand algebras so that they 'encompass' powerset boolean algebras. 
For this section, take A = (A , I) be be an S-algebra, take D to be a set, and 
take U to be an ultrafilter on D. 
Definition 2.59. The St-power of A is the algebra 
A0 = ( A0 ,I) 
where An = { a : D --t A} and the operations on An are defined by 
(a/\ e)(,1) = a( ,1 ) /\ e( ,1 ), etc., and 
-- -
Ii (a) ( ,') = Ii ( a ( ,') ) . 
Following our usual convention we do not distinguish the boolean opera-
tions on An from the boolean operations on A as the distinction will be clear 
from context. We use the accent- to indicate that we are dealing with elements 
of a power. 
We can use U to define an equivalence relation rvu on An by declaring 
a rvu e ¢==? a( ,1) = e( ,1) u a.e. 
We can then use this to get the following, which can be readily seen to be well-
defined. 
Definition 2.60. The D-U-ultrapoiuer of ;4 is the algebra 
A0 /U = (A0 /u,J) 
1· 
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where AD /U = AD /rvu and the operations on AD /U are defined by 
[a]~u I\ [eJ~u = [a I\ eJ~u, etc., and 
h ( [a] ~u) ( r ) = [ Ii (a)] ~u 
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Again, the boolean operations are not distinguished and we use the accent 
" to indicate that we are dealing with elements of an ultrapower. 
There are particular members of An that we need to take note of: 
Definition 2.61. Define a map const : A ---+ An by setting const (a) (,) == a. 
Definition 2.62. Define a choice function rep : An /U ---+ AD by taking rep (a) 
to be any element of A0 such that a= [rep (a)J~u. 
The function const then gives rise to an elementary embedding: 
Definition 2.63. The Los function, l : A ---+ An /U, is defined by 
l(a) = [const (a)J~u · 
Theorem 2.64 (Los). The structure AD /U is well defined and the map l : A ---+ 
AD /U is an elementary embedding. That is, for all first order formulae <p and all 
a EA: 
A f= <p[a] <==* AD /U f= <p[l (a)]. 
- -
Clearly an elementary embedding of one algebra into another is also an 
injective homomorphism. 
We have the following result which could be an immediate consequence of 
the above theorem had we dealt with many sorted structures. 
Lemma 2.65. Let u E ult (A) . Then 
l(u) = {a E AD /U I rep (a)(,) Eu u a.e.} E ult (AD /U). 
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Chapter 3 
Relational Semantics 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we will look at the standard relational semantics for normal 
modal logics with which most logicians will be familiar. It is because of this 
familiarity that we will discuss these first and will wait until Chapter 4 before 
introducing the more general neighborhood semantics which these relational 
semantics effectively specialise. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the conceptual and notational 
basis for the later chapters where canonical relational frames are considered. 
As a secondary task, this chapter will detail and motivate the main question 
which inspired this whole work. 
This chapter will be concerned with normal multi-modal logics, which 
means that in all cases throughout this chapter we will be considering lan-
guages where ni = arity (Di) == 1 for each i E Idx. 
3.2 Relational Frames 
The principal structure here is the Relational Frame which is given as follows: 
Definition 3.1. A relational frame for Sis a structure (X, R) where X is a non-
empty set and, for each i E Idx, Ri is a binary relation on X. If card (Idx) = 1 
then we just write (X, R). 
Since we are dealing with binary relations, we introduce the following 
piece of notation. Suppose that R is a binary relation on X and x E ..,Y then 
R( x), the set of all points which x "sees/' is defined to be 
R(x) :== {y EX I (x, y) ER} 
and we sometimes refer to this as the set of all R-successors of x. 
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Each frame induces operations on the algebra of subsets of its underlying 
space. 
Definition 3.2. If (X , R) is a frame then we say that the R-interior operations 
induced by R consist of functions IRi : P (X) -t P (X) (which we will also 
denote as IRi), for each i E Idx, defined by 
IRi (Y) = {x EX I ~ (x) CY} , 
and their duals f Ri : P (-"Y) -t P (X) (which we will also denote as JRJ, for 
i E Idx, then have definitions 
1 Ri ( Y) = { x E x I ~ ( x) n }/ # 0} . 
We can now define a slightly more general structure, which is sometimes 
called a general frame and this will help set up a full duality between these 
"geometric" objects and the algebras of Chapter 2. 
Definition 3.3. A first order relational frame for S is a structure (X, R, JP) where 
( X, R ) is a frame and JP a subset of P ( X) which contains X, and is closed under 
intersection, union, and complement as well as the operations in IR· 
We take the frame (X, R ) to be equivalent to the full frame (X, R, P (-"Y)). 
The following definition then makes sense. 
Definition 3.4. Suppose that F = (X, R, JP) is a first order frame then the dual 
of F is the S-algebra 
p+ = ((JP, n, u, , , x , 0) , IR). 
If F = (X , R) then we take its dual to be the dual of the corresponding full 
frame: 
p + = (-"Y, R,P (X ))+ . 
Hence we can talk about models and thus satisfaction of formulae. 
Definition 3.5. A model on a frame F = (X, R ,.JP) (or a full frame F = (X, R)) 
is a model M = ( p +, v) on the algebra p+. 
We then say that Ji.If satisfies a formula cp at the point x E X, in symbols 
"Alf Fx cp , iff x E v(cp) and we say that M satisfies a formula cp, in symbols MF cp, 
iff (Vx E X ) [M Fx cp] . We say that F satisfies cp at x , in symbols F Fx cp, iff for 
all models M on F , NI Fx cp and we say that F satisfies cp , in symbols FF cp, iff 
(V X E ./y) [ F F X cp] . 
For x E X we say that M satisfies the set of formulae~ at the point x E X, 
in symbols M Fx ~ , iff (Vcp E ~ ) [M Fx cp] . We define the notions of NI F ~, 
F Fx ~, and F F ~ in an analogous manner. 
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Note that this is in keeping with Definition 2.46 where we introduced the 
notion of an arbitrary structure, in this case a relational frame, giving rise to a 
collection of models. Another thing to note is that each model really does not 
need complete information about the underlying algebra and in fact, we can 
have an alternate but equivalent definition of model and satisfaction. 
Definition 3.6. A model on a frame F = (X, R, JP) (or a full frame F = (X, R)) 
is a triple M = (X, R, v) where v : P -+ JP. We then define satisfaction at a 
point x as follows: 
1. NJ F X p <=* X E V (p)' 
2. NJ Fx ep I\ 1/; <=* NJ Fx ep and M Fx 1/;, etc., and 
3. for each i E Idx, NJ Fx Diep <=* (Vy E X) [ (x, y) E Ri ==> NJ Fy ep]. 
The definitions of NJ F ep, F Fx ep, and F F ep remain the same. 
Note that for i E Idx our dual connective • i has a similar truth condition 
on models: 
lvf Fx •iep <=* (=ly E _X) [ (x, y) E Ri and NJ Fy ep]. 
From these definitions we get the intuition that Diep can be read as "in all 
possible i-alternatives, ep holds" or more succinctly "ep is i- necessarily true." 
Dually •iep is read as "in some i- possible alternative, ep holds" or more suc-
cinctly" ep is i- possibly true." 
Definition 3.7. The theory of a model NJ and the logic of a frame Fare defined as 
Th ( NI) = { ep I M F ep} and £ ( F) = { ep I F F ep} . 
Now that we have a functor which assigns a collection of models to each 
frame (first order and full), we can inherit from Definition 2.46 the notions of 
soundness and completeness, of a logic being complete with respect to a class, 
and of L just being complete in a class. One of these is important so let us 
reiterate it for the special case of relational frames. 
Definition 3.8. We say that a logic L is relational complete or simply complete 
iff the following class is complete with respect to L: 
{ F I F is a full frame and F F L} . 
Such a logic is sometimes referred to as Kripke Complete since the relational 
frames of this chapter are often called Kripke Frames. 
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We did not bother with a notion of first order relational frame completeness 
since, as we will indicate in the next section, all reasonable logics have this 
property. 
We now have enough sophistication in our semantics to allow us to spe-
cialise the concept of completeness: 
Definition 3.9. A logic L is strongly complete (with respect to the relational se-
mantics) iff for each set of propositional letters P and each L-consistent set 
~ C S (P ), there is a frame F == (..,,Y, R), a model NI on F, and an x E X such 
that M Fx ~-
We often distinguish this notion of strong completeness from ordinary 
completeness by referring to "ordinary" completeness as "weak" complete-
ness. Strong completeness is sometimes known as compactness.1 
3.3 Canonical Frames and Canonicity 
There is a special type of tool and structure which we use to establish com-
pleteness and that is the canonical frame. It is based on the Stone space we 
introduced in Chapter 2, Section 2.7. 
Definition 3.10. Let L be a normal multi-modal logic. We define the canonical 
relational frame over a set of propositional letters P as the frame Ff == ( X fe , R~) 
where 
1. X fe == { x C S ( P ) I x is a maximal £-consistent set}, and 
2. for i E Idx, R~i == { (x, y) E 2 Xfe I (\/cp E S (P )) [Diep E x ===} cp E y] }. 
We then can define the canonical first order frame to be ( X fe , R~ , IP~) where2 
3. IP~ == { II cp II I cp E S ( P ) } , 
(we are using the 11-11 of Definition 2.33). Then. the canonical model on the full 
[on the firs t order] canonical frame is defined to be Mfe == (Fft ,vfe) [Mfe == 
(Xfe, R~, IP~, vfe) ]3 where 
1This notion of compactness (see for instance [101]) is not the same as the notion of logical 
compactness (~ f- L cp ===? (=3 finite~ ' C ~) [~' f- L cpl) that all our logics naturally satisfy. 2We do not give this structure a designating name since first order frames will only find 
use in this chapter. 
3Strictly speaking, we should introduce a d iffe rent notational designator for the model on 
the canonical firs t order frame but since we will no t use it beyond this chapter, and because 
the effective difference is very slight, we will overload !YI fe. 
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4. vf (p) = IIPII-
Our definition of canonical model then corresponds to the canonical model 
on the Lindenbaum algebra (Definition 2.44). Hence, by only having to show 
that IIDicplJ = IRi (llcpll), we get the result: 
Proposition 3.11. Let L be a normal logic and Pa set of propositional letters. Then 
£ ( .1Y fe, R~, Ir~) = Th (!VI%) = L. 
This justifies our earlier reticence in talking about a logic being complete 
with respect to its first order frames; the only logics which would not be so 
are the non-normal logics and we have excluded them from discussion in this 
chapter. 
Since Th (JVIfe) == L, we know that£ (Fft) C L, so if we can guarantee 
that Fft F L we will have demonstrated that £ ( Fft) = L. In such a case L 
would be relational complete. Hence this property is important and we give it 
a name-where we note that it is only the cardinality of P that is important. 
Definition 3.12. A normal modal logic L is relational canonical in cardinal K, iff 
F;: F L. We say that L is relational canonical iff it is relational canonical in all 
cardinals K,. 
3.4 Particular Logics and the Finite Model Property 
Canonicity allows us to show that various logics are complete with respect to 
their relational frames and, more significantly, it allows us to show that some 
of these logics are complete with respect to special classes of frames. 
Remember that all our logics are normal so we can assume that they in-
clude the normality axioms. 
Example 3.13. By Definition 2.12 the simplest normal modal logic is Ks which 
is axioma tised by 
1. Di (p -+ q) -+ (Dip -+ Diq) E L for each i E Idx, and 
2. Di T E L for each i E Idx. 
This logic is canonical because its canonical frame, indeed any frame, can be 
readily seen to satisfy these axioms. This shows that Ks is complete with re-
spect to the class of all frames. 
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Example 3.14. The mono-modal logic T is axiomatised by the normality ax-
ioms together with Op • p. The canonical frame Ff; can be (straightforwardly) 
shown to have the first order property of R~ reflexivity and conversely every 
frame satisfying this property is also a frame for T. Thus our conclusion is that 
T is characterised by the class of frames which are reflexive. Moreover it is 
possible to show that every frame for a normal modal logic L which includes 
Ti-the axiom T in the ith connective-must satisfy the reflexivity condition 
on~-
Other normal logics such as K4, S4, KO, S5, can be shown to be sound and 
complete with respect to the class of all "transitive," "reflexive, transitive," 
"serial,"4 and "reflexive, transitive, symmetric" frames respectively. Again, 
the completeness aspect is demonstrated by showing that the canonical frame 
has the appropriate property. 
Now that we have relational semantics we can introduce a special class of 
logics whose only motivation can be the nature of the underlying relation. 
Defini_tion 3.15. For rp a sequence of formulae of length n + 1, and i E Idx we 
let Alt~ ( rp ) be the formula 
I\ •i(()i • V •i ( (()j I\ (()k). 
i~n j<k~n 
For pa sequence of distinct propositional variables, Alt~ (p) is then the ax-
iom which says that each point can have at most n ~-successors-this is again 
proven by showing that any frame for the axiom must satisfy this property, 
that all frames with this property satisfy the axiom, and that the canonical 
frame satisfies the axiom. Any logic which contains Alt~ (p) is called a logic of 
bounded alternative in index i . We say that a logic is simply of bounded alternative 
iff it is of bounded alternative in every index i . 
There are even more restrictive logics where we require that each element 
of a frame has exactly one successor in index i . These are the so called "modal 
logics with functional alternative relations in index i" and are defined to con-
tain the axiom 
•i P H • iP· 
This axiom says that if p holds at one i-successor of a point then it must hold at 
all i-successors. What happens in the event that the point has no i-successor? 
Then Dip holds so •i P also holds giving lie to the claim that the point had no 
i-successor. These logics have been comprehensively studied in SEGERBERG' s 
[73]. 
4 A rela tion R is serial iff each point has an R-successor. 
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Definition 3.16. A relational frame ( .LX-, R) is called finite ( of size n) iff _,,y is 
finite (of cardinality n). 
Another subclass of the class of logics of bounded alternative is the class 
of tabular logics. Recall from Definition 2.54 that a tabular logic is one which 
is£ (A) for some finite S-algebra A. It was an observation of SEGERBERG [72, 
p. 33] that such an A is really just a powerset boolean algebra, and through a 
construction reminiscent of that which produced the canonical frame we get a 
full finite frame F such that p + = A. So we get the following result: 
Proposition 3.17. A logic Lis tabular if! there is a full finite relational frame F such 
that L = £ (F). 
Any tabular logic is clearly of bounded alternative since, for all i E Idx, 
Alt~ (p) E £ (F) where Fis a finite frame of size n. 
In actual fact, SEGERBERG's reasoning [72, pp. 31-33] (indicated above for 
tabular logics) really was reasoning about the finite model property. A simple 
argument along the same lines will show that every logic with the finite model 
property really has the finite frame property. 
Definition 3.18. A normal logic L has the finite frame property iff it is complete 
with respect to the class of its finite frames. 
Proposition 3.19 (Segerberg). A normal logic L has the finite model property if! it 
has the finite frame property. 5 
A lot of everyday logics have been shown to have the finite frame property, 
including K, T, K4, S4, S5, and KMcK. This last system was shown to have 
the finite frame property (and hence to be complete and decidable) by KIT 
FINE in [21]. In most cases, the argument proceeds by taking the canonical 
frame together with the formula that is to be refuted and using the formula 
to partition up the canonical frame into a finite number of equivalence classes 
that can have accessibility relations naturally defined on them. This produces 
a finite counter frame to the same formula. In Chapter 5 we will use a similar 
approach to show that non-iterative logics have the finite frame property. 
Not all logics have the finite frame property. In [60], DAVID MAKINSON 
provides a finitely axiomatised logic which does not possess the finite frame 
property. Some regions of the lattice of logics do have the finite model property 
throughout, for instance ROBERT BULL has shown [11] that the set of all logics 
stronger than S4.36 has the finite frame property throughout. 
5SEGERBERG did this by showing that each finite model for L is equivalent to one which is differ-
en tiated and that a differentiated model really 'is' a full frame for L. 
6This is the logic S4 extended with the axiom • (• p • q) V D(Dq • p). 
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There is a class of normal modal logics which is important in the mod-
ern study of intensional logics and whose members are often cited as 
examples/ counter- examples: 
Definition 3.20. Suppose that Idx = { +, - } and that L includes the normality 
axioms together with 
1. D+P --+ D+D+P, 
2. p--+ • -•+P, 
3. p--+ D+•-P, 
4. •+P /\ •+q--+ •+(P /\ q) V •+(P /\ •+ q) V •+(q /\ •+P) , and 
5. • _ p /\ • _ q --+ • _ (p /\ q) V • _ (p /\ • _ q) V • _ ( q /\ • _ p) . 
Then L is said to be a tense logic. 
The intuition here is that D+cp should be read as " cp holds throughout the 
future," and D_cp should be read as "cp holds throughout the past." Axioms 2 
and 3 essentially require that R+ is the relation converse of R_ and axioms 1, 
4, and 5 represent the requirement that these relations are linear. 
Another thing worth mentioning at this point is that for certain purposes 
we can dispense with the possibility that card (Idx) > l. It was shown by 
KRACHT and WOLTER in [51] that multi-modal normal logics can be simu-
lated by mono-modal logics in the sense that the many modal operators of the 
multi-modal logic can be defined in terms of the single modal operator of a 
mono-modal logic. Also, the mono-modal logic can be axiomatised in such a 
way that a formula is a theorem of the multi-modal logic precisely when its 
translation is a theorem of the mono-modal logic. When this is done, it turns 
out that properties like decidability, finite model property, tabularity, canonic-
ity, and many more hold of the multi-modal logic exactly when they hold of 
the corresponding mono-modal logic. 
A class that also crops up is the class of subframe logics. These logics, 
introduced by FINE in [23], are normal multi-modal logics whose collection of 
(full) relational frames is closed under the taking of subframes: 
Definition 3.21. Suppose that F = (X, R) and that Y C X. Then the subframe 
of F induced on Y is the frame (1/, R'), where for each i E Idx, R~ = Rin(Y x Y). 
It turns out that subframe logics which are extensions of K4 have nice prop-
erties, one of which is the finite model property. 
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3.5 Canonicity and Elementarity 
The central question of this thesis is "which logics are canonical and how does 
canonicity relate to other properties of a logic?" At its simplest level we look 
at properties of the axioms itself, such as whether they are non-iterative or 
even, and we move on to more complicated properties such as whether they 
are determined by elementary classes. In this section we will make some of 
these more complicated notions precise. 
The first notion is that of a descriptive frame which gives rise to the notion 
of cl-persistence which turns out to be equivalent to canonicity. 
Definition 3.22. A first order frame F == (1Y, R , IP) is called descriptive iff 
1. for all x, y E ./y with x #- y, there is a Y E IP such that x E Y and y rf_ Y, 
2. for all x, y E .,Y and i E Idx, 
('~fY E IP) [ x E Ii ( Y) ===} y E }r] ===} ( x, y) E Ri , and 
3. every proper filter V C IP satisfies n V #- 0 . 
Clearly the canonical first order frame for a logic is descriptive and a logic L 
is canonical if its 'descriptive' first order frame is a frame for L when stripped 
of IP~, its set of propositions. 
Definition 3.23. A logic L is d-persistent iff every descriptive first order frame 
F == (X, R, IP) for L satisfies (X, R) F L. 
Through a straightforward argument which embeds each frame into a 
canonical frame over a suitably large cardinal and which relies on the con-
cept of a generated subframe (which we will introduce in Definition 3.42) we 
can get the following result: 
Theorem 3.24. A logic is canonical if! it is d-persistent. 
Another concept in the realm of canonicity is that of complexity. 
Definition 3.25. A logic L is relational complex iff each algebra for L can be 
homomorphically embedded into p+ for some full frame F. 
We noted that logics like K, T, S4 have collections of frames which are 
defined by first order conditions such as "no conditions," "reflexivity," and 
"quasi order." (A quasi order is a reflexive transitive relation.) It turns out that 
a lot of logics are in this category. 
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Definition 3.26. An elementary class of frames is a class of frames defined by 
a collection of first order formulae over the language of equality and binary 
relations, i.e., for ~ a set of first order formulae, it is a class of the form 
{ (..,,Y, R) I (.,~, R) ~ ~}. 
A logic is said to be elementary iff it is characterised by some elementary class. 
Note that a logic being elementary does not mean that all its frames are in 
an elementary class, just that every non-thesis of the logic is refuted by some 
frame in that elementary class and that the class universally gives rise to the 
logic. 
In 1975 HENRIK SAHLQVIST [68] came up with a class of modal formulae 
which were naturally equivalent to first order conditions in that the collection 
of frames satisfying one of these modal formulae also satisfied an elementary 
condition derivable from that modal formula, and vice versa. This meant that 
a large class of logics were immediately amenable to analysis just in terms of 
their first order 'equivalents', rather than through the essentially second order 
definition of truth and satisfaction in modal models. We will not define the 
class of Sahlqvist formulae in this chapter, but we will discuss them in depth 
in Chapter 7 where we recreate an important consequence of SAHLQVIST' s 
work. 
Sahlqvist formulae, of course, define Sahlqvist logics and important ele-
ments of this class are the logics we have met like K, T, 04, etc. But then there 
is a logic like KMcK which is one of the simplest logics that is not Sahlqvist. 
JOHAN VAN BENTHEM [98] has shown that this logic is not elementary, so not 
all logics are elementary. An interesting result proven by KIT FINE [22] gives 
us a 'test' for elementarity. 
Theorem 3.27 (Fine). If a logic is elementary then it is canonical. 
It is natural to wonder about the converse of this theorem. Is it possible that 
there is a canonical logic which is not elementary? A natural test of this is the 
logic KMcK which is not elementary. It took a long time but eventually ROBERT 
GOLDBLATT showed in [34] that this logic is not canonical. Note though, that 
failure of canonicity does not imply the failure of completeness as KMcK was 
shown to have the finite frame property and hence to be complete with respect 
to its class of finite frames. 
This leads to the big conjecture which inspired this thesis and which so far 
remains open: 
Conjecture 3.28. A normal modal logic is canonical only if it is elementary. 
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This conjecture seems quite reasonable and as yet there is no answer. Com-
pelling anecdotal evidence for this conjecture has been provided by GOLD-
BLATT who has shown [32]: 
Theorem 3.29 (Goldblatt). If a normal modal logic L is elementary then it is char-
acterised by the elementary class7 
{ (""Y, R) / (vcp) [():JR~) ~ cp ===} (X, R) ~ cp]} . 
This means that if we want to know which elementary formulae 'define' a 
particular elementary modal logic we need only inspect the canonical frame 
of that logic. Of course, this collection of first order formulae will have a lot 
of unnecessary chaff in it. For instance the canonical frame for the elementary 
logic Tis infinite so in addition to reflexivity, the only really crucial elementary 
condition, our inspection of the canonical frame would also yield unnecessary 
conditions such as, for each n E w, "there are at least n elements." 
Unfortunately, this result requires that we start with a logic that we know 
to be elementary, so this result does not close the conjecture. 
Another piece of anecdotal evidence was obtained by FRANK WOLTER in 
[103]: 
Theorem 3.30 (Wolter). Every canonical tense logic is elementary. 
Other relationships abound. For instance it is clear that if L is canonical 
then it is strongly complete. Also, WOLTER has shown [102] that for normal 
modal logics, strong completeness is equivalent to complexity. 
To summarise, for L a normal modal logic, we have the following relation-
ships between the properties discussed so far. 
Lis elementary 
? 71? -U-
L is canonical ( ¢::=;> Lis d-persistent) 
-U-
L is strongly complete ( ¢::=;> Lis relational complex) 
-U-
L is complete 
7 Remember that P is an infinite set of propositional letters. 
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3.6 Morphisms and Duality 
In this section we will introduce the essential duality between relational 
frames and the boolean algebras with operators set up in the previous section. 
This work has a long history. Longer perhaps than the purely relational anal-
ysis of modal logic which was essentially started by SAUL KRIPKE's landmark 
paper [54] in 1963. BJARNI JONSSON and ALFRED TARSKI produced a paper, 
[44] which, in some sense, anticipated the relational semantics of KRIPKE. In 
that paper they started with boolean algebras with operators, (which in their 
formalism required that the algebras be additive-something the algebras for 
normal modal logics naturally satisfy) and they showed how to move back 
and forth between these algebras and 'relation' structures which really were 
the relational frames first introduced by KRIPKE and are the frames of this 
chapter. This work was later re-explored in part by LEMMON [56, 57] who also 
investigated the duality presented here. 
We saw that a relational frame naturally gives rise to a modal algebra and 
it was on this algebra that we based our truth definitions. (We went on to spe-
cialise the truth definition to obtain truth at a point in a model.) This provided 
the first half of the duality which we have already seen as Definition 3.4: 
Definition 3.31. Suppose that F == (X, R, IP). Then the algebraic dual of F, or 
p+, is the algebra ( A, I ) where A is the boolean set algebra with field IP, and 
I == I R· In the event that F is a full frame, p + is based on the boolean algebra 
p (X) . 
So turning a relational frame into an algebra is easy. The conversion in the 
other direction requires just a little more sophistication and it is essentially the 
construction of the canonical frame: 
Definition 3.32. Suppose that A == (A, I ) is an algebra which gives rise to a 
normal modal logic. Then A+ == (XA, R A, A+) where: 
1. XA is the Stone space of A as given in Definition 2.33, 
2. A+ is the set of clopen sets, namely {ll ali I· a E A}, and 
3. for i E Idx, R == {(x,y) E 2XA I (Va E A) [Ii (a) E x ====> a E y)}. 
Full frames were introduced in this thesis purely as an attendant to the dis-
cussion of the frame / algebra duality since we could not get the functor + to 
undo + with purely full frames. While the duality holds between finite full 
frames and finite algebras, it fails between infinite full frames and infinite al-
gebras. For consider an infinite algebra A. It will have size card (A) and so 
the space of ultrafilters of A will be, in most circumstances, of size 2 car<l(A) . So 
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moving to the full frame has increased the underlying cardinality exponen-
tially. Moving back, via the + functor will take us to an underlying boolean 
algebra p (ult (A) ) of size 22card (A) . Given this type of growth we cannot hope 
to get back to where we started to complete the duality circle. 
We do have a working duality for certain types of first order frames how-
ever (see, e.g., GOLDBLATT's [32, Chapter l]): 
Theorem 3.33. Suppose that A is a nonrzal S-algebra. 8 Then A+ is a descriptive first 
order frame and (A+)+ rv A. 
Conversely if Fis a descriptive first order fra1rze then (F +)+ rv F . 
Sometimes, however, we do want to consider the duality between full 
frames and the underlying algebras to the extent that we identify full frames 
with their dual algebras. 
Definition 3.34. Suppose that A = (A, I ) is such that Arv P (/Y) . Then we can 
consider Ar = (/Y, R ) where for i E Idx, 
Ri = { ( x, y) I (Va E A) [ x E Ii (a) ===} y E a] } . 
In the event that (Ar)+ rv A we say that A. is a complex algebra and that A and F 
are essentially the same. 
When a frame and an algebra are essentially the same the algebra can read-
ily be constructed from the frame and vice versa, so there would be no harm in 
using them interchangeably. Note that every full frame F and its dual algebra 
p+ are always essentially the same. 
We know that we can relate S-algebras with homomorphisms and that 
there are various operations we can perform in the variety of S-algebras. Ex-
amples of such operations include that of finding all the homomorphic images 
of an S-algebra, finding the product of a set of S-algebras, and finding an S-
algebra's collection of S-subalgebras. Through the duality given above, these 
have natural relational frame semantics analogs which we list here. 
Firstly though, let us show how the operations of + and + are contravari-
ant functors between the categories of S-algebras and relational (first order) 
frames. We have already seen that + and + are mappings, so now we need to 
see how they map the morphisms of these categories. We need a definition of 
morphism in order to do this. 
Definition 3.35. A map f : (X , R, IP) ---+ (1 r' S, (Q) is a frame homomorphis1rz in 
index i E Idx iff it satisfies the following: 
8 An S -algebra A is normal iff [, (A) is a normal logic, tha t is, the algebra sa tisfies the laws equiv-
alent to the normality axioms. 
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1. (Vx, y E .,Y) [(x, y) E ~ ===> (J (x), J (y)) E Si) , 
2. (Vx EX, y E "V) [(J(x), y) E Si ===> 
(3z E .,Y) [J (z) = y and (x, z) E ~ ]] , and 
3. (VZ E Q) [J- 1 [Z] E Ir] . 
In the case of full frames we omit the last condition, so a map f : (X , R) -+ 
(},,r, S) is a frame homomorphism in index i iff the map satisfies 1 and 2 above. 
We say that a map f : (1Y, R, Ir) -+ (Y, S , Q) is a frame homomorphisnz if£ 
it is a frame homomorphism in all indices i E Idx. Similarly for a map f : 
(X, R) -+ (Y, S) . 
The last condition does tell us how to turn a frame homomorphism into a 
map between the dual algebras: 
Definition 3.36. Suppose that f : F -+ G is a map between first order (or full 
frames ) then j + : c+ -+ F+ is defined by 
1+(Z ) = J- 1 [Z ] . 
These frame homomorphisms are more commonly called p-morphisms (see 
e.g. , CHELLAS's [13] ) or bounded homomorphisms (see e.g., GOLDBLATT [32] ). 
Recall from Definition 2 .55 that every map f : A -+ B naturally gives rise 
to a map f + between the Stone spaces of Band A respectively. 
Now the following theorems can easily be proven, see e.g., GOLDBLATT's 
book [32]. 
Theorem 3.37. Suppose that f : A -+ B is an S-algebra homomorphism, then 
J + : B + -+ A+ is a franze homomorphism. Moreover, 
1. if f is in to then f + is onto, 
2. if f is onto then f + is into, and 
3. if f is an isomorphism, then f + is an isomorphism. 
Suppose that f : F-+ G is a frame homomorphism, then j+ : c + -+ p + is an 
S -algebra homomorphism. Moreover, 
1. if f is into then j+ is onto, 
2. if f is onto then j+ is into, and 
3. if J is an isomorphis1n, then j+ is an isornorphism. 
I 
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This duality naturally tells us how the logics of frames relate to each other: 
Suppose that G is a frame homomorphic image of F via some frame homomor-
phism f. Thus j + : c+ ----+ p + is an into S-algebra homomorphism, which 
is to say that c+ really is an S-subalgebra of p +. This naturally means that 
£ ( p+) C £ ( c +). Since our initial definition of satisfaction and truth in frames 
depends on truth in their dual algebras, we immediately get the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 3.38. Suppose that the full [first order] frame G is a fra1n e homo1norphic 
image of the full [first order] frame F. Then £ ( F) C £ ( G) . 
Another operation on algebras that has an analog in frames is that of the 
algebraic product: 
Definition 3.39. Suppose that (Fk = (.,Yk : Rk , IP\) I k EK) is a sequence of first 
order frames. Then we define 
~Fk, 
iEK 
the disjoint union of this sequence, to be F = (.,Y, R, IP) where 
i. ..,y := uk EK (_,Yk x { k} ), 
2. for i E Idx, Ri = { ((x, k), (y, k)) I (x, y) E Rk i, k EK}, and 
3. IP= {Z c _,,y I (vk EK) [{ x E xk I (x, k) E Z} E Irk]}. 
For F a full frame we omit the last criterion since it is naturally satisfied. 
Then we have the following result. (See e.g., KRACHT's [50, p. 171] for a 
very category-theoretic presentation.) 
Theorem 3.40. For (Fk I k E K) a sequence of frames, the following equality holds: 
( ~ Fk) + = IT Fk+· 
kEK k EK 
Again, because satisfaction of formulae is based on satisfaction in the asso-
ciated algebra, we get the following result. 
Proposition 3.41. For (Fk I k E K) a sequence of fra1nes, 
£ (~ Fk) = n £ (Fk ) -
k EK kEK 
The last operation is really just a specialised type of homomorphic image: 
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Definition 3.42. A first order frame G = (Y, S, (Q) is a generated subframe of 
F == (./Y, R, IP) iff G is a subframe of F and the map id : Y --+ _/y is a frame 
homomorphism. We say that G is generated by the points in vV C _/y iff }' == 
Ua<w vVa, where 
vV0 == W, and 
~'lfa+l == LJ ~ (w). 
iEldx,wEWa 
As a definition this is not that revealing and we provide the following 
equivalent which tells us that a generated subframe is a subframe which is 
"closed upwards" or that we can start at some collection vV and "generate" G 
by following the various successors of the elements of vV. 
Proposition 3.43. A frame G == (r', S, Q) is a generated subframe of F == (X, R , P) 
if! 
1. ·y C ./Y, 
2. for all i E Idx, Si == Ri n (r' x r'"t and 
3. for all i E Idx, ('t:!y E l'', x E X) [ (y , x) E Ri ===;> x E 1''] . 
Since a generated subframe G of F really has an associated one-one frame 
homomorphism going from G to F, we get that c+ is a homomorphic image 
of F +. Thus: 
Proposition 3.44. If G is a generated subframe of F then £ ( F) C £ ( G). 
We have one last definition which, while essentially implicit in the earlier 
work, should be spelled out as the whole of Chapter 9 is devoted to it. 
Definition 3.45. A map f : F --+ G between frames is called an isomorphism 
iff J is a one-one onto frame homomorphism. It is called an automorphism iff 
F == G. 
3.7 Cardinality Questions and Set Theory 
The canonical frames we discussed earlier are well known to most practition-
ers of modal logic. This is mostly because their ease of use and universality 
facilitates completeness proofs. Certainly the underlying construction is con-
ceptually straightforward, however it is a mathematically deep procedure, not 
in the least because the construction is non-effective and is closely linked to 
the mathematically mysterious powerset operation. Further evidence for this 
' '! 
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can be found in the number of open problems regarding the general structure 
of Canonical Frames. 
An example is Conjecture 3.28 "If a modal logic is canonical then it is ele-
mentary" and we saw G0LDBLATT's Theorem 3.29 that if it is elementary then 
it is described by the elementary class of its canonical frame. Even though this 
almost compels us to believe Conjecture 3.28, it gives us little understanding of 
the canonical frame's true nature beyond the knowledge that it is "saturated" 
in the sense of KIT FINE's proof, in [22], of elementarity implying canonicity. 
Our understanding of canonical frames is further complicated by the intru-
sion of cardinality considerations. For instance, another outstanding problem 
in the study of canonical frames is the question of whether the cardinality of 
the underlying language affects the logic verified by the canonical frame. More 
precisely: 
Conjecture 3.46. If L, a normal modal logic, is ,,\-canonical for some infinite 
cardinal ,,\ then it is rC-canonical for all cardinals rC > ,,\. 
In some sense this conjecture is a derivative of Conjecture 3.28 since if a 
logic is elementary then it would follow that it is canonical in all infinite cardi-
nals, however, if canonicity implied elementarity, the proof of this fact would 
probably be based solely on canonicity with respect to one particular infinite set 
of propositional letters, and so based on canonicity in one infinite cardinal. 
We could even go further and ask: 
Question 3.47. For L, a normal modal logic, and rC, ,,\ different cardinals, is FK,L 
elementary equivalent to Ff? 
It may well be that the answer to these questions will be set theoretic in 
nature or conceivably even independent of ZFC. After all, if the cardinality 
of the language is rC, then the cardinality of the canonical frame (underlying 
Stone space) is 2K, suggesting that some property reminiscent of the Continuum 
Hypothesis may be at work. 
Straying further down this path, we might wonder what happens in the 
presence of new axioms, i.e., statements independent of ZFC. For instance, we 
may wish to answer the very pruned down question of "Do F!; and F/;
1 
verify 
the same logic?" If we suspect that there is something 'independent' going 
on, we may wish to see what happens in the presence of the axiom '2w == 2w 1 '. 
Perhaps we could even prove that F!; is isomorphic to F/;
1
• 
In Chapter 9 we show that we can answer this question with a 'yes' for the 
trivial logics above and around S5 and 'no' for those logics below. Outside 
of this range a partial answer can be obtained by looking at standard versus 
non-standard isomorphisms.9 
9 Recall from Section 2.10 that a map g between Stone spaces (and hence between canonical 
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Even if our approach to these canonical frame problems avoids appeal to 
these extra-ZFC notions, we will still be strongly tempted to construct some 
kind of a map between F; and F;
1
, and we will naturally be inclined to require 
that such a map be a frame homomorphism or at least a map which is almost 
a frame homomorphism. Again, because of the cardinality difference we are 
unlikely to have much luck if we take these maps to be standard. 
Question 3.48. Are there any non-standard frame homomorphisms between 
canonical frames, and if so what properties do they have? 
This is also a difficult question which we cannot ansvver in anywhere near 
a satisfactory manner, however we do make a start, both by looking at non-
standard non-frame-homomorphic maps in Chapter 8 and by looking at stan-
dard versus non-standard isomorphisms in Chapter 9. 
This thesis details some interesting results on these questions and conjec-
tures and it is the hope of the author that by studying simpler problems like 
Question 3.48 we will help bring about a solution to the elusive yet compelling 
Conjecture 3.28. 
frames) is called standard iff it is induced by a map between the underlying algebras-i.e., iff 
it is of the form g = J +· 
"I: 
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Chapter 4 
Neighborhood Semantics 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will introduce the notion of a neighborhood frame that will be 
used in subsequent chapters. As we shall see, the resultant semantics gener-
alise the more common and well known relational semantics of the last chapter 
yet they are still somewhat removed from the most general algebraic seman-
tics of Chapter 2. 
One central notion which we will introduce here is the concept of neigh-
borhood canonicity. This has a natural place in proving neighborhood com-
pleteness of various logics. As far as the author has been able to determine, 
the concept used here was first introduced by BRIAN F. CHELLAS in his book 
[13]. It is a little different to the notion introduced in the previous chapter as 
it allows some flexibility in what a canonical frame is, yet it does still force us 
to deal with the underlying Stone space. Clearly it is a useful concept as it 
generalises the notion of relational canonicity and so gives us yet another tool 
in which to investigate the phenomenon of canonicity. 
The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the general relationship be-
tween neighborhood and relational frames, thus indicating how the descent 
from 'well understood' relational frames to neighborhood frames often intro-
duces an element of mystery. 
For this chapter let us assume that we have one fixed infinite set of propo-
sitional variables P. Thus all our results can be thought of as being prefixed 
by a universal quantification over all infinite P. Also, we will suppress the 
subscript p on various symbols where appropriate, so AL, IL, BL, JL, and XL 
can all be thought to have an invisible subscript p. 
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4.2 Algebraic Frames, Completeness and Canonic-
ity 
There is a duality between neighborhood frames and what are sometimes 
called full algebras. This duality, comprehensively investigated by KOSTA 
DOSEN [17], is so strong that we will often forget about the associated neigh-
borhood structure and just deal with their algebraic equivalents. 
Recall Definition 2.21 which defined a power set boolean algebra to be a 
boolean algebra which is isomorphic to (P (X), n, U, -,, X , 0), where X is an 
arbitrary set, and P (./Y) is the power set of X. 
Recall our remarks in Section 2.8 which arrived at the fact that all inten-
sional logics were verified by their Lindenbaum algebras and so were com-
plete with respect to their algebraic semantics. While this worked easily, 
we did not introduce a concept of strong completeness-something which 
does not make sense unless we have something like a frame underlying it all 
(c.f. Definition 3.9). The reason is as follows: 
We could say that Lis weakly [strongly] complete iff for every £-consistent 
formula cp [set E], there is a valuation v on an S-algebra (A, I), (A, I) F L, 
such that v (cp) #- OA [v (cp) #- 0.4. for all cp E E]. Then the weak and strong 
completeness of every intensional logic L would be immediate as (A~, I~ ) and 
v~ would witness this fact for a suitably large P. 
As will be seen in the next section, it is more interesting to define complete-
ness in terms of algebraic frames; note how the definitions given here are in 
keeping with those in 2.46 and how, qualitatively, these definitions are similar 
to those in Chapter 3. 
Definition 4.1. An algebraic frmne is an S-algebra (A, I) with the property that 
A is a power set boolean algebra. 
An algebra that is an algebraic frame is sometimes called a full algebra. 
Here, if A= P (./Y) then each element of X can be considered to be 'a point 
in the frame'. 
Definition 4.2. An intensional logic L is weakly neighborhood complete iff for 
every £-consistent formula cp E S (P), there is an algebraic frame (A, I ), 
(A, I ) FL, A= P (X), a valuation v, and an x EX such that x Ev (cp) . 
Definition 4.3. An intensional logic L is strongly neighborhood complete iff for 
every £-consistent set E c S (P), there is a frame (A, I ), (A, I) F L, A = P (.X.), 
a valuation v , and an x E )(_ such that x E v ( cp) for each cp E E. 
It is no longer easy to show that Lis complete in either sense. 
Just as with the relational case we have a notion of the finite frame property, 
however it is not so different from what we had for algebraic structures: 
~ 
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Definition 4.4. A logic L is said to have the finite neighborhood fran1e property 
iff L is complete with respect to its class of finite algebraic frames. That is, if 
cp (/_ L, then there is a finite algebraic frame (A, I) such that (A, I) F L and 
(A, I)~ cp . 
This is not really a new concept because every finite algebra is also a finite 
frame. Hence again, the finite frame property corresponds to the finite model 
property. We do have the following result though: 
Proposition 4.5. If an intensional logic L has the finite model property ( or finite 
frame property) then it is also neighborhood cueakly complete. 
Proof Suppose that L has the finite frame property. That L is neighborhood 
weakly complete follows with little work, for if 'ljJ is an L-consistent formula, 
then cp = , '1/J is a non-theorem of L. Applying the finite frame property to cp 
we have a finite frame (B, J) with (B, J , v) ~ cp for some v . Thus v (cp) # T 8 
and so if B really is the power set P ( ){) say, then there is some x E X with 
x E v ( ,cp) = v ( 'ljJ) , as required. • 
We can now move on to the notions of neighborhood canonicity. 
Definition 4.6. For L an intensional logic, we define BL = P (XL). 
Now, BL is a good candidate for showing strong completeness over all L-
consistent sets I:, but BL must first be outfitted with a JL agreeable with IL. 
Definition 4.7. An intensional logic L is r;,-neighborhood-canonical iff for 
card (P) = r;, there is a JL so that (AL, IL) is an S-subalgebra of (BL, JL) and 
(BL , JL) F L. We say that L is canonical iff it is canonical in all cardinals r;,. 
This definition may seem slightly strange at first, however, the standard 
definition of canonicity for neighborhood semantics will be examined in the 
next section and readily seen to be equivalent to this one. 
We included the term 'neighborhood' in the definitions here to distinguish 
this type of completeness from 'relational' completeness-the use of the term 
'neighborhood' itself will be justified in the next section. If the context, such 
as when L has not been constrained to be normal, makes it clear which type of 
completeness we are talking about, we omit the reference 'neighborhood'. 
We note the immediate result: 
Proposition 4.8. If an intensional logic is neighborhood canonical then it is strongly 
neighborhood complete. 
As with the relational semantics, there is a relevant concept which will 
come up occasionally and that is the concept of a logic being neighborhood 
complex. 
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Definition 4.9. A logic L is neighborhood complex iff every algebra (A, I) for L 
can be homomorphically embedded into an algebraic frame ( B , J) for L. 
Certainly this is a more general concept than that of canonicity but which 
turns out to be a concept of interest for normal modal logics-we will note 
in chapters 5 and 6 that what are known as non-iterative logics~ and what we 
will call even logics, have this property. But for the moment, we will content 
ourselves with explicitly noting: 
Proposition 4.10. If L is neighborhood canonical then it is complex. 
4.3 Neighborhood Frames 
In proving most of the main results of this thesis we will avoid the direct use 
of neighborhood frames. However, it is important to see how the algebraic 
constructions introduced here are equivalent to the neighborhood frames ap-
proach and we will use neighborhood frames in our informal discussions as 
they are more intuitive. Moreover, the neighborhood frames approach does 
underline the need for a strong completeness result and this approach will 
give the desired form for our result. 
It should be stressed again that we are only considering the duality be-
tween frames (powerset, or full algebras) and full neighborhood frames. Of 
course, this duality can be made precise for all types of neighborhood frames 
and all algebras; the reader is advised to consult DOSEN [17]. 
Definition 4.11. A neighborhood frame for S is a structure of the form ( X , N), 
where JV== (Ni)iEidx and each Ni : X --+ P (P (X)ni). 
Definition 4.12. A valuation v on (.,Y, N), a neighborhood frame, is a map that 
assigns v(p) C X to each propositional letter p. The valuation v is extended to 
v : S (P) --+ P (X) as follows: 
1. v( 'I/J /\ <p) == v('l/J) /\ v('l/J) , etc., and 
2. for i E Idx, v (Di ('I/J)) == {x Iv ('l/J) E Ni(x)}. 
These neighborhood models are called minimal models by CHELLAS in [13] 
and the semantics are sometimes called Scott-Montague semantics. 
Note that by Definition 2.46 this gives us notions of satisfaction, complete-
ness, and even allows us to talk about£ (F) for Fa neighborhood frame. 
Without loss of generality, in what follows take (A, I ) to be an algebraic 
frame and take A to actually be P ( .)() for some set X. 
Each frame (A, I ) naturally defines a neighborhood frame and vice versa: 
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Definition 4.13. Given an algebraic frame (A, I), define (A, I)+, the neighbor-
hood frame derived from (A, I), as follows: Let (A, I) + = (.Xr, JV) where, for 
i E Idx, 
Ni ( x ) = { a I a 1 , a2 , ... , an i C 1Y, x E Ji (a) } . 
If v is a valuation on (..,Y, N) = (A , I) + it is also a valuation on (A, I ). By 
noting that, for i E Idx, 
V (Di ( ?j; )) = { X I V ( ?j;) E Ni ( X) } 
= { x I v ( ?J; ) E { a I x E Ii (a) } } 
= { X I X E Ii ( V ( ?j;) ) } ' 
we see that the extensions of v to (A., I) and (A, I)+ are identical and so pre-
cisely the same formulae hold over (A, I) + as over (A, I). 
Definition 4.14. If (1Y, N) is a neighborhood frame then set (..,Y, JV)+ = (A, I ) 
where A = P ( .,Y) and Ii (a) = { x I a E Ni ( x) } . 
In a similar way, we can see that the same formulae hold over (.,Y, N) and 
(1Y, N)+. It is also not hard to see that (A, I )++ = (A, I) and (.,Y, 1V)+ + = 
(1Y, N). 
A central quest of this thesis is the quest to find out which logics L are 
canonical. In the sense of neighborhood semantics, this means that we can 
find an NL such that (XL , NL) satisfies: 
1. (/YL, NL) FL, and 
2. ll ?/JI I E N/(x) ¢=> x E IIDk (?/J) II for each i E Idx. 
This is the definition of canonicity that can be found in CHELLAS [13, 
p. 252], modified to take into account multi-adic, multi-modal operators. 
In the light of what we have just seen, it will be enough to find a JL so 
that (BL, JL) FL and (AL, IL) is an S-subalgebra of (BL , JL), for then setting 
(/Y L, NL) = (BL , JL) + will give us cxL , NL) FL and 
11 ?j; II E JV/ ( X) ¢=> X E Ji ( 11 ?j; I I ) 
¢=> X E Ii ( 11 ?j; 11 ) 
¢=> X E I I Di ( ?j;) II . 
This is precisely the requirement that L is canonical. 
Since we have this close duality between neighborhood semantics and al-
gebraic frame semantics we will switch between the two depending on our 
needs. Typically it will be most convenient to use neighborhood frames when 
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discussing the import of certain results and, conversely, we will most likely 
use algebraic frame semantics in our technical derivations where the consider-
ation of 'neighborhoods' removes us a little too much from the mathematical 
undercurrent. 
4.4 Elementary Canonicity and Completeness Re-
sults 
Part III of CHELLAS's book [13] is devoted to an elementary introduction to 
the study of neighborhood semantics or, as he calls them, minimal models. 
We will reiterate some of the canonicity results noted there and then go on 
to provide some other elementary comments on canonicity and completeness 
that have been made. 
Firstly, note that unlike relational semantics, each formula in S (w) natu-
rally interprets as a condition on an algebraic frame and therefore a neighbor-
hood frame. In relational semantics we had to search around (and sometimes 
even failed) to find a first order condition on a frame that guarantees that the 
frame satisfied our logic, whereas with the algebraic semantics, and hence the 
algebraic frame semantics, the formula itself is the condition on the algebra 
that guarantees that the frame satisfies the formula. A simple translation will 
then give us the condition on the neighborhood frame, expressed in terms of 
the neighborhood function, that guarantees that the frame will satisfy the for-
mula. 
This relationship is made precise in ROY A. BENTON's paper [6], however, 
the translation is natural, and we will content ourselves with just listing, in 
Table 4.1, the translations for a few important formulae for the mono-modal 
case (we assume that each of the algebraic and neighborhood translations are 
universally quantified). 
CHELLAS notes in [13] that logics like EN are almost trivially canonical. 
To do this he uses what can arguably be called the smallest canonical frame. 1 
Over the canonical Stone space .)( L he sets 
rvL(x) = {llcpll I • cp EX} 
and so if the structure (.)CL , JVL)2 really is a frame for L then it is clearly a 
10£ course, CHELLAS does not have proprietary rights over this technique and the one given below since they appear in SEGERBERG's [72]. 
2This structure needs to be proven to be canonical, however before that point it is clearly a candidate for a canonical frame and so w e could use the apt term candidate L-canonical frame, which was coined by BE NTON in [6] 
ii; 
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Axiom Formula Algebraic Translation Neighborhood Frame Translation 
M O(p /\ q) • (Op/\ Oq) I(a /\ b) ~ I(a) /\ I(b) Y n Z E N(x) ===?YE N(x) and Z E N(x) 
C (Op/\ Oq) • O(p /\ q) I(a) /\ I(b) ~ I(a /\ b) ·y E N(x) and Z E N(x) ===? :y n Z E N(x) 
N OT J(T) = T XE N(x) 
K O(p • q) • (Op • Oq) I ( ,a V b) /\ I (a) ~ I ( b) (X - Z) UY E N(x) and Z E N(x) ===?YE N(x) 
4 Op • OOp I(a) ~ J(J(a)) }-TE N(x) ===} {y EX I)/ E N(y)} E N(x) 
D Op • •P I(a) ~ ,J(,a) )/ E N(x) ===? (X - )/ ) (/_ N(x) 
Table 4.1: Algebraic and neighborhood translations of common axioms. (Note: Xis the underlying set in the neighborhood frame) 
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canonical frame for L. In the case of simple logics it clearly is a canonical 
frame. 
Proposition 4.15. If Lis one of the logics EN, EC, or ECN, then the frame ():L, NL) 
is a frame for Land so the logics are canonical. 
Proof We prove the result for L = ECN however we suppress the superscript 
Lon X and N. We must verify the two conditions corresponding to C and N. 
(Vx EX) [.1Y E N(x)]. 
Let x EX. Since OT EL we have that OT Ex and so X = IITII E N(x) . 
(Vx E .1Y) (VY, Z ~ X) [YE JV(x) and Z E N(x) ===> Y n Z E N(x)]. 
Let x E .1Y, let Y, Z C X, and suppose that Y E N(x) and Z E N(x). 
Thus there are cp, 'ljJ E S (P) such that Y = JJcpJJ and Z = ll'l/JII, for some • cp E x and • 'lj) E x. But by C we can then conclude that •( cp /\ 'ljJ) E x so 
Y n Z = Jlcp /\ 'l/J II E JV(x). 
• 
One can then quickly see that simple logics which only have axioms of the 
form 
• po /\ · · · /\ DPn-1 ~ cp 
(where the propositional letters of cp are among {p0 , ... , Pn-i}) can be quickly 
shown to be canonical through use of this smallest canonical frame. Problems 
start when we have the mixing of propositional letters in the antecedents. A 
simple example of this is the logic EM, but this logic can be handled by adding 
to the elements of NL in a nai:ve way and this forms a new (XL, NL) which is 
what CHELLAS calls the supplementation of the minimal canonical frame: 
NL(x) = {17 C .1YL I (3cp ES (P)) [Dcp Ex and JlcpJJ C 27 )}. 
That is we take the smallest model and, as CHELLAS would say, supplement it 
by closing NL(x) under supersets. · 
Definition 4.16. A neighborhood frame (X, N) is called supplemented iff 
(Vx E _x·) (VY E N(x)) (VZ E p (X)) [Y C z ===;> z E N(x)]. 
Clearly our frame (_)CL , NL) is supplemented. 
Proposition 4.17. For L = EC and (XL, NL) the neighborhood frame given above, 
we have that (XL , NL) FL, i.e., (XL, NL) is a canonical frame for L. 
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Proof Again we suppress the superscript L. We need only verify the condition 
for • (p/\q)--+ (Dp/\Dq): 
(Vx E .,,Y; Y, Z ~ X) [·v n Z E N(x) ~YE N(x) and Z E JV(x)] 
Let x E _,,,y, let ·v, Z c _)C, and suppose that :v n Z E N ( x) . Thus there is a 
cp E S (P) such that JJcpll = YnZ and • cp E X. But both 1,.'", Z ::) 1-rnz = llcpll 
so we then have that 1''", Z E N ( x) as desired. 
• 
Of course things get more complicated as we add axioms, for instance if 
we were to look at a canonical frame for EMC we would need, what CHELLAS 
calls a quasi-filtering of our "smallest canonical frame." This is where we take 
the smallest canonical frame and close each JVL(x) under finite intersections, 
and then perform a supplementation-close under supersets. 
A final type of simple canonical frame construction that we will mention 
here is that which is provided in BENTON's paper [6], where he takes all non-
effable sets (not of the form JjcpJI for some cp) and puts them in NL(x) regardless . 
This will quite clearly be the largest candidate L-canonical frame. BENTON shows, 
along the lines given above, that if L includes formulae of the form 
cp --+ • po V · · · V • Pn-1 
(where the propositional variables of cp are all in {Po , ... , Pn-i}) then the largest 
candidate £-canonical frame verifies the condition corresponding to this for-
mula. Again, what we see here is a kind of lack of mixing of propositional 
variables. 
The canonical constructions we have seen so far are still rather simplistic 
as we make one global change to the canonical frame and then hope that this 
creates a candidate £-canonical frame which satisfies L. Unfortunately this 
is too much to hope for (even in some simple logics). In the same paper [6] 
BENTON shows that EK cannot be treated in this manner and goes on to carry 
out a very delicate construction of a canonical frame for EK from the smallest 
candidate £-canonical frame. 
The logic EK is an example of a class of logics known as non-iterative. This is 
a class where intensional operators are not allowed in the scope of intensional 
operators within some axiomatisation for each logic in the class. These are 
reasonably simple logics and so it is not surprising that they are all complete 
with respect to the neighborhood frame semantics-this was shown by DAVID 
LEWIS in [58] where he took the canonical model for a non-iterative logic and 
filtered it down to a finite frame for that logic. We will revisit that technique 
in Chapter 5 where we will use the same overall idea to show that this im-
r 
66 Neighborhood Semantics 
plies canonicity and the complexity of our proof will be testament to how the 
neighborhood canonicity question becomes complicated. 
We have seen that canonicity, and hence completeness, for some logics is 
reasonably straightforward. In fact, it has been almost immediate and so some 
people may think that this shows that there is little in neighborhood semantics 
beyond that given by algebraic semantics.3 This would be wrong, as BEN-
T0N's complicated and delicate proof that EK is canonical (and so strongly 
complete) reveals. Moreover, we will see in the next section that not all logics 
are complete with respect to the neighborhood frame semantics. 
4.5 Relational Frames and Neighborhood Frames 
As we originally stated at the start of this chapter, a neighborhood frame is 
a generalisation of a relational frame and here we will make this precise. Of 
course, when talking about relational frames we move into the realm of normal 
multi-modal logics-and this means that we take all our modal operators to 
be unary, and our logics to be normal. 
Definition 4.18. Let (X, R) be a relational frame. Then the neighborhood frame 
associated ·with (X, R) is the neighborhood structure (X, N) where, for i E Idx, 
Ni(x) == {Y C X I ~(x) CY}. 
If this happens, we say that (X, N) and (X, R) are equivalent. 
We then get the following immediate result which shows that as far as the 
language is concerned there is no difference between a relational frame and its 
associated neighborhood frame: 
Proposition 4.19. Let (X, R) be a relational frame and (X, N) its associated neigh-
borhood frame. If v is a valuation on one of the frames (X, R) and (..,\'", N) then it is 
also a valuation on the other frame and 
(\/cp ES (P)) (\Ix EX) [(X, R, v) Fx cp ¢==} (X, N, v) Fx cp] . 
We can reverse the process given above for if (X, N) is the neighborhood 
frame associated with (X, R), then for each x E X, R(x) = n N(x). How-
ever we cannot adopt such an approach with an arbitrary neighborhood frame 
since a full equivalence would require that each N ( x) is closed under arbitrary 
intersections and under supersets: 
3Note that I am not saying "algebraic frame semantics" here. 
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Definition 4.20. A neighborhood frame (X, JV) is augmented4 iff is it is supple-
mented and each JVi ( x) is closed under arbitrary intersections. 
Proposition 4.21. Each augmented neighborhood frame is equivalent to a relational 
frame and vice versa. 
Of course, we could have a perfectly good neighborhood frame for a nor-
mal multi-modal logic where some neighborhoods are not closed under arbi-
trary intersections, and we will see examples of this later. One thing we should 
note is: 
Proposition 4.22. Let (X, N) be a neighborhood franze. If ,C ( (..,Y, JV)) is normal then 
(X, N) is supplemented. 
Thus we can test a neighborhood frame for a normal logic to see whether 
it is essentially relational just by looking to see if it is closed under arbitrary 
intersections. 
One simple consequence of this fact is that any finite neighborhood frame 
for a normal modal logic is closed under arbitrary intersections and so it is 
always associated with a relational frame. 
We will see in Section 5.5 that for some ordinary normal modal logics we 
can find a neighborhood frame for that logic which is so 'non-relational' that if 
we were to take its augmentation-closing its neighborhoods under arbitrary 
intersections and supersets-we would end up with almost trivial neighbor-
hoods as each neighborhood would be very close to P (X). 
A more involved and revealing illustration of the non-relational nature of 
most neighborhood frames can be found in the papers of MARTIN GERSON. 
In these papers, and also in his Ph.D. Thesis [26], he investigates the relation-
ship between neighborhood semantics and other types of semantics for normal 
modal logics (including the algebraic and relational mentioned here). There 
are two major lessons from this work: 
1. The neighborhood frame semantics is strictly stronger than the algebraic 
semantics . In [28] he looks at two logics, the Thomason logic (presented 
by S.K. THOMASON in [97]) and the Fine logic (presented by KIT FINE in 
[19]). Both are examples of logics which are incomplete with respect to 
the relational semantics. GERSON shows that they are both also incom-
plete with respect to the neighborhood semantics. 
We saw that via the Lindenbaum construction each normal modal logic 
is complete with respect to its algebraic semantics. GERSON was able to 
conclude that neighborhood frames are essentially richer structures than 
algebras . 
• see CHELLAS [13, p. 220]. 
r 
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2. The neighborhood frame semantics is strictly weaker than the relational 
frame semantics. Gerson showed that there are normal modal logics (one 
above T [29] and one above S4 [27]) which are complete for the neigh-
borhood frame semantics but incomplete for relational frames. He ac-
complished this by constructing neighborhood frames whose logics are 
naturally complete with respect to their neighborhood frame semantics 
and these logics are then shown, after a bit of work, to be incomplete 
with respect to the relational semantics. Similar work was carried out 
by Dov M. GABBAY who also provided [24] such a neighborhood frame 
and associated logic. 
This also establishes that there are sensible neighborhood frames whose 
neighborhoods are not always closed under arbitrary intersections-
otherwise these frames could be turned into relational frames without 
affecting the logic. 
The kind of incompleteness result presented by GERSON has been taken 
further by LILIA CHAGROVA in [12] where she has taken a result of W.J. BLOK 
[7] (that the degree of relational frame incompleteness of a normal modal logic L5-
card ( { L' I (VF a relational frame) [ F F L ¢=} F F L']}) 
-is either 1 or 2w) and shown that the analogous result holds for neighbor-
hood frames. In fact, she showed that the degree of neighborhood frame in-
completeness of a normal modal logic is equal to the degree of relational frame 
incompleteness of that logic. 
The coercion process of turning a relational frame into a neighborhood 
frame also shows the following: 
Proposition 4.23. If a normal modal logic is relational canonical (in cardinal K,) then 
it is also neighborhood canonical ( in cardinal K,). 
The converse is, however is not so straightforward. 
Conjecture 4.24. If a normal modal logic is neighborhood canonical then it is 
also relational canonical. 
If we add up the anecdotal evidence available to us there is little indication 
that this result does hold. After all, we have seen that relational frame seman-
tics is stronger than neighborhood frame semantics so it does not seem unrea-
sonable to expect that there is a logic which does have a canonical neighbor-
hood frame yet it is not verified by its canonical relational frame. Remember 
5With one unary modal operator. 
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that we have a lot of freedom when it comes to choosing a canonical neighbor-
hood frame that might be suitable, however we have absolute constraints over 
which canonical relational frame we can choose. Why should they be related? 
Nevertheless, this is a natural question to ask and, in Chapter 6, we will show 
that the logic KMcK is a counter example to this conjecture. 
One of the problems we encounter when making the jump from relational 
frame to neighborhood frame semantics is that we lose a number of familiar 
notions. For instance, we can no longer talk about elementary classes of neigh-
borhood frames as there is no accessibility relation on which to hang our first 
order satisfaction. All we have are the conditions on sets in neighborhoods 
and these are essentially second order. Also missing is the notion of a gen-
erated subframe; as we will see in our appendix on the logic EK4 (Appendix 
A) every point in the frame could be important to the truth of some formulae 
and so no points can be dropped. We do have a notion analogous to a frame 
homomorphism (see DOSEN [17]) but this notion is little more than the homo-
morphism between the associated algebraic frames, so again we have lost the 
geometric aspect. 
We do, however have disjoint unions: 
Definition 4.25. Suppose that (Xk, JVk), k E K, is a collection of neighborhood 
frames. Then we define their disjoint union to be 
~ (X\ iVk) = (X, N), where 
kEK 
X = LJ _}Ck x { k} and, for i E Idx, 
kEK 
iVi ( ( x, k)) = { Y C _,,y I { y E X k I ( y, k) E }/ } E N/ ( ~r) } . 
Proposition 4.26. Suppose that (.,,Yk , iVk), k E K, is a disjoint collection of neighbor-
hood frames and v is a valuation on their disjoint union (.,,Y, JV). Then for each k E K, 
v 1 ... Yk is a valuation on ( Xk, Nk) which satisfies 
(Vcp ES (P )) (Vx E Xk) [()Ck, JV\ v) Fx cp ¢=:} ()( , N , v) Fx cp] 
and so£ ( (.,,Y, 1V)) = nkEK £ ( ( Xk, JVk)). 
We can also ask about the counterparts of other familiar concepts surround-
ing relational semantics. While, as we have seen,' disjoint union' does interpret 
naturally in our semantics, and' frame homomorphism' is present (albeit with 
a purely algebraic feel) [17L the crucial operation of taking a generated sub-
frame seems to be completely incompatible with neighborhood systems. How 
about the notion of cl-persistence? Can we define such a thing as a' descriptive 
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neighborhood' frame, and if so would this lead to something which is equiv-
alent to the notion of complexity, as in the relational semantics case? Without 
these, or similarly natural concepts, the theory of neighborhood frames is un-
likely to reach the sophistication of relational frame semantics that we see in 
works such as ROBERT GOLDBLATT's [32]. 
We finish off this chapter by noting an interesting relationship between 
neighborhood frames and relational frames. A logic L1 is said to simulate a 
logic L2 iff there is an appropriate translation t such that for all cp E S (P), 
cp E L 2 ¢::=} t(cp) E L 1 . MARCUS KRACHT and FRANK WOLTER have shown 
[51] that each monotonic classical logic6 is complete with respect to its neigh-
borhood frames iff it has a simulation which is complete with respect to the 
simulating logic's relational frames. KRACHT and WOLTER point out that any 
normal mono-modal logic falls into this category. 
6 A mono-modal, uni-arity, classical logic L is monotonic iff it satisfies the rule cp -+ 'ljJ E 
L ==> • cp -+ • 'ljJ E L. 
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Chapter 5 
Non-iterative Logics and Canonicity 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will concern itself with showing that an important class of weak 
intensional logics is canonical and so in one go we will identify a large vol-
ume of logics where canonicity is the norm. Of course, these logics are rather 
simple and so this result does not have the breadth needed to invalidate the 
idea that canonicity is an inherently interesting question about intensional log-
ics. This chapter will also highlight the not inconsiderable difference between 
neighborhood and relational canonicity by producing canonical neighborhood 
frames which can in no way be related to relational frames. 
The logics we look at in this chapter are the 'non-iterative logics' which 
were first introduced in DAVID LEWIS's 1974 paper [SSL where he showed that 
every intensional logic without iterative axioms has the finite model property. 
In effect, LEWIS showed that such logics are weakly complete, each non-thesis 
having a counter-frame. In an unpublished paper ROY A. BENTON [6] conjec-
tured that it should be possible to extend LEWIS's result to show that all such 
logics are strongly complete, in that every consistent set of formulae can be re-
alised in some frame, possibly even a canonical frame. In this chapter we will 
show that LEWIS's method can be reinterpreted and augmented to provide a 
positive answer to this question. 
In his book on modal logic [13, p. 261L CHELLAS sets as an exercise, the 
problem of showing that EK, the equivalential non-normal modal logic formed 
by taking D(p • q) • (Op • • q) as the only axiom, is canonical.1 As we 
have seen, and as CHELLAS had defined it, this means that we must find some 
neighborhood system over the canonical set of ultrafilters which treats the effa-
ble (definable) sets in an appropriate manner. While this gives us considerable 
1 Actually, he sets the problem of showing that EK is determined by its neighborhood 
frames, however, the method he had in mind was one which used canonical neighborhood 
frames . 
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leeway as to which structure we could choose, there is little indication of which 
non-effable sets can be included in any neighborhood and how they can be 
stopped from 'destructively' interacting with sets already there. This created a 
problem with a greater level of difficulty than CHELLAS first assumed. KRIS-
TER SEGERBERG, considered the logic EK in [72],2 where he commented that 
there was a completeness result (without proof). Eventually, EK was proved 
to be canonical in BENTON [6], where an elegantly constructed neighborhood 
frame was presented, however, this paper never saw print and the result lay 
forgotten. The logic EK returned to interest recently when it was revisited by 
CHELLAS and SEGERBERG [15]3 as part of a comprehensive investigation of 
modal logics in the vicinity of S 1. Again, completeness and hence canonicity 
of these non-iterative logics became a significant issue. This chapter is pre-
sented primarily as a solution to the EK problem, however, unlike BENTON's 
construction, the solution given here applies to all non-iterative logics and the 
chapter is presented with that in mind. 
The reader should be assured that the logic EK and its close relatives are not 
the only non-normal non-iterative logics to be found in the literature. FRANCIS 
JEFFRY PELLETIER's proposal for a logic of indeterminacy [64] is an example 
of a non-iterative logic well away from K. 
5.2 Non-Iterative Logics 
A number of the early modal logics had a decidedly simplistic structure, in 
that their axioms do not require that intensional operators interact too strongly 
with each other. Examples of such axioms are K D(p • q) • (Op • • q), T 
• p • p, D • p • •P, etc., and these axioms have the following common 
property: 
Definition 5.1. A formula cp E S (P) is non-iterative iff every subformula of the 
form Di t/J satisfies the requirement that no intensional operator occurs within 
any of the tPi· Set 
S1 (P) = { cp E S (w) I cp is non-iterative}. 
When we go beyond the scope of the simple modal logic of necessity and 
possibility and start mixing in other intensional operators, we see that the class 
2SEGERBERG dealt with only two types of canonical objects, the 'canonical model,' and 
the 'augmented canonical model', so he neither defined nor used CHELLAS's full notion of 
canonicity. 
3CHELLAS and SEGERBERG use PK to denote EK, so locating it within a class of classical 
logics which they call prenormal. 
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of non-iterative formulae includes a large number of well known formulae. 
LEWIS provided the following representative list of iterative and non-iterative 
formulae in [58]: 
Iterative axioms 
• p-+ • Op 
(p~q) -+ (• p~q) 
O (OP-+ p) 
Fp-+ -P - Fp 
Non-iterative axioms 
• p-+ p 
(p~q) -+ (• p -+ • q) 
- (OP & 0 - p) 
F(p -+ p) 
Using non-iterative formulae as axioms we can produce the non-iterative 
logics. 
Definition 5.2. A logic L is called non-iterative iff it can be axiomatised over 
the rules of modus ponens and replacement of provable equivalents by using 
only non-iterative formulae and Taut. 
We should stress here that not all formulae in a non-iterative logic are non-
iterative . For example •• p -+ • p is an instance of T. 
5.3 Power Set Boolean-Subalgebras 
Our goal in this Chapter is to show that all non-iterative logics are canoni-
cal and we get a hint at how to solve our problem of extending (AL, IL) to 
(BL, JL) by looking at the result of LEWIS [58]. Interpreted within the frame-
work of S-algebras, what he showed was: 
If (,4, I ) is an S-algebra and B is a power set boolean subalgebra of ~4 
we can find a J which agrees with I as much as possible and (B , J ) satisfies 
exactly the same non-iterative formulae as (.A. , I ). 
Informally, his argument is: 
Let B = P (.,Y ) , set Ji (b) = Ii (5) n X , and note that the non-iterative 
formulae will be unaffected precisely because they are non-iterative. 
In this section we will formalize these ideas and recreate LEWIS ' s result. 
We start with the idea of a boolean subalgebra agreeing as much as possible 
with its parent S-algebra. 
Definition 5.3. The algebra B = (B ) J ) is a quasi-S-subalgebra of A = (A, I ), in 
symbols B -< J., iff 
- -
l . B is a boolean subalgebra of A and 
2. (Vi E Idx) (Vb E B ) [ Ii (b) E B ===> Ji (b) = Ii (b)]. 
r 
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Definition 5.4. We say that B = (B, J) is a 1-S-subalgebra of A = (A, I), in 
symbols B <J _tL iff 
1. B-< _tL and 
- -
2. (Vcp E S1 (P)) [AF cp ====>BF cp]. 
So, by descending to a 1-S-subalgebra we are guaranteed to preserve the 
non-iterative formulae. But as we saw, not all the theses of a non-iterative logic 
are non-iterative. 
Lemma 5.5. Let L be a non-iterative logic. If B <J A and ~4 F L then B F L. 
Proof { cp I B F cp } is a logic and contains all of L's axioms. 
So now we can formalize and prove LEWIS's observation: 
• 
Theorem 5.6. Let (A, I) be an S-algebra and suppose that B is a power set boolean 
subalgebra of A. Then there is a J such that ( B , J) <J ( A, I ). Moreover, ( B, J) satisfies: 
(Vi E Idx) (Vb, CE B) [b ( Ii (c) ===? b ( Ji (c)]. 
Proof We can assume that there is some X such that A is a subalgebra of P (.,Y) 
(for instance, A 'is' a subalgebra of the power set of all its ultrafilters). So in 
particular A C P (X). 
Now Bis a power set algebra, so there is an isomorphism h: B --t P (Y) 
for some set Y. For each y E Y, h- 1 [y] is a nonempty set in P ( X), so we can 
actually take y E h- 1 [y] , thus without loss of generality we can have y · C X 
and h (b) = {y E Y I y Eb} = }" n b. So, define Ji (b) = h- 1 [Y n Ii (b)]. 
Since B is given as a boolean subalgebra of _tL confirmation that (B, J) <J 
(A , I) consists of two verifications: 
(1) (Vi E Idx) (Vb E B) [ Ii (b) E B ====> Ji (b) = Ii (b)]. 
Let i E Idx, b EB, and suppose that b := Ii (b) E B. Thus 
Ji (b) = h - l [ Y n Ii (b) ] = h - l (:Y n b] = b = Ii (b) . 
(2) (Vcp E S1 (P)) [(A, L) F cp ====> (Ii, 1) F cp] . 
Let v be a valuation on (B, J), which induces a map v B : S (P) --t B. 
Similarly, v induces a map vA : S (P) --t A. Since B is a boolean subal-
gebra of _tL it is a simple induction to show that for 1/J a boolean formula, 
i.e., a formula without intensional operators, vA ( 1/J ) = v B ( 1/J). 
Claim: (Vy E Y) (Vcp E 5 1 (P)) [y E v B (cp) <==} y E vA (cp)]. 
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Proof of claim: 
Fix y E y·_ The proof of this claim now proceeds by induction on the 
complexity of cp. The case of cp = pis immediate and the inductive steps 
where cp is a boolean combination are straightforward, so the difficult 
case is where cp = Di ( 'ljJ) and the claim holds for each '1/Ji· Remember that 
cp E S 1 ( P) and so each '1/Ji does not contain an intensional operator and so 
is simply a boolean combination of propositional letters. Thus our earlier 
observation that vB ( 'ljJ) = vA ( 'ljJ ) allows us to complete the proof of the 
claim: 
y E VB ( cp) {::::=? y E v 8 (Di ( '1/) )) 
{=::=? Y E Ji ( V B ( '1/) ) ) 
¢==} Y E Ji (VA ( '1/) ) ) 
¢==} y E h - l [ Y n Ji ( v A ( '1/) ))] 
¢==} y E Ji ( VA ( '1/) )) 4 
<===} y E VA (Di ( '1/) )) 
¢==} y EVA (cp) 
So for cp E S1 (P) with (A , I) F cp, we have that v B (cp ) = vA (cp) = TA = 
T 8 . Hence ( B, J) F cp. End of proof of claim. 
We now complete this proof by verifying the last condition mentioned in the 
conclusion of the theorem. 
(Vi E Idx) (Vb,c EB) [b ~ Ii (c) ===} b ~ Ji (c)]. 
Let i E Idx, b, c E B, and suppose that b ~ Ii (c). Then 
Ji (c) = h-1 [Y n Ji (c)] 
= h- 1 [(Y n Ji (c) n b) u (17 n Ji (c) n ,b)] 
= h- 1 [(Y- n Ji (c) n b)] u h- 1 [1/r n Ji (c) n , b] 
=:) h-1 [YnJi(c)nb] 
= h- 1 [Y n b] 
= b. 
• 
To fully recreate LEWIS's result we need to show that we can construct a 
1-S-subalgebra of the canonical algebra such that particular non-theses of L 
4Remember that we have already fixed y E Y. 
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do not hold in this structure. The following definition and lemma make this 
precise. 
Definition 5.7. Let D be a set, A an S-algebra. We say that D denies cp in A iff 
D C A and there is a valuation v on A so that for each 1/J <subj cp, v ( 1/J ) E D and 
v(cp)#TA. 
Lemma 5.8. Let B = ( B , J) -< ( A, I) = A and suppose that D C B denies cp in A. 
Then D denies cp in ( B , J). 
Proof Let v be the valuation which witnesses that D denies cp in A. Let v' be 
a valuation on B defined by putting v'(p) = v(p) for p <subj cp and v'(p) = TB 
otherwise. We make the following claim: 
Claim: (V'l/J <subj cp) [ v' ( 1/J) = v ( 1/J) ]. 
Proof of claim: 
This is proved by induction on the complexity of 1/J . The case of 1/J = p is 
immediate and the inductive case where 1/J is a boolean combination is straight-
forward. Now, in the case where 1/J = Di (x) <subj cp, with the claim holding 
for each Xi, we have that v (1/J) = Ji (v (x)) ED c Band v (x) ED c B by D 
denying cp . Thus by B -< A we can complete the proof of the claim: 
v (1/J) = Ii (v (x)) = Ji (v (x)) = Ji (v' (x)) = v' (1/J ). 
Thus (V'l/J <subj cp) [v' (1/J) = v ('l/J) ED] and v' (cp) = v (cp) #T A= TB· So D 
denies cp in B. End of proof of claim. 
• 
Now LEWIS' s theorem is almost straightforward: 
Theorem 5.9 (Lewis). Every non-iterative logic has the finite fra1ne property and so 
is weakly complete. 
Proof Let cp E S (P) be a non-theorem of L a non-iterative logic and so we 
have (AL , IL, vL) Jr cp . Let D'P = { vL ( 1/J ) I 1/J <subj cp }. Trivially D'P denies cp 
in (AL , IL). Since D'P is finite it generates B 'P , a finite boolean subalgebra of 
AL . Every finite boolean subalgebra is a power set boolean algebra and so by 
Theorem 5.6 there is a J'P so that (B'P, J 'P ) <J (AL, IL). Thus (B'P, J 'P ) FL since L 
is a non-iterative logic. Moreover, since D'P c B 'P and D'P denies cp in (B 'P, J 'P) 
we have that (B 'P, J 'P ) F cp. Thus (B'P, J 'P ) is a finite counter frame for cp . 
That Lis weakly complete then follows by Proposition 4.5. • 
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5.4 Canonical Frames 
Fix Las an intensional logic. In this section we will complete the construction 
of a canonical frame for L. 
In the previous section we noted that B cp is a boolean subalgebra of AL 
and so a J cp just fell out. Here the analogous approach would be to hope that 
BL is a boolean subalgebra of A. L. Unfortunately for us this is not true, but 
we will see here that it is possible to elementarily extend (AL, I L) to a larger 
algebra (CL , KL) with the property that BL is a boolean subalgebra of CL and 
the result will follow. 
Our extension from (AL, IL) to (CL, KL) will be through the use of an ul-
trapower construction and since this is essentially a compactness argument 
the resulting JL on BL will not be unique nor constructively defined in terms 
of (AL, IL) and so (BL 1 J L) can not really lay claim to the title "The Canonical 
Frame for L." In [6] BENTON produces a particular canonical frame for the 
logic EK and while this canonical frame has no claim upon being unique it 
does have the advantage of being constructively defined from (A. L . I L) .5 
Before we can attack the main ultrapower argument we need an initial re-
sult: 
Lemma 5.10. Let D be a finite boolean subalgebra of B L. Let F C X be finite. Then 
there is a boolean endomorphisnz h : D --t AL which is the identity on6 D n .-l L and 
(Vx E F ) (Vd E D) [x E d {::==;- x E h(d)] . 
Proof Let C = D n .-l L, and let 
Y = { c E C I c is an atom in C} and 
Z = { d E D I dis an atom in D}. 
Without loss of generality we can assume that F intersects each element of Z 
at just one point-otherwise, just increase D so that it includes the singletons 
{x} for x E F. 
For each C E Y let Z c = { d E Z Id ~ C}; sa Y Z c = {do, . .. , d~c _ 1 } and so 
C = do V, · · V d~c-1 ' Recall that each C E Y C .-i L is really a set of ultrafilters 
and since P is infinite, c is an uncountable set. Thus there are distinct points 
w8: ... } w c~c-1 E C. By our assumption given above we can make our choice so 
that all elements of F are represented among these w s. By the general theory 
of canonical models we can find ea , ... , e~c - 1 E _-iL pairwise disjoint sets such 
that wJ E ej and C = ea LJ · · · LJ e~c - 1' 
5Benton's analysis is in terms of neighborhood frames . 
6The boolean algebra D n .-l L is the boolean. algebra with underlying set D n AL . 
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Let D be the boolean subalgebra of AL generated by { eJ } cEY,j<nc . Now, 
{ eJ } is the set of atoms of D since each eJ does not meet any distinct ef and 
Uc,j ej = Uc C = TA · 
Thus we can define a map h: D--+ D by setting h (dJ) = eJ , c E Y, j < nc. 
This is a 1-1, onto map between the atoms of finite boolean algebras and so h 
is an isomorphism. Thus h : D --+ AL is an endomorphism. 
To see that his the identity on C it is enough to show that it is the identity 
on Y, the set of atoms of C: Let c E Y; then: 
h ( c) = h ( d~ V · · · V d~c _ 1 ) 
= h ( d8) V · · · V h ( d~c _ 1 ) 
= ec V · · · V ec 0 n c -1 
= C. 
To finish off the proof note that if x E F then there is a c E Y and some j such 
that x = wJ, telling us that 
de' 1 d · x E k <¢==? c = c an J = k 
I 
<¢==? X E e~ 
<¢==? X E h ( df ) . 
Using the homomorphic properties of h we then see that for any x E F and 
d E DI X E d <¢==? X E h ( d) . • 
Now we are in a position to deduce that the algebra BL is, in some sense, 
contained within an ultra power of AL. 
Theorem 5.11. Let L be an intensional logic .7 Then there is an index D, an ultrafilter 
U on D, and a map h : BL --+ A Ln /U such that: 
1. h is a boolean endomorphism into A Ln /U, 
2. h I AL = l, and8 
3. (Vu E ult (AL)) (Vb EB) [u 0 Eb{===} h(b) E l(u)]. 
Proof We will suppress the superscript Ls. Set 
D = { (D, F) I F C ./yL and D < Bare both finite} 
7There is no restriction, such as non-iterativity, on this logic. 
8 Recall that l : A. L ---+ A Lo /U is the Los elementary embedding. 
' l,1 
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and, for (D 0 , F0 ) E D, set 
U( D0 , F0 ) = {(D , F ) E D / Do C D and F0 c F } 
and choose U to be any ultrafilter which extends 
{U( D , F ) I (D , F ) E D}. 
This set clearly possesses the finite intersection property so we can be assured 
that it can be extended to an ultrafilter. 
For each 1 = (D , F ) E D we can use Lemma 5.10 to give us a map h, 
D --t A which is the identity on D n A and satisfies 
(V x E F ) (V d E D ) [ x E d ¢==;> x E h, ( d)] . 
~ ~ 
Now, create a map h: B --t A 0 by setting h(b)(1 ) = h, (b) and we are able to 
complete our definitions of h : B --t AO / U by setting 
h ( b) = [ h ( b)] ~u . 
We then have three conditions to verify: 
l. h is a boolean endomorphism into A.°)U. 
Let b1, b2 E B and let DO = ( { b1, b2}), the boolean subalgebra of B gener-
ated by {b1, b2}. Let ro = (D0 , 0) and 1 = (D , F ) E U(1 0 ) . Then 
~ ~ 
h (bi) ( r ) /\ h ( b2 ) ( r) = h, (bi) /\ h, ( b2 ) 
= h,(b1 I\ b2) 
= h ( b 1 /\ b2) ( r ) 
where the first and last lines follow because b1 , b2 E D0 C D. Since this 
held for each I E U( 1 0 ) E U we have that 
Similarly 
~ ~ 
h(bi) I\ h(b2) = [h(b1)] ~u I\ [h(b2)]~u 
~ 
= [h (b1) I\ h(b2)]~u 
= [ h ( b1 /\ b2)] ~u 
= h ( b1 /\ b2) . 
h (, b 1 ) ( r) = h, (,bi) 
= ,h,(bi) 
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~ 
= ,h(b1)(, ), 
and since this holds U a.e. we have that h( ,b1 ) = ,h(bi) allowing us to 
conclude that his a boolean homomorphism. 
To see that h is one-one note that if b1 # b2 then h, ( b1) # h, ( b2) since h, 
is one-one on D ::) D 0 ::) {b1 , b2 }. So 
~ ~ 
h(b1 )(1 ) # h(b2 )( , ) U a.e. 
~ ~ 
Hence h(bi) = [h(bi)]~u # [h(b2)]~u = h(b2). 
2.h1A=l. 
Let a EA, D0 = ( {a}), and ,o = (D0 , 0). We show that h(a)(, ) = a U a.e. 
by showing that it holds almost everywhere on the set U(, 0 ). 
So let , = (D , F) E U(, 0 ). Thush, istheidentityonDnA::) D 0 nA::) {a} 
and so h(a)(, ) = h, (a) = a. 
Hence h(a) = [h(a)]~u = [const (a)]~u = l(a). 
3. (\/u E ult (d)) (Vb EB) [u 0 Eb¢:::::=? h(b) E l(u) ]. 
Let u E ult (A) and set 
x = u0 = {cp E S(P) I llcpll Eu} E ,;yL_ 
Let b EB and set D0 = ({b}) and F0 = {x }. We show that 
u 0 E b ¢==;> h,(b) E u U a.e. 
by showing that it holds on U(D 0 , F0 ), for if , is in this set then: 
u 0 E b ¢:::::=? X E b 
¢:::::=? X E h, ( b) 
¢:::::=? h, ( b) E u. 
Now, we finish the proof by noting that, 
h(b) E l(u) ¢:::::=? h(b)(, ) E u U a.e. 
¢:::::=? h,(b) Eu U a.e. on U(D 0 , Fo) 
¢:::::=? u O E b. 
• 
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Lemma 5.12. Let L be an intensional logic. 9 Then there is an S-algebra ( CL, KL) 
satisfying 
1. (CL , J( L) F L, 
2. (AL , IL) is an S-subalgebra of (CL, KL), and 
3. BL is a boolean subalgebra of CL . 
Proof Again, we suppress the superscript Ls. Use Theorem 5.11 to find an 0, 
and an ultrafilter U satisfying the conclusion of that theorem. So h : B ----t 
AD /U is a homomorphic embedding with h 1A. = l. By Los's theorem AD / U F 
L, and l : A ----t A.° /U is also a homomorphic embedding. Thus we can 
rename the elements h( b) of h[ B ] to be just b and we will get an algebra ( C, I<), 
isomorphic to AD /U which satisfies conditions 1 (by ( C, K ) being isomorphic 
to AD / U and A.° / U FL), 2 (by h1A = land l being an elementary embedding) 
and (3 by h being an injective homomorphism) . • 
This lemma allows us to go on to the desired result that there is a JL so that 
(BL , J L) really is a canonical frame. 
Theorem 5.13. Let L be a non-iterative intensional logic. Then L is canonical, i.e., 
there is a JL such that (),_L, IL ) is a S-subalgebra of (BL, JL) and (BL , JL) FL. 
Proof Let ( CL , KL) be as given by Lemma 5.12. B L is a power set boolean 
subalgebra of CL . Thus by Theorem 5.6 there is a JL such that (BL, JL) <J 
(CL, KL). Now, (CL.KL) F LandLisnon-iterative,so (BL , JL ) FL. Thus it 
remains to show that (A.L, IL ) is an S-subalgebra of (B L, JL), and all we need 
to do for this is to show: 
(Vi E Idx ) (Va E .A. L) [ IF (a) = Jf (a)] . 
So let i E Idx and a E A_L_ By (AL. IL) a S-subalgebra of (CL , h-L) we 
have that If (a) = Kf (a) . This together with AL C B L gives I<F (a) E BL 
and since JL was constructed such that (BL, JL ) --< (CL,I<L) we can 
conclude that 
Jt (a) = Kt (a) = It (a) . 
• 
It is an observation of FRANK WOLTER [102] that the proof given here says 
a little more about non-iterative logics since our procedure effectively takes an 
algebra and shows how to construct a power set algebra over its ultrafilters. 
9Not necessarily non-iterative. 
r 
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This algebra could be called a 'canonical embedding algebra', however unlike 
the case of normal modal algebras there is no clear recipe for constructing 
them, and so this concept is inappropriate, or at best may only be available 
when a logic is provably canonical. We will content ourselves with reporting 
the apparently weaker extension of Theorem 5.13. 
Theorem 5.14. All non-iterative logics are complex. 
Our proof even shows that every non-iterative logic satisfies the neighbor-
hood equivalent of cl-persistence, however it is not clear if this concept is use-
ful, or even natural, in this semantic setting. 
5.5 The Normal Modal Logic Case 
If we were to confine our interest to the area of normal modal logics our re-
sult would be neither new or particularly astounding: We know from LEWIS 
[58] that all non-iterative logics are weakly complete, from KIT FINE [22] that 
all elementary normal modal logics are canonical, and from JOHAN VAN BEN-
THAM [99, p. 99] that all non-iterative normal modal logics are elementary and 
putting these together gives the result. Unfortunately this argument offers 
little precedent for the problem of this chapter as use of the canonical accessi-
bility relation is essential, and the argument detours through correspondence 
theory to allow application of FINE' s ingenious result. This argument does 
produce the full relational result of canonicity whereas our approach will just 
produce one of the many possible canonical neighborhood frames10 and may 
not correspond to the relation on the Stone space. 
The proof of Lemma 5.12, in many ways has the 'look and feel' of FINE's 
result, with the approach of taking frames for the logic, using compactness to 
mesh them together,11 and then dropping down to the canonical frame. How-
ever, our approach differs markedly in that whereas FINE used compactness to 
produce emulators of the saturated points of a canonical frame, our use of com-
pactness gave us emulators of the unconstrained sets of the canonical power 
set algebra. Whether this is all the similarity that there is, or that there is a 
deeper correspondence, is open for discussion, and considering these issues 
may produce a counterpart for the notion of elementarity in relation seman-
tics, which would allow us to emulate the classic proofs of normal modal logic 
in our more general domain. 
10Even though the technical discussion of this chapter was with reference to 'algebraic 
frames', this terminology is not that distinctive and so, as indicated in Chapter 4, for the pur-
poses of this informal discussion we will revert to the term 'neighborhood frame'. 
11 While we use ultra products, the result of this chapter can be obtained by compactness-
see (93]. 
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We now can consider how the different canonical neighborhood or, equiv-
alently, algebraic frames produced here relate to the underlying canonical 
relational frame. Remember that the canonical frame production procedure 
is entirely non-constructive and so there may be many canonical neighbor-
hood frames. We will now graphically illustrate this by presenting a canonical 
neighborhood frame which can in no way have an equivalent relational frame. 
In fact we will show that under any sensible definition of a relation on this 
neighborhood frame, the relation will be as small as it can possibly be. 
Remember that in this section we are dealing with normal multi-modal logics. 
We will start by looking at what it means for the neighborhood or, equiva-
lently algebraic, frame to induce a relation on its underlying set of points. 
Definition 5.15. Suppose that (X, JV) has an equivalent algebraic frame (A., I ), 
where A is just P (..,X-). Then this induces a sequence of binary relations R (I ) 
on _)( as follows, for i E Idx: 
Ri (I ) :== { (x, y ) I (Va E .4 ) [x E Ii (a) ==} y Ea]}. 
This is of course the natural definition which we would expect given the 
precedent of Definition 3.32, however it is a little non-standard because it 
moves from an algebra to its underlying set rather than its set of ultrafilters. 
It is the definition which would be natural if we were to assume that each 
neighborhood frame really did correspond directly to a relational frame . 
Now we proceed to show that our non-constructive approach to canoni-
cal neighborhood frames, or equivalently algebraic frames, does give us quite 
some leeway. Consider this analog of Lemma 5.12. 
Lemma 5.16. Let L be a normal multi-modal logic. 12 Then there is an S-algebra 
( C', !(' ) satisfying 
1. (C', K' ) FL, 
2. (AL, IL) is an S-subalgebra of (C' , K' ), 
3. BL is a boolean subalgebra of C', and 
4. (Vb1 , b2 E At BL) (Vi E Idx ) [b1 # b2 ==} b1 ~ I<i ( ,b2)] . 
Proof By Lemma 5.12 there is an 5-algebra (CL , KL) satisfying 
1. (CL , KL) FL, 
2. (AL, IL) is an 5-subalgebra of (CL, KL), and 
12 Not necessarily non-itera tive. 
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3. BL is a boolean subalgebra of CL. 
To facilitate ease of reading and to avoid clutter we will drop the superscript L 
throughout. It is also worth reverting to the consideration of Bas a power-set 
algebra, P (X). 
For each pair (x , y) E 2 X, choose an ultrafilteru; according to the following 
prescription: 
1. If Y = X then set u; : = { y C 1Y I X E y}. 
2. If y # x then u; is any non-principal ultrafilter which extends13 
{11 4? 11 I <p E y} · 
Note here that u; extends { 114? 11 I <p E y} regardless of whether or not x # y. 
Now for each x EX define a map hx : P (X) --+ P (X), as follows 
hx ( }7 ) : = { y E )( I Y E u;} . 
Claim: (Vx E X) [hx : B --+ Bis a boolean homomorphism]. 
Proof of claim: 
Let x E X. We then have 2 verifications: 
(1) (VY, Z ~ X) [hx (Y n Z) = hx (Y) n hx (Z)]. 
Let}', Z C X and let y E -"Y: 
y E hx (Y n Z) ¢=? Y n Z E u; 
¢=? } ' E ux and Z E ux y y 
¢=? y E hx (Y) and y E hx ( Z) . 
¢=? y E hx (Y) n hx ( Z) . 
(2) (VY ~ 1Y) [ hx (X - Y) = "-y- - hx (Y)]. 
Let 17 C X and let y E -"y: 
y E hx (-"Y - Y) ¢:::=? X - Y E u; 
13Such a non-principal ultrafilter can be found since X - {y} can be added to this set. 
For if not then there exist <p1, . .. ,<pn E y such that IJ<p1II n · · · n ll<pnll n (.,Y - {y}) = 0, so 
ll<p1 /\ · · · /\ <pn II n (.,Y - {y} ) = 0 . But <p := <p1 /\ · · · /\ <pn E y, so IJ <pl J n (.X - {y}) = 0, so 
Y E ll<pll C {y }. This tells us that IJ<pJJ = {y} and since we have taken our language to be 
infinite this means that for some p0 not in the propositional variables of <p, p0 E y ( or •Po E y ), 
so <p • Po E L (or <p • , p0 ) so by substitution of 1- / p0 (or T /p0 ), <p • 1- E L, thus JJ<pJJ = 0, a 
contradiction . 
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End of proof of claim. 
Claim: (Vx E X ) [ hx I A is the identity]. 
Proof of claim: 
<===} y (/_ ux 
y 
<===} Y (/. hx ( l'r) 
<===} y E X - hx (Y.) . 
We prove the following assertion, for x E )C. 
(V cp E 5 ( P) ) [ hx ( 11 cp 11 ) = 11 cp 11] · 
Let cp E 5 (P ) and let y E X . Then 
Y E hx (llcpll) <===} llcpll Eu: 
<===} (t) E y 
<===} y E llcpll' 
85 
where the second line follows because u; extends { llcpll I cp E y} which is 
itself an ultrafilter in the restricted algebra A . 
End of proof of claim. 
Thus hx I A : (A , I ) --+ (.A. , I ) is an 5-algebra isomorphism. 
Now define (C' , K' ) := fi xEX (C, J() and define h : B --+ C' by 
h ( b) ( x) = hx ( b) . 
Remember that hx : B --+ B < C so each component of h is a homomorphism 
and thus h is a homomorphism. Moreover each hx r A is an isomorphism so 
hr A is an isomorphism of ( .A., I ) to h [A]. Moreover 
Claim: h is an injection. 
Proof of claim: 
Let y·, Z c X and suppose that ·v -1- Z. Without loss of generality take 
y E Y - Z. Thus y E ·v, so Y E Ut , so y E hy (Y.) = h(Y )(y). But y (/_ Z, 
so z (/_ ui I so y (/_ hy ( Z ) = h( Z ) (y) . Thus h(} r) (y) -1- h( Z ) (y) I allowing us to 
conclude h(Y ) -1- h( Z ). End of proof of claim. 
The function his an injective boolean homomorphism so, modulo su itable 
renaming of elements, we can think of 
3. B [as] a boolean subalgebra of C', 
and since h can be thought of as the identity on J_, we can think of 
2. (A , I ) [as] an 5-subalgebra of ( C' , J(') . 
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Since ( C', I<') is a power of the algebra ( C, K) which itself satisfies ( C, J() F L 
we have that 
l. (C', K') FL. 
This only leaves our last condition which we write as 
(4) (\Ix, y E .,,Y) (Vi E Idx) [x # y ===} x E I<i (.,,Y - {y} )]. 
Let x, y E )(, i E Idx, and suppose that x # y. We really want to show 
that 
(\/ z E X) [ h( { x }) ( z) C Ki ( X - h ( {y}) ( z))] 
which we will rewrite slightly as 
(\/ z E _,,y) [ h z ( { x}) ~ Ki ( h z (_)( - { y}))]. 
Let z E _,,y and let w E h2 ({x}). Thus {x} EU! and we can imme-
diately conclude that x = z = w since this is the only possibility for 
a smallest element of an ultrafilter. Remember now that x # y, so 
X E _,,y - {y} Eu:. 
hz ( ./X: - {y}) = _,,y 
Let u E _,,y and remember that z = x . We have two cases 
Case u = x 
ThusX - {y} Eu: =U:,sou E hz (X - {y}). 
Case u # x 
Thus u: is non-principle and so X - {y} E u: which tells 
us that u E h z ( _,,y - { y}) . 
Hence 
h2 ( { x}) C )( 
= Ki (.,,Y) by normality 
= I<i ( h z ( X - { y})) . 
• 
Remark 5.17. We didn't really need the full force of normality for this result. 
It would have gone through for any logic that contains the axiom Di T for each 
i E Idx, however the value of this result is only in its ability to say something 
about logics with underlying relations. 
We can now move towards our result, however we do need the following 
definition: 
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Definition 5.18. Given any set vV we define the diagonal relation ti (vV) as 
follows: 
6 (vV) := { (w, w) I w E vV}. 
Theorem 5.19. Let L be a non-iterative normal modal logic. Then L is neighborhood 
canonical and it has a canonical frame (BL , JL) ·where, for all i E Idx, 
~ (JL) C 6 (/YL). 
Proof This proof follows that of Theorem 5 .13 in form, however we need to 
look inside the proofs of Theorem 5.13 and the results it depends on to identify 
some important elements which we will exploit in this proof. 
We start by noting that there is a ( C' , K' ) satisfying conditions 1 through 4 
of Lemma 5.16. We use the reasoning of Theorem 5.13 to see that there is a J L 
such that 
(AL , IL) < (BL ' JL) <J ( C' ' I{' ) . 
We must now show that 
(Vi E Idx) [R (JL) ~ 6 (.x~L) ]. 
Let i E Idx and assume that there exists x, y E .;\. L with x -/- y and (x, y) E 
R ( JL). Thus by condition 4 in Lemma 5.16 (which was used to produce 
(C',K')), 
{ x} C Ki ( ),: - { y}) . 
But if we look closely at Theorem 5.6 which gave us the operators JL, we 
have the extra condition on J L: 
(Vb ) C E BL) [ b C J( I ( C) ===? b C Jf ( C)] . 
Thus taking b := { x} and c := .Ly - {y}, and our observation above, we 
can conclude that 
{ x} C Jf ( X - { Y}) . 
But this means that x E JF (.LY - {y} ) and since (x, y) E R ( JL), we can 
conclude that y E .Ly - {y} a clear contradiction. 
• 
Remark 5.20. This result cannot be sharpened, for consider any logic L which 
verifies the axiom T in index i, then if (A, J) F L, A = P (W ), and (w , w) tf_ 
~ ( I) we would have that there was some a E A such that w E Ji (a) and 
w tf_ a. But this contradicts Dip -t p E L. 
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5.6 Canonicity for -Iterative Logics? 
While this paper has established canonicity for non-iterative logics, the canon-
icity, or even completeness of iterative logics, is wide open. To the best of my 
knowledge there is no result establishing even the finite model property for 
the logic EK4. 14 The next chapter will be able to answer this question for some 
iterative logics that we are unable to consider through the techniques of this or 
earlier chapters. For instance we will be able to show that the McKinsey logic 
is neighborhood canonical. Unfortunately EK4 still remains elusive and while 
we will have canonicity if we can demonstrate the finite model property for 
EK4 we do not know if we even have the finite model property. This makes 
EK4 an ideal candidate for studying the adequacy of neighborhood seman-
tics for simple non-normal logics. Appendix A details my early thoughts on 
the behaviour of this system and anyone thinking seriously about the major 
problem of the completeness of EK4 should consult that Appendix. 
14Any naive attempt to carry out a filtration quickly ends in despair because there is no 
apparent or na tural way to determine the action of I on a boolean combination of sets which 
were forced into our subalgebra. 
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Chapter 6 
Canonicity for Even Logics 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 5 we saw that every non-iterative intensional logic is neighbor-
hood canonical. In that chapter there were no indications of how one could 
extend this result to iterative logics. Of course, from Chapters 3 and 4 we have 
well known relational canonicity results for some normal modal logics that 
immediately gave us a few results, and we also had the elementary techniques 
of BRIA_N CHELLAS [13] and their refinements given by ROY A . BENTON [6] 
which gave us others. Unfortunately the normal modal logic results shed no 
light on the situation with sub-normal modal logics and the elementary tech-
niques of CHELLAS and BENTON only worked for a narrow class of artificially 
simple logics. 
Even the results for normal modal logics had gaps in them. Recall our 
Conjecture 4.24: 
Conjecture 6.1. If a normal modal logic is neighborhood canonical then it is 
also relational canonical. 
A worthwhile logic to pursue with regard to this conjecture is the McKin-
sey logic KMcK. As noted in Chapter 3 this logic is neither elementary nor 
canonical-as shown by GOLDBLATT [34]. Could it be that it is neighborhood 
canonical? It does have the finite frame property (see FINE [21]), and maybe 
this could be used to construct a canonical neighborhood frame. We could ask 
ourselves an even easier question about this logic. Recall that WANG [101] 
has shown that KMcK is not strongly complete for the relational se·mantics, so 
what happens when we replace relational frames by neighborhood frames? 
In this chapter we advance our understanding of the concept of neigh-
borhood canonicity by identifying a large class of easily recognised logics for 
which the finite model property will imply neighborhood canonicity. In fact, 
this class includes the so called uniform logics of KIT FINE [21] and so we will 
quickly get the canonicity of FINE's uniform class-since he showed that these 
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logics have the finite model property. As FINE points out, the McKinsey logic 
is in this class and so we will have found a counter example to the conjecture 
above, and then the possibility that the McKinsey logic is not neighborhood 
strongly complete is also dismissed. 
6.2 Even Logics 
In this section we shall define what it means for a logic to be even, provide 
some examples, and compare this notion to that of KIT FINE' s uniform logics 
of[21]. 
Definition 6.2. We define Se (P) C S (P), the set of even formulae, to be the 
smallest subset of S ( P) containing 
{Di ep I i E Idx , ep E S0 (P)} 
and which is closed under all logical operations. 
A logic is called even iff it has an axiomatisation that consists entirely of 
even formulae. 
Thus we can easily spot a non-even, or uneven, formula just by seeing if it 
has a subformula which is a boolean combination of intensional formulae and 
propositional letters. The table below gives examples of formulae which are 
even and formulae which are uneven-not even. 
Even Formulae 
• (p-+ q) -+ (• p-+ • q) 
• p-+ •• p 
• •p-+ • Op 
OT 
Uneven Formulae 
• p-+ p 
p-+ (• q-+ p) 
• (• p-+ p) -+ • p 
p-+ D+• -P 
In [21] FINE defines the following classes-where he dealt with mono-
modal normal logics, i.e., Idx is of cardinality one, and the arity of • is also 
one. 
Definition 6.3 (Fine). We define the sets unif (n), for n E w, as follows 
unif (0) := {Diep I i E Idx , ep E So (P)} , 
and unif ( n + l) is the closure of 
{Diep I i E Idx , ep E unif (n)} 
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in S ( P) under the boolean operations. The collection of all uniform formulae 
is then the set 
unif (w) := LJ unif (n). 
n Ew 
A uniform logic is one which has a uniform axiomatisation. 
Note that the 4 axiom: • p ••• pis not uniform yet it is even. 
As FINE points out, a uniform formula is one where the propositional let-
ters are all nested within a "uniform" number of intensional operators. Clearly 
this rules out the prospect of having a subformula where a propositional letter 
is in boolean combination with an intensional operator so we get: 
Proposition 6.4. Every uniform formula is also even and every uniform logic is also 
even. 
FINE proved [21, p. 234], through a technique of constructing finite models 
out of the subformulae of a formula itself, the following theorem. 
Theorem 6.5 (Fine). All uniform normal mono-modal logics have the finite model 
property and so, if finitely axiomatisable, are decidable. 
When FINE refers to the Finite Model Property he is, of course, referring to 
finite relational frames but these are, of course, a special case of neighborhood 
frames. 
As in the previous chapter we will assume that Pis some fixed set of propo-
sitional letters, we will suppress the subscript p, and we will then get that all 
results given in this chapter hold for all infinite sets of propositional letters P . 
6.3 Even Pairs 
In this section we disclose, well ahead of time, the trick we will use to prove 
canonicity. Remember that we have to take our power set algebra BL and 
stick a JL onto it and often it will not be clear exactly how such a JL could 
be defined. Here we show one technique for generating such a sequence of 
functions in such a way that the even formulae are preserved. Of course, the 
conditions necessary for this to go through are relatively restrictive: 
Definition 6.6. We say that B and A are evenly paired iff: 
l. B is a boolean algebra, 
2. A is an S-algebra, 
3. There is a homomorphism h: B ---+ A., 
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4. There is a homomorphism g : .A --t IL and 
5. For each i E Idx, 
(\/ a E A) [g ( Ii ( h o g (a))) = g ( Ii (a))] . 
When this happens, we write ( ( h : B +-------t A : g)) . 
Under these apparently restrictive conditions we can define our J. 
Definition 6.7. The operations J on B induced by ( (h : B +-------t (A, I) : g)) are 
defined as follows: For i E Idx, b E B, 
Ji (b) = g ( Ii ( h (b))). 
Now it is just a matter of verifying, at least as far as even formulae are 
concerned, that this definition preserves validity. 
Theorem 6.8. Suppose that ( (h : B +-------t (A, I) : g) ) and that (A, I) F L for L an 
even logic. Then for L the induced operations on IL 
(B , J ) FL. 
Proof Suppose that v is a valuation on (B, J). Define v' a valuation on (A, I) 
by setting 
v'(p) = h(v(p)) . 
Thus by h being a boolean homomorphism v' (?/J) = h(v(?/J )) for 11/J E S0 (P). 
Claim: (\/cp E Se (P )) [v(cp) = g(v'( cp))] . 
Proof of claim: 
By induction on the complexity of cp as an even formula. 
Base Cases: cp = • i?/J for 11/J E S0 ( P ). Thus 
v(cp) = v(• i'l/J) 
= Ji ( V ( 11/J) ) 
= g ( Ii ( h ( V ( 11/J ) ) ) ) 
= g ( Ii ( v' ( 11/J))) 
= g( v' (• i?j))) . 
-Inductive Hypothesis: Assume that the result holds for the formulae in 11/J E 
Se (P). 
Inductive Step: Suppose that cp is built up from the components of 11/J in one 
step. 
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Case cp = ?/J1 /\ ?/J2 . 
Then we have the equalities: 
Case cp = • ?/J1. 
V ( cp) = V ( '1/) 1 /\ '1/)2) 
= V ( ?/J i) /\ V ( '1/)2 ) 
== g(v'( 'l/J1)) /\ g(v'( 'l/J2)) 
== g( v' ( ?/J1) /\ v' ( ?/J2)) 
== g( v' ( ?/J1 /\ ?/J2)) 
== g(v'( cp)) . 
Then we have the equalities: 
Case cp = Di?/J-
v(cp) == v(,7/Ji) 
== ---,v( ?/J1) 
== ---,g ( v' ( ?/J1)) 
== g ( ---,v' (?/Ji)) 
== g( v' (-,?/Ji)) 
== g(v'( cp )). 
We get the following sequence of equalities: 
v(cp) == v(Di?/J) 
== Ji ( V ( ?p) ) 
== g ( Ii ( h ( V ( 7/J ) ) ) ) 
== g ( Ii ( h (g ( v' ( 7/J ))))) 
== g(Ii(v'( ?/J ))) 
== g(v'(• i?/J )) 
= g(v'(cp)). 
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Where the fifth line follows because of the fifth condition on B and ( A, I) 
being evenly paired. 
End of proof of clairn. 
Now assume that (B , J ) Ji: L. Thus there is an even axiom cp and a valuation 
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v such that (B, J, v) F cp. Let v' be as given above. Hence 
g(v'(cp)) = v(cp) #TB, 
but since g is a homomorphism v'( cp) #TA and so (A, I, v') F cp a contradiction 
to (A, I) F L. • 
This gives us the criteria around which the rest of this chapter will be 
aimed. 
6.4 Even Logics with the Finite Model Property 
In this section we will slowly work our way through the main proof of this 
paper, namely that all even logics that have the £mp are neighborhood canon-
ical. So, fix our logic L which we take to be non-trivial, even, and to have the 
finite model property. Take D, U and h to be the result of applying Theorem 
5.11 to the canonical algebras for this logic. Throughout this whole section, we 
suppress the superscript L, so we will take it as given that A represents AL, J 
represents JL, etc. 
Take C to be the class of finite S-algebras that verify Land take IF to be the 
class of all homomorphisms from A to elements of C. 
Proposition 6.9. Each f : A --+ C in IF has an associated homomorphism 
f' : AO / U --+ C - -
such that f' o l = f. 
Proof Let C and f be as in the hypotheses of this proposition. 
Note that since C is finite, for each a E A0 , there is a c(a) EC such that 
f(a(,)) = c(a) U a.e. 
This is because f (a(,)) has only a finite number of possible values, hence one 
of these values must come up almost all of the time. 
For a E An /U set f' (a) = c(rep (a)) and then it readily follows that f' is a 
homomorphism and that f' o l = f. • 
Now we observe, using the homomorphisms in IF, that every ultrafilter in 
a finite S-algebra for L will be, in some sense, realised in an ultraproduct of 
the canonical algebra: Let C E C, f E IF, f : A --+ C and let z E ult ( C). Then 
J'- 1[z] E ult (A0 /u). 
(" 
I 
I 
'11 L 
Ill 
111 
§6.4 Even Logics with the Finite Model Property 95 
Definition 6.10. Define the set of pseudofinite points to be 
W = { f' - 1 [ z] I C E C, z E u 1 t ( C) , f : A ---+ C in IF} . 
Note that W is nonempty as the following argument shows: L is non-
trivial, has the finite model property and so there is a ( C, J() E C such that 
( C , K) ~ c.p for some c.p (/. L . Thus there is a valuation v on ( C, K ) such that 
v(c.p) -IT. Define a map f : (A, I) ---+ (C, K ) by taking f (11 7/J II) = v(?/J). 1 Then 
f E IF. 
Since A O /U is an ultrapower of the canonical algebra we could think of 
its ultrafilters as being sets of formulae in some non-standard, extended lan-
guage. Then, each element w E W would correspond to a maximal consistent 
set in this extended language, and so vV would define, in a manner following 
GROVE [36], a theory t(vV) of all, non-standard, formulae which hold through-
out W. We will show, relative to the appropriate notions for our algebraic 
point of view, that every element of XL can be thought of as being an exten-
sion of t(W) and inverting this procedure will give us a map g which will 
satisfy: ( (h: B ~ A 0 / U: g) ). 
The set W can be thought of as "the collection of points in finite frames for 
L" and so we can think of t(vV) to be "the theory of finite frames for L." So 
what exactly is t(W)? 
Definition 6.11. t(W) = {a E A0 /U I (Vw E vV) [a E w] } = n W. 
The analog of a theory in a language is a filter in a boolean algebra. 
Proposition 6.12. The set t(W) is a proper filter. 
Proof This consists of a number of verifications. Let a, e E A0 /U. 
a,e E t(W) ==} al\ eE t(W). 
Let a, e E t(W ) and w E W. Thus a, e E w so a I\ e E w . 
a E t(W) and a~ e ==} e E t(vV). 
Let a E t(W), a~ e, and let w E W. Thus a E w and so e E w. 
J_ (/. t(W). 
W-/= 0 so take w E vV. Thus J_ (/. w => t(vV) . 
1This is well defined for i£ 111/JII = llxll then 1/J H x EL so v(?/J ) = v(x) . 
• 
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Since t(W), in some sense, represents the class of all finite algebras for Lit 
also has some properties like that of a class of algebras: 
Proposition 6.13. Let a, e E A0 /U and i E Idx. Then 
a He E t(vV) ~ i (a) H i(e) E t(W). 
Proof Suppose that a He E t(Wt let w E W, and let (C, Kt f, z give rise to 
w. Then a He E J'-1 [z'] for all z' E ult ( C). Thus 
(Vz' E ult (C)) [J(ci H ~) E z'] 
- -
~ f (a) H f (e) == TC 
~ K i(f (a)) H Ki(f (e)) ==TC 
- -
~ f(Ki(a) H Ki(e)) == Tc 
- -
~ J(J<i(a) H Ki(e)) E z 
~ K i (a) H J(i (~) E w == j'- 1 [z]. 
The first of these clearly holds so we are left with the last and desired result. 
• 
The next two propositions show, in effect, that each x E XL can be made 
into a maximal consistent extension of t(Hl ), which could be thought of as 
meaning that each x E XL 'extends' to a point in a finite frame. 
Proposition 6.14. For all u E ult (A), the set l[u] has the finite meet property. 
Proof Let l(a) , l(e) E l[u] for a, e Eu. Thus a!\e Eu and so l(a)!\l(e) == l(a!\e) E 
l[u]. So all we have to show now is that each element of l[u] is non-1-. 
Assume that l(a) == 1- for a E u. Thus by l being an elementary embedding 
(and so one-one) and by 1- == l(1-) == l(a) == 1- we have that 1- == a, so a rf_ u, a 
contradiction. So 1- rf_ l[u]. • 
Proposition 6.15. For all u E ult (A), the set l[u] Ut(vV) has the finite meet property. 
Proof Assume not. Individually, l[u] and t(W) have the finite meet property so 
there must be an a E u and an e E t(vV) such that l(a) !\ e == 1-. Thus e ~ ,l(a), 
so ,l(a) E t(vV). 
But a # 1-, since a E u, so ,a # T. We can take a == Jlcpll, so , cp rf_ Land 
thus, by L having the finite model property there is an algebra C E C for L 
which denies , cp. Hence there is a valuation v on C such that v(,cp ) #Tc - As 
before, v induces a homomorphism f : A ---+ C such that J( ,a) == J(ll , cp ll) == 
v( , cp) #TC· - -
Take z E ult (C ) such that f'(l(,a )) == J (,a) rf_ z . Setw == J'- 1 [z] and we see 
that l (,a) rf_ w . Thus ,l(a) rf_ w, a contradiction. D 
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Let us now pick a function which witnesses the extendability of x E .,\" L to 
maximal consistent extensions of t(vV). 
Definition 6.16. Define a function (: ult (A) ---+ ult (An /U) as follows: 
((u) = {l(u) 
any ultrafilter extending l[u] U t(T1V) 
We now observe that vV is completely covered by(. 
Proposition 6.17. range ( () => W. 
if l ( u) E vV 
otherwise . 
Proof Let w E W and suppose that this is witnessed by C, J E JF, and z E 
ult (C). That is, w = J'- 1[z]. Set u = 1- 1[z] and we are done with the following 
claim ( since then ( ( u) = l ( u) = w). 
Claim: l ( u) = w. 
Proof of claim: 
Let a E An /U, and take a= rep (a). 
a E l(u) <¢===? a(, ) Eu U a.e. 
End of proof of claim. 
<¢===? a(,) E f - 1[z] U a.e. 
<¢===? f (a(, )) E z U a.e. 
<¢===? (3c EC) [J(a( , )) = c U a.e. and c E z] 
<¢===? (3c E C) [!' (a) = c U a.e. and c E z] 
<¢===? j' (a) E z U a.e. 
<¢===? a E j'- 1[z] = w. 
• 
As the 't' function is anti-monotonic and since each ((u) extends t(vV) we 
can conclude: 
Corollary 6.18. t(range (()) = t(W). 
We already have the h which was given by Theorem 5.11, so in order to 
apply Theorem 6.8 we need to produce a g: 
Definition 6.19. Take g : An /U ---+ B to be defined by 
g(a) = { XE XL I ci E ((x*)}. 
Since B is a powerset boolean algebra it is immediate that: 
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Proposition 6.20. The map g is a boolean homomorphism. 
Our next result will show that g respects t(W). 
Proposition 6.21. (va E AD /U) [a E t(W) ===} g(a) == Ts]. 
Proof Let a E AD /U and suppose that a E t(W). Thus a En range((), so 
g(a) == { X E XL I a E ((x*)} == XL == TB· 
• 
To show that we are in a position to apply Theorem 6.8 we only need prove: 
Lemma 6.22. ( (h: B ~ AD /U: g) ). 
Proof We just need to verify the last condition of Definition 6.6, which in our 
case is: For each i E Idx 
( Va E A0 /U) [g(I;(h o g(O:))) = g(I;(O:))] . 
We do not need to verify something so complicated since by Proposition 6.13 
together with Proposition 6.21 we need only show: 
(va E AD /U) [h O g(a) H CLE t(W)]. 
So let a E AD/U, w E Wand let x E XL be such that x* == (- 1 (w), so 
l(x*) == w. Thus, by the last condition on h given by Theorem 5.11, 
Thus a H h(g(a)) E w. 
a E w <==* a E ((x*) 
<==* X E g(a) 
<==* x*0 E g(a) 
<==* h(g(a)) E l(x*) == w. 
• 
So applying Theorem 6.8 we get a J such that (B, J) F Land canonicity 
can quickly follow: 
Theorem 6.23. If L is an even logic with the finite model property then L is neigh-
borhood canonical. 
Proof Since we have that (B, J) F L we need only verify that (A, I ) < (B , J), 
and for this we need only show: 
(Vi E Idx) (Va E A) [ Ji (a) == I i (a)]. 
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Let i E Idx and a E A. Then 
...--.. 
Ji (a) = g ( Ii ( h (a) ) ) 
...--.. 
= g ( Ii ( l (a) ) ) 
= g ( l ( Ii (a) ) ) 
= { x E XL I l ( Ii (a) ) E ( ( x *) } 
= {x E XL I l(Ii(a)) E l[x*] } 
= { x E XL I Ii (a) E x * } 
= Ii(a), 
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where the first line follows by Definition 6.7, which gave us our L the 
fifth line by ((x*) n l[A] = l[x*],2 and the most of the other lines by l being 
an elementary embedding. 
• 
As with our result on non-iterative logics we have also essentially shown 
that each even logic that also has the finite model property is complex. 
Another simple extension of this theorem is that if we had another power-
set boolean algebra B' = P ( )(') where l- 1 [vV] c ./Y' c XL then we can also 
find a suitable J' such that (B', J') F L. In some sense, the 'non-finite' points 
were irrelevant to neighborhood canonicity. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Our main conclusion, foreshadowed in our introduction, is: 
Corollary 6.24. All uniform normal modal logics are neighborhood canonical. 
Proof As FINE showed in [21], each logic in this class has the finite model 
property. Since they are uniform they are also even and the result follows. • 
Corollary 6.25. The logic KMcK is neighborhood canonical. 
This answers a question posed in [93]. 
This chapter has enlarged the class of logics which we know to be neigh-
borhood canonical. This still leaves many gaps since there are many logics 
which are neither uniform nor have the finite model property. Thus it is nat-
ural to ask if there are any other syntactically defined classes like the class of 
even logics for which similar tricks can be carried out. 
2The set ((u) extends l[u] which exhaustively bisects l[A.]. 
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Also, how important was the assumption that the logics have the finite 
model property? We needed it because finiteness was essential in taking 
a homomorphism f : A ---+ C and 'extending' it to a homomorphism 
f' : A0 /U ---+ C. If we had another class of even logics and associated al-
gebras for which we could do this we would get a similar result. Perhaps this 
technique could be used to demonstrate that neighborhood canonicity in one 
cardinal implies neighborhood canonicity in higher cardinals. 
There are many worthwhile uneven logics which have the finite model 
property and we can ask whether these logics are canonical. Consider, for 
instance, the provability logics KG and KGrz (The normal logics axiomatised 
by • (• p -+ p) -+ • p and D(D(p -+ • p) -+ p) -+ p respectively). These logics 
are known to have the finite model property yet not be relational canonical. 
Can we adapt our proof here to show that these logics, too, are neighborhood 
canonical? 
Finally we can ask how our neighborhood constructions relate to the 
canonical relational constructions. Are there lessons to be learned here for 
relational canonicity? 
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Chapters 5 and 6 dealt with neighborhood canonicity while Chapters 8 and 9 
will deal with the more traditional notion of canonicity and the fixed notion 
of a canonical ·accessibility relation and enclosing frame. This chapter will 
provide the middle ground. Here we will present an approach to canonicity 
that will be able to give us a large section of existing and well understood 
relational canonicity results. At the same time, the technique is perfectly able 
to handle canonicity for non-iterative non-normal logics. This is a technique 
that is truly independent of the bounds of normal or, if we consider JONSSON' s 
work [43] which has a very similar theme, additive logic. 
A result of relative simplicity is that the canonical model for a normal modal 
logic L satisfies L, and, as we saw, the situation becomes more mysterious 
when we move down to the canonical frame and ask whether this more gen-
eral structure satisfies L: Some logics fail to be determined by their canonical 
frame, while other logics are almost trivially determined by their canonical 
frame. Traditionally, canonicity is proven by first detouring through an analy-
sis of the elementary conditions that the canonical frames satisfy. 
Without using the elementary properties of the canonical frame, we cannot 
get much of an idea of how non-effable sets1 interact to either verify a logic or 
reject it. With the canonical model (XL, RL , vL) it was easy because each set of 
interest has the form llcpll and so just by the fact that llcpll = X for cp an axiom 
we conclude canonicity. It would be nice if we could simulate this process for 
sets not of this form, i.e., if Z is any set then there is some formula cp and some 
"interpretation" U such that Z = llcp llu, where llcp llu = { x I cp Eu x}, and which 
will allow us to conclude ll ?); llu = .,\for ?); an axiom, simply from the fact that 
1Not of the form ll <f ll for some <p E S (P). 
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'ljJ E x for all x so 'ljJ Eu x . If we can then ensure that (for the most part), for 
i E Idx, ll • icpllu = Ii (llcpllu), llcp /\ '1/Jllu = llcpllu n 11'1/Jllu, and 11 , cpllu = X - llcpllu 
we would have canonici ty. 
This chapter will create such a notion of 11 -llu and will use it to show that 
the canonicity of any Sahlqvist logic can be derived in this fashion. This will 
show relational completeness for each of the Sahlqvist logics. 
As a result, this is not surprising. Completeness has been known since 
SAHLQVIST [68] and what is more, Sahlqvist has at least given us a description 
of the frames for these logics. On a more theoretical level we know that all 
elementary logics are canonical so, unless the results of this chapter can ap-
ply to some logics which are not elementary, we are not going to prove some-
thing new. What this chapter does show, however, is that the elementarity part 
of completeness is unnecessary2 and it is the author's hope that this chapter 
sheds some light on the relationship between elementarity and canonicity-
particularly in the light of the conjecture that elementarity is equivalent to 
canonici ty. 
This chapter does take some time to fully develop all the necessary machin-
ery for Sahlqvist' s Theorem, however the flavour of the result can be sampled 
by just reading to the end of Theorem 7.10 at which point the Ultrafilter Se-
mantics will have been introduced and a motivational theorem will have been 
proven. 
At an appropriate point in our development we will take some time out 
to show that the technique of "Ultrafilter Semantics" can also handle non-
iterative logics and we will rederive, with some prompting from Chapter 5, 
the results of that chapter. This, more than anything, motivates our interest 
in this technique as a conceptual tool since it crosses the border separating 
normal from non-normal logics. 
Before continuing we should note that there is a strong similarity between 
the work reported here, and the algebraic techniques of BJARNI JONSSON. In 
[43] he uses the ideas of JONSSON and TARSKI's [44] and an extension by H. 
RIBEIRO [ 67] to show that the Sahlqvist logics are canonical. The essence of 
his work is to analyse the behaviour of closed sets under the action of positive 
terms. 
JONSSON's work is part of a small but significant body of results that al-
ready exists in the area that could be described as "Sahlqvist without rela-
tions" and beyond that is an even larger body of work on extending additive 
operators to perfect extensions. This chapter was not written as an exposition 
of a shiny new technique in canonicity theory, rather it is meant to be a bridge 
between the earlier and later results of this thesis. So, a full analysis in keep-
2This is also a result of JONSSON's [43]. 
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ing with the existing literature is not within the scope of this work. We w ill 
however provide comment in Section 7.9 on the work that has already been 
carried out in this area and we will indicate how our results fit in. 
7.2 Notation 
We will adopt a slightly different notation in this chapter so that our treatment 
of sequences of subsets of the canonical frame will be transparent. In this 
chapter we use two different sets of propositional letters. 
Firstly, we will take L to be a fixed logic and, in all but Section 7.5, we will 
take L to be a normal modal logic. 
We then fix (.,Y, R) as the canonical frame for L over P, suppressing the 
subscript P and superscript L. 
We have this result about the nature of an Ri image of a point. 
Proposition 7.1. For x E .1Y, i E Idx, Ri ( x) is a closed and thus compact set in )C. 
Proof From the definition of Ri(x) we have 
Ri ( X) = { y E .,\ I ( X' y) E Ri } 
= {y E ){ I (Vcp E s (P )) [Diep EX==> cp E y] } 
= n llcpll -
• icpEx 
This is an intersection of clopen sets and so is closed. • 
We can now move onto our second set of propositional letters Q . For each 
Z C ./y we will want a representative in Q. Specifically, for each Z E P (X), 
let d(Z) be a new distinct propositional letter. Let Q := { d(Z ) I Z E P (.1Y) }. 
Then, of course, S ( Q) is the set of all well formed formulae constructed from 
Q using the same connectives as before. 
A central notational tool of this chapter is that of the P (X) -sequence. For-
mally, such a sequence is just a function with domain P (./Y) , but because 
we will interpret statements about these P ()C)-sequences non-standardly we 
need to distinguish them in our notation. 
By writing re 
7 
we will mean a sequence of objects indexed by P (.1Y), 
i.e., (e( Z ) I Z E P (.,Y)). 
In particular we will adopt the following conventions: 
1. If W is some object that has already been fixed (e.g. S (P )) then by rvV
7 
we will mean the P (X )~sequence which uniformly takes the value T1V. 
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2. As with ordinary finite sequences, if T(x 0 , ... , Xn-i) is a relation between 
the values of P (X)-sequencesr a0
7
, ... ,r an_ 1
7
, thenbyT( a0
7
, .•• ,r an_ 1
7) 
we mean that Q holds "pointwise/' 
i.e., (\/Z E P (_,,,Y)) T(ao(Z), ... , an-i(Z)). 
For instance, by writing 
r 7r 7 r 7 r 7 r 7 
cp , 1/J E S ( Q) , and ~ L cp --+ 1/J 
we are requiring that for each Z E P (_,,,Y) 
cp( Z) , 1/J( Z) ES (Q), and ~L cp( Z )--+ 1/J( Z). 
3. As with ordinary finite sequences, if vV is fixed, re 7 E r vV 7 , and g : i,v -t 
1/ then by g( e 
7
) we mean the sequence (g (e( Z )) I Z E P (.,Y)) . 
4. The P (.,Y) -sequence r D7 E r P (.,Y) 
7 
will be the diagonal set, namely: 
(Z I ZEP (_,,,Y) ). 
We will think of elements of S ( Q) as functions of P (.,Y)-sequences, i.e., we 
write cp E S ( Q) as cp C d7) and cp C 1/J 7 ), for r 1/J 7 E r S (P(, will mean the element 
of S ( P) obtained by replacing each occurrence of d( Z) in cp by 1jJ ( Z). 
Via the usual interpretation of the connectives T, ..l, /\ , V, ,, Di, •i as the 
operations .,Y, 0, n, U, ,, Ii, Ji on P (X) we get from cp C d7) ES (Q) a function 
<P : r z 7 E X f-----t <PC z7). 
In this way a logic will be canonical if£ for all cp in an axiomatisation of L, 
and all r Z
7 
E r .,Y
7 
we have that <PC Z
7
) = X-in fact, by L being closed under 
substitution, it is enough to show that <P CD 7) = .,Y 
We can think of sequences r x 
7 
E r X
7 
as residing in IlzEP(X) .,Y, however as 
foreshadowed by our notation, it is more convenient to think of them as resid-
ing in r ..-Y
7
. Further, we will not talk about arbitrary subsets of r .,Y
7
, instead we 
will abuse the terminology and take a subset of r .,Y7 to be an object of the form 
r Z
7 
such that r Z
7 c r X 7. We can go further in our abuse and talk about open 
and closed subsets: 
Definition 7.2. r Z
7 c r X 7 is called closed if£ for all},,. E P (.,Y), Z (}r) is closed 
in X, and open (basic-open) iff for all Y E P (.,Y), ZCY) is open (basic-open) in 
.,Y. 
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Note how all this conforms with our concept of a property of the compo-
nents of r Z 7 , r _,,,y 7 (in this case closure of one in the other) holding iff it holds 
pointwise on each component. 
We should underline the fact that r Z
7 
is basic-open iff it is of the form 11 r 1/) 
7
11 
r 7 r 7 
for some 'z/J E S ( P) . 
7.3 Ultrafilter Semantics 
In Chapter 8 we will show how non-standard maps between canonical frames 
can be defined by using an ultrafilter to 'average' out a collection of map-
pings between the underlying languages. We will use a similar technique here, 
whereby we use an ultrafilter to tag each set Z E P (X) with a propositional 
letter d(Z) and ensure that d(Z) is appropriately interpreted as Z. 
Definition 7.3. Let Q := {' µ 
7 I r µ 7 E rs ( P) 7}. 
Fix, for the moment, U an ultrafilter on O and we will be ready to define 
11 • llu, our interpretation of formulae in S ( Q). 
Definition 7.4. For each cp C d 7 ) E S ( Q) let 
llcpllu := { X E X I {r µ 
7 
I cp C µ 7 ) E X} EU}, 
i.e ., llcpllu = { x E _,,,y I cp C µ 7 ) E x U a.e.}. 
Immediately we can derive a number of simple consequences of this defi-
nition: 
Proposition 7.5. For each cp ES (Q), 11 , cpl lu = ,ll cp llu• 
Proof Let x E ){. Then 
x E 11,cpllu ~ , cp C µ 7 ) Ex U a.e. 
~ cp C µ 7 ) (/_ x U a.e. 
~ not [cp C µ 7 ) Ex U a.e.] 
~ x E , jjcp Jlu• 
Proposition 7.6. For all cp , 'z/J E S ( Q), 
llcp /\ 'z/J llu = llcp llu n ll'z/J llu-
• 
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Proof Let x E Jy_. Then 
x E ll cp /\ 1/Jl lu ¢::::=} (cp I\ 1/J )( µ 7 ) Ex U a.e. 
¢===} cp C µ 7 ) E x and ?j; C µ 7 ) E x U a. e. 
¢===} cp C µ 7 ) E x U a.e. and 1/J C µ 7 ) E x U a.e. 
¢===} x E ll1Pllu and x E 111/Jllu• 
• 
Thus we immediately get the following: 
Proposition 7.7. For all cp, 1/J E S ( Q) 
1 . . llcp V 1/J llu = ll1Pllu u 11/Jllu, 
2. llcp-+ 1/J llu = -il l1Pllu u 111/Jllu, 
3. llcp H 1/Jl lu = { x I x E ll1Pllu <==? x E 11?/Jllu Land 
4. llcp-+ 1/Jl lu = )C ===} llcpllu C 111/)llu• 
One other immediate consequence of Definition 7.4 is this crucial result. 
Proposition 7.8. Let cp E S ( Q). Then~ L <p ===} llcpllu = X. 
Proof Suppose that ~ L cp and let x E ~Y. Thus ~ L cp C µ 7 ) for all r µ 7 E D since 
L is closed under substitution. Thus cp C µ 7 ) E x for each r µ 7 E D and so 
x E ll1Pllu• D 
Unfortunately things do not run as smoothly when the Di connective is 
compared with the interior operation Ii. 
Proposition 7.9. Let cp E S ( Q) and i E Idx. Then 
1. ll • icpllu C Ii (ll1Pllu) and 
2. ll•cpllu => Ji (ll1Pllu)-
Proof (1) Let x E ll • icpllu• Thus U := {r µ 7 I Diep C µ 7 ) E x} E U. We want to 
show that ~(x) C llcpllu• So let y E ~(x) . For all r µ 7 E U, Diep C µ 7 ) E x so 
cp C µ 7 ) E y. Thus cp C µ 7 ) E y U a.e. So y E llcpllu• 
(2) Follows from (1) by duality. • 
The reverse inclusions do not usually hold because it would amount to re-
quiring that U is closed under (certain) infinite intersections. We wilt however, 
construct a U so that the reverse inclusions do hold for certain 'V • 
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As a prelude for what is in store we are now in a position to prove a simple 
canonicity result. This will give the flavour of the arguments to come and 
readers are asked to keep the argument given here in mind as our our full 
result is nothing but a generalisation of this. 
Theorem 7.10. Let m, n E w, i, j E Idx. Suppose that •?P --+ • jmp E L. Then 
(X , R) r= •?P--+ • jmp. 
Proof Let Z c )( and let p = d( Z ). We need to show that ff ( Z ) C If ( Z). For 
each finite F C _/y let 
U(F ) = {r µ 7 ED I (Vx E F ) [µ(Z ) EX <===} X E Z]} • 
From this definition it can readily be seen that 
(V F 1 , F2 C X finite ) [U( F1 U F2) C U( Fi) n U(F2)] 
so {U(F) IF C X finite} will have the finite intersection property if we can 
show: 
Claim: (VF C _/y finite ) [U( F ) # 0] 
Proof of claim: 
Let F C X be finite. Since Fis finite and we are in a Hausdorff space)( we 
can find basic open sets (11(/)xll I x E F ) such that 
(Vx, y E F ) [x E 11(/)yll <===} x = y] . 
Define rµ 
7 
to be any P (_/Y)-sequence which satisfies 
µ (Z) = V (/)x • 
xEFnZ 
We must verify that 
(Vx E F ) [PCµ 7 ) E X <===} X E z] 
Let x E F 
p( µ
7
) E X <===} µ (Z ) EX <===} V (/)y E X 
yEFnZ 
<===} (3y E F n Z ) [(l) y E x ] 
<===} (3y E F n Z ) [x = y] 
<===}XE Z. 
So rµ 
7 
E U( F ) # 0 . End of proof of claim. 
So let U extend {U( F ) I F C ) (_ finite}. 
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Claim: l!Pllu = Z 
Proof of claim: 
(C) Let X E z. Thus (vr µ 7 E U( { X})) [PCµ 7 ) E X] and so PCµ 7 ) E Xu a.e. 
giving x E l!P llu• 
(:J) Let x E --,z. Thus 
(\frµ 
7 
E U ( { X})) [ p ( µ 
7
) ~ X] 
and so not [PCµ 
7
) E x U a.e. ] giving x ~ IIPllu• End of proof of claim. 
Now, the canonicity condition is easy to verify: 
Jt(Z) = It (IIPllu) 
C ll • ?Pllu 
C ll• JmPllu 
CIT (IIPllu) 
= J5(Z) 
With the first line following from the second claim, the second and fourth lines 
from Proposition 7.9, and the third line from~ L • np -+ • imP and Proposition 
7.8 (4) and Proposition 7.7. • 
We have proved that these (obviously elementary) logics are canonical and 
so complete with respect to their relational semantics. Unfortunately the proof 
sheds no light on the nature of the logics' relational frames, however the proof 
is entirely by basic properties of the canonical model and depended only on 
the fact that we can express Z as lld(Z) llu• 
In subsequent sections we will refine this approach and show that we can 
provide "instant" canonicity for all the Sahlqvist logics. 
7.4 Combining Ultrafilters 
Before proceeding we can save some conceptual effort later on by discussion 
how ultrafilters can be 'combined.' This will of course be based on how we 
combine elements of ultrafilters and, even more fundamentally, on how we 
combine elements of their elements. 
Definition 7.11. For r µl 7 ' r µ2 7 E D define r µ1 /\ µ2 7 E D as follows: 
(VZ E P (X)) [(µ1 /\ µ2) (Z ) = µ1(Z) /\ µ2(Z)]. 
In this way we can define r /\a EF µa 
7 
for Fa finite set and r µa 
7 
E D, for a E F. 
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We deliberately ignore issues raised by different orderings of F. 
Definition 7.12. Let O = (Ua I a E F) be a finite sequence in P (D). Define: 
@ U : = { r (\ µa 
7 
I (Va E F) [' µa 
7 
E U a] } · 
aEF 
_, 
This will not work for U an infinite sequence, so we need the services of an 
auxiliary ultrafilter. 
Start with any set G. Let r( G) := { F I F c G is finite}. For each F0 E r( G) 
let 6(F0 ) c P (r ( G)) be defined by 
6(Fo) :={FE r(G) IF :J Fo}. 
Clearly {6(F ) IF E f(G)} has the fip since F E 6(F) and 6(Fi) n ~(F2 ) 
6(F1 U F2 ). So it can be extended to an ultrafilter v7(G). We will take this 
ultrafilter to be fixed for each set G. 
Definition 7.13. Let O = (Ua I a E G) be any sequence in P (D). For 6 E v7(G) 
set 
{8)0:= LJ@ (U0 laEF) . 
6. FE6. 
Now we can define the 'conjunction' of a sequence of ultrafilters: 
_, 
Definition 7.14. Let U = (Ua I a E G) be any sequence of ultrafilters over 
P (D). Let 0 Ube a (fixed) ultrafilter which extends 
{ C?pD I (Va: EC) [U0 E U0 ] ,6. E 'v (C) } , 
a set that clearly has the finite intersection property. 
This conjunction construction will come in useful once we have introduced 
the various types of positive formulae in Section 7.6. 
7.5 Non-iterative Logics Revisited 
We will take a break now from our progression towards Sahlqvist's theorem 
to show that our approach does unify the normal and non-normal. That is, 
we will use the technique of ultrafilter semantics to rederive the canonicity of 
non-iterative classical logics. 
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For this section only, take L to be any classical multi-modat multi-adic 
modal logic. 
In obtaining our canonicity result we will decide whether to put Z into 
J\ T(x) by looking at whether x E II D:z:d(Z)llu · Of course, we need to work a 
little to show that there really is a U that will satisfy the canonicity condition 
and get rid of ambiguity. 
For each finite G c P (.X'" ), let D (G) be the finite boolean subalgebra of B L 
generated by G and let C(G) = D (G) n A_L_ 
Each r µ 
7 
E D induces a map A(µ 7 ) : BL --+ .A_L defined by A(µ 7 )(Z ) = 
ll d( Z ) C µ 7 ) II • 
vVe can now start the process of defining our ultrafilter U. For a finite F c 
_Y, and finite G c P ( ... Y ) let [/ (F > G) be the set 
{ ' µ 
7 
ED j,,\( µ 
7
) is a one-one homomorphism on D (G) 
which is the identity on C ( G) and 
for each x E F and each Z E G, x E Z ~ x E ,,\ (' µ 
7
)(Z ) }. 
Lemma 7..15. For finite F1 i F2 C _)( and finite 1G11 1G2 C P (JC) 
1. U(F1 U F2 ) G1 U G2 ) C U( F1i Gi) n [I( F21 G2 )f and 
-(F1 } 1Gi) i= 0 . 
Proof (1),. This follovvs easily from the fact that each of the defining properties 
of U( F 1 1G) is closed under subsets,. 
For (2), Lemma 5.10 guarantees the existence of a homomorphism h which 
satisfies the properties of,,\ ('µ 
7
) ,. For any Z E G, h(Z ) EA so set d(Z )(' µ 7 ) = 
here ll'PII = h(Z).. • 
From this Lemma 1/,re see that 
{U(Fl G ) I F' C X and G C P (){ ) are finite} 
can be extended to an ultrafilter U,. 
Lemma 7.16 . For all {() E S (P )r and all i E Idx, ll• id(ll y ll) llu = ll• i'P II 
Proof Let {{) E S (P ), Z := II\DII, F' := 0, and G := { Z}. For all ·µ 7 E [I (F, G ), 
~("µ") is the identity on D (G) n A=> {Z}. Thus 
ll d(Z )(" µ
7
)11 = >. ( µ ')( Z ) = z = 11 1{) 11 -
This tells us that r-L d(Z )(" µ.,) H cp and so by the fact that Lis at least a classical 
logic i-L • id(,Z)(' µ") ++ • i\Ur vvhich means that 1r• id(Z )(r µ ' ) 11 = ll• icp u. 
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We have just shown that x E IJ • id(Z) C µ 7 ) II U a.e. iff x E ll • icpllu, i.e., 
x E li• id(Z) llu iff x E /IDicp//u as required. • 
Now we can see that U ensures that d(Z) really does represent Z. 
Lemma 7.17. (\/Z E P (,,,Y)) [//d(Z)llu = Z]. 
Proof Let x E ){, and let r µ 
7 EU( {x }, {Z} ). Thus 
x E Z ¢==} d(Z)( µ 
7
) E x . 
Since this held for any r µ 
7 we have that 
x E Z ¢==} ( \/r µ 7 E U ( { x} , { Z})) [ d ( Z) ( µ 7 ) E x] 
By U ( { x}, { Z} ) E U we get that 
x E Z ¢==} x E /l d(Z)llu• 
Now, for i · E Idx, define JV(x) := { Z Ix E IIDid(Z) Ji u}. Thus Ii (Z) 
l!Did(Z) llu -
• 
We must verify that N satisfies the first condition of a neighborhood canon-
ical frame that is given in Chapter 4 
Lemma 7.18. For all <p E S ( P) and i E Idx, 
// cp 11 E Ni ( X) <==> Di cp E X. 
Proof This is just a restatement of Lemma 7.16: 
II cp I I E Ni ( x) <==> x E II Did ( II cp II) llu = II Diep II 
<==> Diep E X . 
• 
As a final lemma before the main theorem of this section, we need to verify 
that ll 4?llu really is representative of what it claims to represent-at least for 
non-iterative formulae. 
Lemma 7.19. Let cp E S1 ( Q) have propositional variables among (d( Zk)) k<n · Then 
ll<t?llu = <P ( Z) · 
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Proof We proceed by induction on the complexity of ep. 
The base case follows by Lemma 7.17. 
The Boolean steps follow by Propositions 7.6 and 7.5. 
The only remaining step is when we deal with Diep for ep E S0 ( Q). We 
know that llepllu = <P (Z) by the inductive hypothesis. Let vV = <P (Z), and we 
must show that Ii (W) = IIDiepllu• 
So let r µ 
7 
E u (0, {Zo, ... ' Zn-1} u {liVo, ... 'vVni-1} ). Since >-C µ 7 ) is a 
boolean homomorphism we get that >-C µ 7 )(vV) = <P (>.C µ 7 )(Z) ), telling us 
that 
r--L d(vV)( µ 
7
) Hep(µ 
7
) 
and so 
r--L Did(W)( µ 
7
) H Diep(µ 
7
) , 
Hence Ii (vV) = IIDid(Zo)C µ 
7 )11u = IIDiepllu as required. 
Now we are able to provide a canonicity result. 
Theorem 7.20. All non-iterative logics are neighborhood canonical. 
• 
Proof Suppose that L is a non-iterative logic. Let ep (p) E S ( P) be a non-
iterative axiom of Land let Z E P (X). We must show that 
<D(Z)=X. 
Let ?jJ result from ep by replacing Pj by d( Zj) for j < n. Thus 
<D (z) = w (z) = 11?/Jllu = )( 
by identity, Lemma 7.19, and Proposition 7.8. • 
7.6 Positive Formulae 
We now return from our sojourn below normality to the realm of uni-adic 
multi-modal logics. 
In the derivation of the non-elementary version of Sahlqvist's Theorem we 
will need to take a look at its attendant formula types with a view to our "ul-
trafilter analysis." In particular we need the following definitions: 
Definition 7.21. A formula is the dual of a formula ep if it is the result of re-
placing each occurrence of T, _l, /\, v, Di, and •i in ep with their duals _l, T, V, 
/\, •i, and Di respectively. We denote this formula by :p. 
l 
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Definition 7.22. We call a formula cp positive iff it is built up from propositional 
letters using only T, __L, A, V, Di, and •i - We call a positive formula strongly-
positive if it contains no •i s for all i E Idx. 
Notice that the dual of a positive formula is still a positive formula. 
Strongly positive formulae are particularly friendly to ultrafilters as the 
following result shows. 
Proposition 7.23. If cp E S ( Q) is strongly-positive and r '1/J 7 E r S ( Q) 
7 
then 
jjcp C 'I/J 7 ) 11u C <I> (!I r 'I/J 7 llu)· 
Proof By induction on the complexity of cp . 
Base Cases: If cp is in Q or is Tor J_ then the result holds immediately. 
Inductive Hypothesis: The result holds for strongly-positive cp 1 , ~ 2 E S ( Q). 
• r 7 r 7 
Inductive Step: Let 'ljJ E S ( Q) . We want to show that the result holds for 
cp . 
Case cp == cp1 A cp2 
Then 
Case cp == cp1 V cp2 
Then 
Case cp == • icp1 
Then 
11 cp C '1/J 7 ) 11 u = II cp 1 C '1/J 7 ) II u n 11 cp2 C '1/J 7 ) 11 u 
C <I>1 (llr '1/J 
7 
llu) n <I>2 (llr '1/J 
7 
llu) 
C <I> (ll r 'I/J
7
l\u)· 
\\cp C 'I/J 7 ) llu = llcp1 C 'I/J 7 )11u u \lcp2 C 'I/J 7 )11u 
C <P1 (l\ r '1/J 
7 
llu) U <P2 (\I r '1/J 
7 
\lu) 
C <I> (ll r 'I/J
7
llu)· 
llcp C '1/J 7 ) llu = IIDicp1 C '1/J 7 ) \\u 
C Ii ( 11 cpl C 'ljJ 7 ) 11 U) 
C Ii ( (p 1 ( 11 r '1/J 
7
11 U) ) 
= <I> (ll r 'I/J
7
llu)· 
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With the second line fallowing from Proposition 7. 9 and the third line 
from the monotonicity of I. 
• 
To deal with the antecedent part of Sahlqvist formulae we will need the 
fallowing concept. 
Definition 7.24. A positive formula rp is dual-strongly-positive if it contains no 
mention of Di, i.e., it is a dual of a strongly-positive formula. 
By duality, or induction on complexity, we can readily obtain that: 
Proposition 7.25. If rp E S ( Q) is dual-strongly-positive and r ?jJ 7 E r S ( Q) 7 then 
llrp C 'l/J 7 )11u => cJ? (!I r ?/J 7 llu)· 
Because of the presence of •i s in arbitrary positive formulae we cannot ex-
tend Proposition 7.23 to them. Positive formulae are, however, monotonically 
increasing in each variable. More precisely: 
Proposition 7.26. Let rp E S ( Q) be a positive formula. Then 
1. (',l 1f,r X7 E r S(Q) ' ) [f-L r 1/J 7 ----+ r X7 ==>f-L 'P C 1/J 7 )----+ 'P C x' )] and 
2. (',/z7 ,r W 7 E rP(X) 7 ) [r Z 7 C rW 7 ==> <I> (Z 7 ) C <I> (W 7 )]. 
Proof By induction on the complexity of rp . We will just prove (1) above as (2) 
follows in a similar fashion. 
Base Cases: If rp is in Q or is T or 1- then (1) holds immediately. 
Inductive Hypothesis: That (1) holds for positive rp1 , rp2 E S ( Q). 
Inductive Step: Let r ?/J 7 , r X 7 E r S ( Q) 
7 
and suppose that f- L r ?/J 7 • r X 7 • Thus 
by the inductive hypothesis we have that 
Case rp == rp 1 /\ rp2 . 
f- L !f) 1 C 'lp 7 ) • !f)1 C X 7 ) 
f- L !f)2 C 'lp 7 ) ---+ !f)2 C X 7 ) · 
By the propositional calculus we immediately get that 
f- L !JJ1 /\ !f)2 C 'lp 7 ) ---+ !f)1 /\ !f)2 C X 7 ) • 
Case rp == !JJ1 V !JJ2. 
Also direct from the propositional calculus. 
! 
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Case cp = • icp 1 . 
By applying necessitation to the L-theorem above we get that 
1-L • i (cp1 C v/)--+ cp1 C x7 )) 
and then by the K axiom we get that 
1- L • icpl C v/) --+ • icpl C x 7 ). 
Case cp = •icp 1 . 
Follows in a similar way except we use the contrapositive of the L-
theorem above and this version of the K axiom: 
• i(-,q • -ip) • (•iP • •i q). 
• 
Positive formulae behave nicely with respect to ultrafilters in one particular 
sense: 
Proposition 7.27. Let U = (Ua I a E G) be a sequence of ultrafilters on D and let 
cp E S ( Q) be a positive formula. Then for each a 0 E G: 
. llcpll ®u C llcplluoo. 
Proof Let 0:0 E G and suppose that x E -illcpllu00 • For a E G define 
Ua := { {r µ 
7 
I cp C µ 7 ) (/. X} E Ua if 0: = O:o 
D E U0 otherwise. 
_, _, 
Let 6 = 6 ({a:0 }) E f(G) and so @6 U E @U. So when we have shown the 
following we will have demonstrated that x rf_ llcpll®u: 
(vrµ7 E ®L'.0) [cpCµ7) \tx]. 
r7 _, r7 r 7 
Let µ E @6 U. Then µ = /\ a.EF µ 0 for some FE 6 and 
(\/ a E F) [r µ 0 
7 
E U a] • 
Thus f- L r µ 
7 
• r µ 00 
7 
and thus by monotonicity (Proposition 7.26) f- L 
cp C µ 7 ) • cp C µa. 0 7 ). But cp C µa. 0 7 ) r/. X since r µ 00 7 E U00 • So cp C µ 
7
) r/. .r 
as required. 
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• 
We cannot, in general, say much about the reverse inclusion, however vve 
are able to guarantee it if we are dealing with a much smaller class of formulae: 
Definition 7.28. We call a positive formula cp E S ( Q) super-strongly-positive3 
iff 
( '/ 'lj/, r X 7 Er S (P ) 7) [f--L'f? C 1/J I\ X 7) H <p C 1/J 7) /\ <p C X 7)] . 
Examples of such formulae abound, e.g., • in(d(Z0 ) V • 1 T) for any n E Vo;' 
i, j E Idx. 
Proposition 7.29. Let cp E S ( Q) be super-strongly-positive and let z1 
(Un I a E G) be a sequence of ultrafilters over D. Then 
II cp II ® u == n II cp II Uo . 
nEG 
Proof We have the inclusion (C) by the previous proposition. 
Suppose now that x E llcpllu
0 
for each a E G. Set Ua 
{r µ 7 I cp C µ 7 ) E x } E Un. We will show that x E JJcpll 0 a by showing that: 
(vr µ 7 E 0 6(0/J) [cp C µ 7 ) Ex] 
Let r µ 
7 
E @ 6 (0 ) 0. Thus there exists a finite F C G such that r µ 7 == 
r /\nEF µa 7 and (Va E F) [r µa 7 ] E Ua . By cp E S ( Q) being super-strongly-
positive we get that 
'r- L cp C µ 7 ) f--+ /\ cp C µCt 7 ) . 
etEF 
By r µa 
7 
E Ua we have that <p C µa 7 ) E x . Thus /\ aEF cp C µa 7 ) E x and so 
C µ 7) Ex. 
• 
7.7 Positive Formulae and the Separation of Closed 
Sets 
We will now look at the similarities between positive formulae and intensional 
operators and then look at the similarities betw een super-strongly-positive for-
3Unlike most of our definitions, this defini tion is not based on the structure of the formula, 
but rather on the underlying logic itself. A patient reader will see in Section 7.9 that this 
definition, and the results tha t follow from it, allow us to conclude canonicity for a very large 
class of logics. 
1'' 
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mulae and the Di operator. First however, we need to discuss closed sets in 
r y7 
.. / \. . 
Definition 7.30. For r Z
7 
C r x
7 
we define 1/ C Z7) to be the set of pairs 
(r C7, r 1(7) such that r C7 and r K 7 are closed and 
r C7 C r z 7 C - / K7. 
- -
We call such a pair r Z 7 -valid. We say that the basic-open set llr 'l/J 7 11 separates the 
pair (r C7, r 1(7) iff r C7 C llr 7/J 711 C - / 1( 7 • In this case we write (r C7( 7/J 71r K 7) . 
Lemma 7.31. Every r Z
7 -Valid pair can be separated. 
Proof Let (rC 7 ,r K 7 ) be a rz 7 -Valid pair and let} '" E P(.,Y ). Thus C1 (Y-) C 
Z(Y) c --il( (}'") and so C(r'") n K(1 '") == 0 and both are closed sets in a compact 
space. Hence there exists a 7/J (1',.) E 5 (P) such that C(l,'") C ll 'lj) (1,. )11 C --iK(}·'"). 
Taking r 7/J 7 to be so defined we get that (r C7 Ir ?j/ Ir 1<7) . D 
The II r 7/J 
7
11 so found can be considered to be a crude "approximation" to 
r Z7, at least when we compare Z to the components of (r C7, r K 7) . 
We will now show that these "approximations" can always be found to 
satisfy reasonable conditions with respect to positive formulae. 
Recall the definition of Ri where we have that x (/_ l (Y-) means that 
(Vy E } '") [(x, y) (/_ ~] 
or less poetically (Vy E 1r) (37/J E y) [ •i'l/J (/_ x] . The { x} and {y} can be thought 
of as singleton sets which really are closed sets, and so we have an excellent 
precedent for the next theorem. 
Theorem 7.32. Let cp E 5 ( Q) be a positive formula, let x E 1Y and suppose that 
x (/_ <I> C Z 7 ). Then 
(v C c7 , r J{ 7 ) E V C z 7 )) ( :f 1/; 7 E rs ( P ) 7 ) [ tp C 1P 7 ) ff X and CC l 1P 7 Ir J{ 7 ) l • 
Proof By induction on the complexity of cp 
Base Cases: If cp is one of the constants T or J_ there is nothing to do as the 
result holds by the previous lemma. So suppose that cp == d(} 0). 
Let (r C7) r K 7 ) E V C Z7 ) and let X (/_ l o == <I> CD 7) • Define r!(' 7 as follows: 
K'(Y) == {!< (1,.) U {x} 
l( (} ,.) 
if l ,. == Yo 
otherwise. 
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We have that r 1( ' 
7 
is the union of two closed sets and is thus closed, moreover 
r C 7 c r Z 7 c r K' 7 • Thus we can apply the previous lemma to get the desired 
result for if ( c7 ( 1/; 7( K' 7) then 
X (/:_ 1( I ( 1/o ) ~ 11 1/J ( l'o ) 11 = 11 cp C 1/J 7 ) 11 . 
Inductive Hypothesis: Assume that the result holds for cp0 and cp1. 
Inductive Step: Say that cp is built up from cp0 and cp1 in one step. 
Fix (r C 7 , r 1( 7 ) E V C z7 ) . For each i < 2 and X E ,cpi C Z 7 ) let 
r 1/;; ( x) 
7 
E r S ( Q) 
7 
be given by the inductive hypothesis, i.e., 'Pi C 1/;; ( x) 7 ) r/: x 
and ( c7( 1/;; (x) 
7
1r K 7 ) . 
Suppose now that x (/:_ cD C Z 7 ). 
Case cp = ((Jo V cp1 . 
Thus x (/:_ cD o C Z 7) u cD1 C Z7) and so x (/:_ cD 0 C Z7) and x (/:_ cD 1 C Z7). Set 
r 7 r 7 
1/J = 1/Jo(x) /\ 1/)1 (x ) . We then have that 
r c7 C ll r 1/Jo (x) 71 1 n llr 1/) i( x ) 711 = llr 1P 711 C 
SO \ r C 7
1 
r 1/J 7
1 
r J( 7 ) • 
Also, 
r 1/Jo ( X) 
7
11 C , r K 
7
, 
(Vj < 2) [f-L 'PJ C 1/; 7) • 'PJ C 1/!1(x) 7)] 
and so (V j < 2) [ cp j C 1/J 7 ) (/:_ x] giving cp C 1/J 7 ) = ( rp0 V rp 1 ) C 1/J 7 ) (/:_ x as 
desired. 
Case rp = rp0 /\ rp 1 . 
Thus x (/:_ cpo C Z 7 ) n cp1 C Z 7 ), so for some j < 2, x (/:_ (()j C Z 7 ) . Put 
r 1/J 7 = r 1Pj ( X) 7, and so (r C 7 Ir 1/J 7 Ir J( 7) and we have that (()j C 1/J 7) (/:_ X. Thus 
(r 7) (r 7) . (r 7) (()j 1P /\ (()1-j 1P (/:_ X , Le., cp 1P (/:_ X. 
Case cp = • icp1. 
Thus x (/:_ I i ( cD 1 C Z 7 )) . So there exists a y E Ri(x ) such that y (/:_ <P1 C Z 7 ). 
Put r 1/J 7 = r 1P1 (y) 7 so we have (r C7 ( 1/J 7 Ir }(7) and cp1 C 1/J 7 ) (/:_ y. By the 
definition of the relation Ri we then get that cp C 1/J 7 ) = • irp 1 C 1/J 7 ) (/:_ x. 
Case cp = •icp 1. 
Thus x (/:_ t (<I> 1 C Z 7 )). So for each y E Ri(x) , y (/:_ <P 1 C Z 7 ), i.e ., 
R;(x) C ,<I>t C Z 7 ). Now, for all y E R(x) we have cp1 C 1/J t (y) 7 ) and 
I ll 
Ii 
! 
( .. 1 
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( c7 ( 1:,7 Ir K 7 ) . Thus for all y E R; (x) , y E II • <p1 C 1P1 (y) 7 ) II , so 
{ • <p1 C 1P1(Y) 7 ) I YE R; (x) } 
is an open cover of R;, ( x) a compact set. So we must have an m E w and 
Yj E R;, (x) for j < m such that 
R; (x) c LJ II • <p1 C 1P1 (yj) 7) 
j< m 
Now set r '1/} 7 = r /\ j <m 'l/J1(Yj)
7
• Note that we still have rc 7 C !Ir 1µ 7 11 C 
-,r J,( 7 so (r C 7 ( w 7 Ir K 7 ) still holds. We also have by cp 1 being positive that 
(Vj < m) [f--L <Pt C 1{) 7 )--+ 'P1 C 1P1(Yjf) ] 
which tells us that 
(VJ < m) [ ' 'P t C 1Ji(Yj ) 7 ) C ll • 'P1 C 1P 7 ) 11 ] · 
Thus R;, (x) C jj -,<p1 C '1/J 7 ) jj , so x E Ii (ll -, cp1 C '1/J 7 ) 1i ) = II Di-,~1 C 1,:/) II 
telling us that • i-, cp1 C 'ljJ 7 ) E x . Hence cp C 'ljJ 7 ) = •icp 1 C 'ljJ 7 ) ff_ x . 
• 
The class of super-strongly-positive formulae are essentially • -like opera-
tors as we can now make clear. 
Definition. 7.33. For (f) E S ( Q) a super-strongly-positive formula let 
r R 1n ( X) 
7 
= n { II r V 7 11 I cp C v/) E X } . 
Note that this is a pointwise intersection and hence is a closed se t. 
r 7 r 7 
Lemma 7.34. For (f) E S ( Q) a super-strongly-positive formula and Z E P (~Y) 
r Ru,(x) 
7 
C r Z
7 
¢::::=? X E <I> C Z 7 ) • 
Proof We prove the if and only if parts separately. 
(<==) Suppose that X E <I> C z') and not C R,;,(x) 7 C C z7 ) , Thus there is 
a closed ' C
7 c r Rcp(x ) 7 - r Z 7 c -,r Z 7 with some C (l-o) # 0 . So 
(r C 7 , r 0 ,) E 1- (-,r Z ,) . Also x E -,cl) ( -,r Z 7 ) and rp is positive . So by 
Theorem 7.32 there is a r ?]• 7 such that (rC, l 1/J 7 lr0 7 ) and cp C U 7 ) ff_ X . 
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Thus cp C --,?{) 7 ) E X and r C 7 C llr 7/J 7 11 · Hence r R<p(x) 7 C llr --, 7/J 7 11 C --, r C 7 
telling us that r C 7 c --,r R<p(x) 
7 
n r R<p(x) 
7 
= 0 contradicting C(}r0 ) # 0. 
(==> ) Suppose that r Rcp(x) 
7 
C r Z 7 and X (/c ip C Z 7 ). Since ( Rcp(x) 7 , r 0 7 ) E 
V C Z 7 ) we have that there is a r 7/J 7 E r S (P ) 7 separating the pair and 
which satisfies 
n { 11 r X 7 11 I cp C X 7 ) E X} = r R<p ( X) 7 and cp C 7/J 7 ) ~ X . 
Since cp only mentions finitely many variables, without loss of general-
ity we can assume that 7/J(Y) = T for all but finitely many}'". Thus by 
r 7 r 7 compactness there exists an m E w and Xj E S (P) such that 
('v j < m) [ cp C Xj 7 ) E X] and n 11 r Xj 7 11 C 11 r 7/J 7 11 . 
j<m 
We then put r x 7 = r /\ j<m Xj 
7 
and we have cp C X 7 ) E x by c.p being super-
strongly-positive and Jlr X 
7
11 C llr 7/J 
7
lJ , i.e., r-L r x 7 • r 7/J 7 • Thus by cp being 
a positive formula we have that cp ( 7/J 
7
) E x, a contradiction. 
• 
7.8 Finding the Right Ultrafilters for Sahlqvist's 
Theorem 
We can now put our results together to find an ultrafilter which will allow us 
to get the Sahlqvist result. In particular we will find an ultrafilter U which will 
satisfy the following conditions: 
1. ('v Z E P (X)) [lld(Z) llu = Z ], 
2. ('vcp ES (Q) super-strongly-positive) [llcpllu =CDC D 7 )], and 
3. ('vcp ES (Q) positive) [ilcpllu C CDC D 7 )] 
These conditions will allow us to: 
1. Show that each set is expressible, 
2. Deal with the antecedent part of a Sahlqvist formula, and 
3. Quickly dispatch the consequent part. 
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Fix, for the moment an x E _X .. and a positive cp E S ( Q). 
Definition 7.35. For (r C
7
, r K
7
) E V C D 7) let 
u(c7,r l(7) = {r µ7 ED I ('C71r µ 71rI<7) and (x ~<PC D 7) ~ cp C µ 7) ~ x)}. 
Lemma 7.36. 8 := {U ( C
7
, 'K
7
) I (r C
7
, ' K
7
) E V C D 7)} has the finite intersec-
tion property. 
Proof Theorem 7.32 immediately guarantees to us that 0 ~ 8 and if 
l'C 7 ' J( 7) ;rC 7 ' K 7) V (' D 7) \ o, o ,\ 1 , 1 E 
then 
'C 7 re 7 r z 7 , 1, 7 ' I< 7 o u i c c -, ·{o n-, i 
so (r C0 
7 
U ' C 1
7
, r K 0 
7 
U ' 1(1
7
) _E \,/ C D 7). Moreover, it is clear that if 
(r Co 7 u r C1 7 Irµ 7,, Ko 7 u I I<1 7) 
then for i < 2 (rC7ilrµ 7jrK7i)· This establishes that U(C0
7
,rK0
7
) n 
U( C 1
7
, ' J,(1
7
) ::J U( C0 
7 
u ' C 1
7
, '1(0 
7 
u ' K 1
7
). Notice how there is nothing to 
show here for the second condition on membership in U( C 7, r K 7). • 
Choose U to be an ultrafilter which extends 8. 
Lemma 7.37. For all 'ljJ E S ( Q) super-strongly-positive 
11'1/Jllu => W CD 7 ). 
Proof Let y E w (' D 7 ) . Thus by Lemma 7.34 ' R1/J(Y) 7 C ' D 7, telling us that 
( R,p(y)
7
, r 0 7) EV C D 7 ). 
(,/ µ 
7 
E U ( R,p (y) 
7
, r 0 
7
) ) [ 1/J ( µ') E Y] 
Let r µ
7 
E U(R1/J(Y)
7
,
1
0
7
). Thus r~(y)
7 
C llr µ
7
11 and Lemma 7.34allows 
us to conclude that y E w ( II' µ 711) = 111/J C µ 7) 11 , so '1/J C µ 7) E y. 
This establishes that y E \l'I/Jllu• • 
Remember that x and cp are fixed for the moment. 
Lemma 7.38. x E llcpllu ~ x E <PC D 7 ). 
122 Ultrafilter Semantics and Sahlqvist Logics 
Proof Suppose that x (/_ <I> CD 7 ) 
( vr µ 7 E u C 0 7' r 0 7)) [ cp C µ 7) (/_ X] 
Let r µ 
7 
EU( 0
7
, r 0
7
). Since x (/_ <I> C D7) we must have that cp C µ 7) tf_ x . 
This establishes that x tf_ ll cp llu• • 
Now that we have these results in hand let U (x,rp) be the name for the ultra-
filter so resulting from each choice of x and cp . Also, we make the following 
two definitions: 
U == ( U (x,rp) Ix EX, cp ES (Q) is positive ), and 
u ==@u. 
Lemma 7.39. The ultrafilter U satisfies conditions (1), (2), and (3) given at the start 
of this section. 
Proof Notice that (1) is just a special case of (2). We prove (3) first: 
For (3): Let x EX, cp E S (Q) be positive. Suppose that x E ll cp llu C llcpllu 
(x ,'P) 
by Proposition 7.27. Thus x E <I> C D 7 ) by Lemma 7.38. 
For (2): Let 'ljJ E S (Q) be super-strongly-positive. Thus 11 1/J llu C w C D 7 ) 
because 'ljJ is positive and we already have (3). 
We have that 11 1/J llu ~ WC D 7 ) by Lemma 7.37. Thus 
(x ,'P) 
w CD 7 ) ~ 11 1/J llu ~ n 11 1/J llu(x,<p) ~ w CD 7 ). 
(x,<p) 
Now we can attack the essence of Sahlqvist's Theorem: 
Definition 7.40. A sub-Sahlqvist formula is one of the form 
1/J (r cp 7) --+ X, 
where 
l. 'ljJ is dual-strongly-positive, 
2. r cp 7 is a sequence of formulae which are either 
(a) super-strongly positive, or 
(b) the negation of a positive formula, and 
3. xis a positive formula. 
• 
1. 
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Lemma 7.41. If 0 = ?jJ C <p 7 ) • ( E S ( Q) is sub-Sahlqvist then it satisfies: 
JJ?/J C rp 7 ) • (Jiu C --,\lf (r<I> 7 C D 7 )) U 3 CD7 ) , 
i.e., ll0llu C 8 C D 7 ). 
Proof We start with the following claim: 
r <P 
7 C D 7 ) ~ JJr <p 7 Jiu · 
Suppose that rp is a formula which satisfies one of the sub-requirements 
(a) or (b) in requirement 2 of Definition 7.40. So we have 2 cases: 
Case <p is super-strongly positive. 
Thus <I> C D 7 ) = llrpllu by condition (2). 
Case tp = --,0, 0 a positive formula. 
Thus ll0llu C 8 C D 7 ) by condition (3). Hence 
<I> C D 7 ) = --,9 C D 7 ) C --, ll 0llu = Jl--,0llu = lltpllu• 
By ?jJ being positive, we see that w is monotonic (Proposition 7.26 (2)) and to-
gether with Proposition 7.25 we get that 
wC<I>
7
CD
7
)) C w( Jlr<p
7
11 u) C ll?/J Crp
7
)11u· 
Now let x E JJ?J; C <p 7 ) • ~l lu and suppose that 
x E W C<I>
7 
CD
7
)) C JJ?J; C rp
7
)11u· 
Thus x E ll(llu C ~ C D 7 ) . • 
Definition 7.42. We say a formula is Sahlqvist iff it is of the form 1/J C <p 7 ) for ?/; 
strongly positive and each rp( Z ) sub-Sahlqvist. 
Theorem 7.43. Suppose that L contains a Sahlqvist formula r Then (X, R) F r 
Proof Let v be a valuation on the frame (X, R ). Rename the propositional 
letters of ~ so that it can be of the form 1/J C rp 7 ) for ?/; strongly-positive, each 
cp( Z) is sub-Sahlqvist and each propositional letter p E Ir renamed so that it 
becomes d ( v (p)) . Thus 
): = 111/J C <p 7 ) ll u 
C W (JJr cp 
7
11 u) 
C w C <P 7 CD 7)) 
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= ~ C D7), 
where the first line is by Proposition 7.8, the second by Proposition 7.23 and the 
third by Lemma 7.41 and Proposition 7.26. Since r D 7 agrees with the valuation 
we have that (X, R, v) F ~- • 
7.9 A Comparison With Existing Approaches to 
Sahlqvist Logic 
The earliest approach to Sahlqvist's Theorem is naturally SAHLQVIST's own 
result [68] which worked at building the correspondence between modal for-
mulae and first order formulae in a natural manner. This correspondence then 
gave us, via Fine's Theorem, the desired canonicity result. Sahlqvist's The-
orem has been generalised from its original incarnation to take into account 
multi-modal operators and to maximize the class of axioms which it encom-
passes. A very revealing example is KRACHT's treatment in [50, Section 5.5] 
which leads the reader through a wide reaching calculus of correspondence 
that then gives rise to the Sahlqvist result. These results are all upfront about 
the role played by elementary conditions on the accessibility relation and are, 
of course, more revealing about the particular logics. 
Our idea of doing away with elementary conditions is not unique. Since the 
author first detailed this work in the technical report [87] he has become aware 
of a small but significant collection of papers which approach Sahlqvist' s theo-
rem from an algebraic point of view. In each of these works it is made explicit 
that the underlying topology and the closed sets that the topology gives rise 
to are important, and of equal importance is the way that positive formulae 
respect these closed sets. In this section we will attempt to outline the alter-
nate approach and indicate how it produces a comparable range of canonicity 
results, however a full analysis of the relationships between the alternate ap-
proach and the one given in the preceding sections is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. 
The first and undeniably foundational pape·r is BJARNI JONSSON and AL-
FRED TARSKI' s Boolean algebras with operators [ 44, 45] .4 This paper predated the 
work by KRIPKE on the relational semantics for modal logics [54] and so was 
presented from an algebraicist's point of view. JONSSON and TARSKI dealt 
with boolean algebras augmented by operators. Much like ours, their opera-
tors were of arbitrary arity and were allowed to exist in any number, however 
4An overview of this work is given in HENKIN, MONK and TARSKI's book Cylindric Alge-
bras I [38, Chapter 2.7] which, naturally enough, treats the results within the context of Cylin-
dric Algebras. 
~~ 
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their fundamental operations were essentially dual to the 'necessity' operators 
of modal logicians-their operators distributed over join (disjunction). The 
results they presented were extremely deep, involved, and their relevance to 
modal logic, while apparent, was not very persuasive and it is perhaps for 
this reason that the Sahlqvist nature of these results was not recognised. In-
deed, JONSSON himself lamented [43, p. 473] that the techniques of [44] have 
suffered II decades of neglect" and that "modal logicians are still at best only 
superficially acquainted with the paper." 
The starting point of [ 44] is to take a boolean algebra A and look at the class 
of operators Jon this boolean algebra that satisfy: 
1. For each a, b E A such that aj = bj for all j < length (a) = length ( b) 
arity (J ), j -/- k < arity (J ), 
- -
J (a Vb) = J (a) V J (b) . 
2. If a EA is such that aj = 1- for some j, then J (a) = 1-. 
These operators, which are called additive, are dual to operators more familiar 
to modal logicians, that is those that distribute over meet (/\). Nevertheless, 
by simply dualising the arguments of [44] we obtain results that seem to make 
more sense to modal logicians, and so we will continue our discussion by re-
porting a dualised version of the contents of [ 44]. 
Thus, their basic non-boolean operator was the nonnalr multiplicative oper-
ator I which satisfied: 
1. For each a, b E .A such that aj = bj for all j < length (a) = length (b) 
arity (I )r j -/- k < arity (J)r 
I ( a !\ b) = I (a) /\ I (b). 
2. If a EA is such that aj = T for some j, then I (a) = T. 
They then discussed a specialised type of multiplicative normal operator 
which allowed for infinite meets in one coordinate. This type of operator was 
called completely multiplicative. 
JONSSON and TARSKI then introduced the notion of a perfect extension 
of a boolean algebra A. which is essentially5 the boolean algebra B formed 
from the stone space of A.. They went on to talk about the perfect extension 
5JONSSON and TARSKI actually talked about an arbitrary perfect extension of~ however 
they proved that all perfect extensions are isomorphic . 
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of a multiplicative normal modal operator I by defining it to be the map I* 
n B ----+ B given by6 
J*(Z) = n u III(a)II -
Y2Z ll n ll~ Y 
Y open aEA 
This turns out to be a completely multiplicative operator and, in the case of 
uni-adic operators, it turns out to be equivalent to the induced operations on 
the canonical frame. Thus if we can guarantee that the perfect extension of any 
algebra A has certain equational conditions in common with A we will be sure 
that the move to a canonical frame will preserve the corresponding logical 
formulae and, consequently, canonicity for particular intensional logics will 
obtain. 
By looking at how the class of normal multiplicative operations behaved 
under composition, JONSSON and TARSKI were able to show the following: 7 
Theorem 7.44 (Jonsson and Tarski Extension Theorem). Let K be an equation-
ally definable class of boolean algebras ·with normal multiplicative operators. The per-
fect extension of any element of K is in K. 
Unfortunately for the cause of canonicity, by an equation JONSSON and 
TARSKI were referring to any algebraic equality whose terms were built up out 
of normal multiplicative operators, and the boolean operators /\ and V . They 
explicitly did not consider ,. Nevertheless, this result does have immediate 
and interesting consequences. For instance, consider the 4 axiom: • p-+ •• p, 
whose algebraic equivalent is the inequality I(a) ~ I(I(a)). Turning this into 
an equation we get 
I (a) I\ I (I (a)) = I (a) . 
This is clearly of an appropriate form for the JONSSON and TARSKI extension 
theorem so we instantly get the canonicity of the logic K4. Again, this is with-
out reference to the transitivity of the underlying relation. 
The paper [ 44] did not take its result as far as possible, for consider our 
rather elementary Theorem 7.10: That 
•~ p -+ • jmP E L 
6Notice how open sets are important in this extension, whereas in our proof of Sahlqvist's 
Theorem we relied heavily on closed and hence compact sets. This is indicative of a strong de-
pendence on topological notions in the two approaches, and indeed, G. SAMBIN and V. VAC-
CARO [69] have obtained the elementary condition version of Sahlqvist's Theorem through 
an elegant analysis based on topological notions, including a strong reliance on the closure of 
R(x). 
7Theorem 2.18, p. 928 of [44]. 
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is canonical. This formula can not be handled by the JONSSON-TARSKI exten-
sion theorem because its equational equivalent would be 
I f (-,a ) V I7t (a ) = T 
which contains a forbidden -,_ As this seems like such a minor impediment 
to the application of the extension theorem it is no surprise that [ 44] was im-
proved upon, with the first result by HUGO RIBEIRO [67]. Specifically, RIBEIRO 
showed that monotonic, as opposed to multiplicative, functions can be used 
in certain "closed under composition" lemmata. Later, LEON HENKIN, [37], 
picked up the trail by extending the extension result to operators which he 
called 'p-additive', a generalisation of the notion of 'additive' (dual to 'multi-
plicative'). After a further 24 years, and with the prompting of MAARTEN DE 
RIJKE and YDE VENEMA's paper [16], which gave a formalised statement of 
Sahlqvist' s Theorem for boolean algebras of arbitrary similarity type, JONSSON 
[ 43] was then able to gather these results together to show that the whole force 
of Sahlqvist' s Theorem can be derived by following the lead of the original 
paper [ 44].8 
As in [44], and as in our work, JONSSON's proof gives canonicity without 
referring to any elementary conditions on accessibility relations, however, un-
like our work so far, JONSSON was able to go further and demonstrate that 
certain non-Sahlqvist logics can be canonical. An example is K4McK which 
JONSSON showed to be canonical by detouring through what he called quasi-
identities. Translating into the terminology of logical satisfaction these are 
statements of the form 
<p ==? ?jJ 
which is true for an algebra A precisely when 
A r= cp ==;, A r= 7/J . 
Our ultrafilter semantics formalism does not seem to admit such a notion since 
ll cp llu = )( by itself does not necessarily correspond to a statement about rela-
tionships between the R-interior operators and so ultrafilter semantics appear 
to be unable to deal with K4McK canonicity. Nevertheless, K4McK can be dealt 
with by our Sahlqvist result as follows: 
Lemma 7.45. In the logic K4McK the fonnula cp := • Op is super-strongly-positive. 
Proof Work in the canonical model of L = K4McK. Since <p is positive and 
8 Another way in which [44] and [37] have been built on is the work [2] which looks at 
how perfect extensions of an algebra relate to perfect extensions of derived algebras, such as 
subalgebras and products. 
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hence monotonic we need only show: 
• Op I\ • Oq -t • O(p I\ q) E L. 
Suppose that • Op, • Oq E x in the canonical model for L. To show that 
DO(pAq) holds at x we show that O(p !\ q) holds at all R-successors y. Fix 
such a y. 
By the 4 axiom we have that Oq, • Op, O• p (by • Op and McK) hold 
throughout all of R* (y) .9 Thus there is a z E R(y) such that • p E z 
and so by the 4 axiom p holds throughout R(z) . Also, there is a w E R(z) 
such that q E w. Hence p I\ q E w, so O(p I\ q) E y by R(z) C R(y). 
• 
Thus, the system K4McK is axiomatised by Sahlqvist formulae and so is 
canonical. 
The determination of exactly how our approach relates to JONSSON' s for 
this and similar logics is a quest deserving of further research yet is, unfortu-
nately outside the scope of this thesis. 
The Sahlqvist result given in this chapter does differ slightly from that 
given by DE RIJKE and VENEMA in [16]. Most obviously there is the differ-
ence in the allowable arity of the modal operators. We have only discussed 
unary normal modal operators however it is reasonable to expect that our ap-
proach will generalise. The other difference is that caused by our inclusion 
of super-strongly-positive in our definition of Sahlqvist formulae. While DE 
RIJKE and VENEMA talked only about formulae of the form • io · · · • in _ 1 p, we 
used the more general notion of a super-strongly-positive formulae of which 
the • io · · · • in-iP formulae are an obvious special case. DE RIJKE-VENEMA 
Sahlqvist formulae then have the endearing feature of being patently identifi-
able by their very form whereas we look to a larger class of formulae which 
may not always be easily identifiable. 
This chapter has looked at a marriage of canonicity for non-iterative non-
normal logics and canonicity for the normal S~lqvist logics. Our analysis has 
highlighted a technique which, while related to those exploited in Chapters 5 
and 6, does give us yet another way of looking at canonicity. While JONSSON 
and TARSKI 1s results may go further in their ultimate conclusions our work 
does appear new and different and the nature of the true relationship between 
these two approaches is a topic worthy of further study. 
One final comment that arises from the difference between the DE RIJKE-
VENEMA notion of "Sahlqvise' and our own: Any logic which has an axioma-
9 R"' is the reflexive transitive closure of R. 
I•· 
§7.9 A Comparison With Existing Approaches to Sahlqvist Logic 129 
tisation consisting solely of axioms of the form 
(p) /\ cp (q) • <p(p I\ q)' 
for <p a positive formula, is canonical since its axioms are almost trivially Sahlq-
vist-<p is super-strongly-positive. This tells us that some bizarre looking log-
ics are canonical such as ones with axioms drawn from the following list: 
• Op I\ D• q • D•(p /\ q) 
D• Dp A D• Dq • DOD(p /\ q) 
D (p /\ • D• q) /\ D (r /\ • D• s) • D (p /\ r I\ • D• q I\ s). 
These logics do not strike the author as being elementary and so we may w ish 
to consider axioms of this form to see if we can use them as counter-examples 
to the "canonicity implies elementarity" conjecture. 
While we have seen that there is compelling circumstantial evidence to be-
lieve that the conjecture is true, we have at last found some indication tha t it 
may not be true. 10 
10 ADDED IN P ROO F: The au thor now suspects that the whole ultrafilter semantics approach 
will work not only in the canonical frame but also in any ultrapower of the canonical frame. 
If this is indeed the case then all fo rmulae that can be shown to be canon ical via the ultrafilter 
semantics technique must be elementary. Stay tuned ! 
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Chapter 8 
A Non-standard Injection Between 
Canonical Frames 
8.1 Introduction 
We now return, full time, to the study of normal modal logics and we will be 
looking at the problems highlighted in Section 3.7, and in particular we will 
look at the way to relate canonical frames via our usual repertoire of maps. 
In an attempt to make a start on problems to do with the existence of non-
standard isomorphisms or automorphisms, we will try to answer the weaker 
question: Are there any non-standard injective accessibility preserving maps 
between canonical frames? 
In Section 8.3 we develop maps which we call ultrafilter embeddings, some of 
which actually are non-standard, however we won't verify this until Section 
8.6 when we will have sufficiently developed the theory of such maps. The 
particular property of ultrafilter embeddings which we will use is that for any 
countable collection of points in F!;
1 
we can find an ultrafilter embedding from 
F ~ into F \ which will hit every element of that countable collection. 
Also in Section 8.6 we will argue that in some instances, an injective acces-
sibility preserving embedding is the only way to relate F!; and F!;
1 
in such a 
way that we will be guaranteed of hitting some particularly awkward points. 
We will then conclude this chapter with a discussion in Section 8.7 of how 
these ultrafilter embeddings actually turn into frame homomorphisms when 
we deal with logics of bounded alternative. This will set us up for the next 
chapter where we can use these maps to say something about non-standard 
isomorphisms and automorphisms. 
It is a reasonable hope that the ultrafilter embeddings introduced here will 
be a basis for further investig_ation into the canonical frame problems, as well 
as providing a new tool in the general analysis of canonical frames . The tech-
niques and results of the next chapter will provide some justification for this 
hope. 
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8.2 Notation and Basic Definitions 
As indicated in Section 2.4 when working within the sphere of normality we 
will restrict ourselves to normal multi-modal logics of arity one. 
The question of this chapter is that of whether there are any interesting 
maps between canonical frames which are not generated from maps between 
the underlying language, i.e., maps which are not standard. 
Recall the following definition which originally appeared as Definition 
2.57. 
Definition 8.1. A map h : Xp --+ XQ is called standard if h 
homomorphism f : Q --+ S (Pt and non-standard otherwise. 
J + for some 
Clearly there are non-standard maps, but are there non-standard homo-
morphisms? We will not be able to get even an answer to this until at least 
Section 8.7, and then our solutions will be only partiat however we will be able 
to answer affirmatively the question of whether there are any non-standard ac-
cessibility preserving embeddings of X P into )C Q for arbitrary logics. The next 
definition will make this precise. 
Definition 8.2. A map f : (.,Y, R) --+ (Y, T) between frames is an accessibility 
preserving embedding iff 
(Vi E Idx) ('v'x1, X2 E X) [ (x1, x2) E ~ {=} (/ (xi) , f (x2)) E Ti] 
We use the additional phrase "accessibility preserving" to distinguish this 
kind of map from the kind described by the plain word "embedding" which, 
to many, will strongly suggest a frame homomorphic embedding. 
8.3 Ultrafilter Embeddings 
The basic map which we will use in our construction of a non-standard accessi-
bility preserving embedding is the ultrafilter embedding. The idea behind the 
construction of these maps is to use an ultrafilter on a collection of standard 
embeddings to average the output of this collection.1 Fix, for the moment, P C 
Q as sets of propositional variables. Also, set DP,Q = {µ : Q --+ P I µ r p = id} 
and where unambiguous we will suppress the P , Q so that we just write D. 
1Given a sequence (xi)iEO in a canonical frame ()C, R ), together with an ultrafilter U on D 
we can define the ultrafilter average of (xi) with respect to U to be the maximal consistent set 
{ <p I <p E Xi U a.e.}. This construction is not new, as (xi) defines a point within (X, R) 0 /U 
which can be mapped in a canonical way down onto the 'average' point given above (see, for 
instance, the map given in the proof of Theorem 11.2.1 in [32]). 
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Definition 8.3. For U an ultraJilter on DP,Q define hu : _y_ p --+ _,y_Q as follows: 
hu ( z) = { <p E 5 ( Q) I { µ E D I µ ( cp) E z} E U} . 
Proposition 8.4. hu as given is 'Well defined. 
Proof We must show that hu (z) is in fact in .fy_Q· 
hu ( z) is maximal 
hu ( z) is cons is tent: 
tf_ hu ( z) ===> { µ E D I µ ( cp) E z} ~ U 
===> {µ E D I µ ( cp) tf_ z} E u 
===>{µED I -.µ (-P) E z} E U 
===> {µ E D I µ (-.cp) E z} E u 
===> , (f) E hu ( z) . 
Suppose that YO · .... ~n- 1 E hu (z) and assume that 'i7o, . . . , <t?n- 1 ~ L l_ . 
Thus n {µ E o , µ ( cpj) E z} E u 
j<n 
which guarantees us aµ E O so thatµ (cp0), ... , µ (-?n - d E z . Now, by L 
being indifferent to substitutions we have thatµ (vo) /\ · · · /\ µ (<t?n - 1) ~ L 
µ (_L ) and clearly µ (_L ) ~ L _L so we have by z being deductively closed 
that _L E z , a contradiction. 
• 
Even though hu is a map between canonical frames over two different lan-
guages, it is conservative, in the sense that if we restrict ourselves to formulae 
in S (P ) when we look at the makeup of the members of .:YQ, hu will not effect 
any change: 
Proposition 8.5. For U as above, hu (z) n 5 (P ) = z . 
Proof We show that z C hu ( z) and, by the maximal consistency of both these 
sets, we will get our result. So let -P E z. Thus for allµ E 0, µ (-P) = <p by µ 1 P = 
id and trivially{µ E O Iµ (y) E z} =DE U giving us that v E hu (z) . D 
Our construction \,vill be complete when we verify that hu is indeed acces-
sibilitv preserving. 
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Theorem 8.6. For U as before, · hu is an accessibility preserving injection from F p 
into FQ. 
Proof That hu is one-one is an immediate consequence of the previous propo-
sition, so all that remains to be shown is that 
(Vi E Idx ) (\:/z1,z2 E )(p) [(z1,z2) E RPi ¢=> (hu (zi) , hu (z2)) E RQJ. 
So let i E Idx, z1 , z2 E Xp. 
The if part is straightforward: 
(hu (zi), hu (z2)) E RQi ¢=> (\:/ep ES (Q)) [Diep E hu (zi) ===? ep E hu (z2)] 
===? (\:/ep ES (P)) [Diep E hu (zi) ===? cp E hu (z2)] 
¢=> (\:/cp ES (P)) [Diep E z1 ===} cp E z2] 
¢=> (z1, z2) E RPi· 
with the second line following by restriction, and the third by the previous 
proposition. 
For the only if part, suppose that i E Idx, (z1 , z2) E RPi, and let Diep E 
hu (zi). By (z1, z2) E RP i we have that 
{µED I µ(Di ep) E z1 } ={µED I Diµ( ep) E z1 } C {µ E O I µ( cp) E z2 }. 
Since the first of these sets is in U, the last one must also be in U giving <p E 
hu (z2) . D 
When U is a principal ultrafilter, hu will correspond to a standard map, and 
this may also be the case for particular non-principal ultrafilters. To see that 
hu can in fact be a non-standard map is relatively straightforward, however 
we will leave that discussion till near the end of this chapter at which point 
the theoretical development will make such a result almost obvious. 
8.4 Finding Variables 
To meet our promise of providing an embedding which hits particular points 
we will adopt a construction closely modelled on that used in the proof of the 
downward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem. 
Our approach will be to take each n-tuple of points that we wish to include 
(remember that each point is a maximal consistent set of formulae) and extract 
from those points the formulae, and thus the propositional variables, which 
contribute to the 'variability' in, and the 'structure' ot the n-tuple. 
I" ' 
t 
it 
11: 
Iii 
,., 
l11 
§8.4 Finding Variables 135 
Lemma 8.7. Given PC Q and x E XQ, there is a set e( P, x) C Q such that: 
1. For each cp E S ( Q) (with cp and x having the same arity n), there is a µ E 
D e(P,x),Q so that 
(V j ( n) [ cp j E x j ¢=:? µ ( cp j) E x j] . 
2. card ( e( P, x)) ( max (w, card (Idx ), card (P) ). 
Proof We need only look at the case where w < card (Q) and card (P) < 
card ( Q). We will construct the set e(P, x) in stages. Let S be a countable set of 
new propositional variables distinct from those in Q. Let P0 == P and suppose 
that Pk has already been constructed. Let 
Gk == {µ: Pk u S--+ Q I µ is constant on Pk,µ is one-one} , 
let cp E S (Pk U SL and let rv! be an equivalence relation on Gk defined by 
µ rv~ v ¢=:? (\/f ( n) [µ (cp1 ) E Xj ¢=:? v (cpj) E Xj] . 
There can be at most 2n equivalence classes since µ rv! v iff they have the 
same 'signature/ where j E sig µ, the signature ofµ, iff µ (cp1) E x1, and clearly 
sig µ C P (n) . 
So let 6.f C Gk be a set of size card (Gk / rv!) ( 2n, with each element a 
representative of a distinct rv! equivalence class. Set 
Pk+1 == Pk U LJ {range(µ) I µ E .6.f, cp ES (Pk US)}. 
For each µ E .6.f the size of range (µ ) is bounded by card (Pk) + card (S) , 
and there are (w + card (Idx ) + card (Pk ) + card (S) )n sequences cp of length n 
in S (Pk US), thus 
card (Pk+i) ( card (Pk) + 2n (w + card (Idx) + card (Pk)+ card (S))n+l 
( max ( card (Pk) , card (Idx ) , w). 
So, put Pw == uk Ew pk and we complete the proof of this lemma by making 
the claim that we can put e( P, x) == Pw. The proof of this claim consists of two 
verifications: 
(V(/5 E 5 ( Q)) ( 3 µ E OP,,, Q) (V j ( n) [ cp j E x j ¢=:;> µ ( cp j) E x j] . 
Let cp E S ( Q ). Since cp consists of a finite sequence of finitely long formu-
lae we can assume that cp E S (Pk U (Q - Pw)) for some k E w . Clearly, 
there is a 7_/J E S ( Pk U S) and a one-one function v1 : Pk U S --+ Q, iden-
tity on Pkt so that v 1 ( 1/J) == cp . Further, v1 has a representative v2 E ~f in 
its rv!-equivalence class. 
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Now, letµ E D,Pw,Q be defined by 
q if q E Pw 
µ (q) == < v2 o v11 (q) if q E range (vi) 
Po otherwise 
where p0 is any element of Pw. We have that 
µ ( (() j) E X j {==} V2 o V 1 1 ( cp j ) E X j 
{=:} V2 ( 1/J j ) E X j 
{=:} V1 ( '1/Jj) E Xj {==} (()j E Xj 
with the second to last line following by v1 r-v~ v2 . 
card (Pw) ~ max ( card (P), card (Idx), w) 
This follows by our observation that 
card (Pk+i) ~ max (card (Pk) , card (Idx), w). 
• 
The above lemma shows that given an n-tuple of points it is possible to find 
a collection of propositional variables so that the formulae over those propo-
sitional variables adequately 'characterize' all the formulae resident in those 
points, and that this set of propositional variables is not too large. 
We will be ready for the next section when we show that we can find a sim-
ilar collection of propositional variables which 'characterize' any set of points 
in a canonical frame. 
Lemma 8.8. Given P C Q and Y C XQ, there is a set e( P, Y) C Q such that: 
1. For each rp E S ( Q) and x E y· (each having the same arity n), there is a 
µ E ne(P,Y),Q so that 
(\:/j ~ n) [rpj E Xj ===> µ (rpj) E Xj]. 
2. card ( e(P, y·)) ~ max (w, card (Idx), card (P) , card (Y) ). 
Proof Iterate the operation P r-r U xEY e (P , x) w many times. • 
I· 
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8.5 Specific Target Embeddings 
We are now able to piece together the two previous sections to produce an 
accessibility preserving embedding from .LYp , to )CQ, for some P' C Q of re-
stricted cardinality, which is guaranteed to hit some pre-specified subset of 
~Y..Q. 
To that end, fix P C Q, }/ C .LYQ, set P' = e( P, } r) and let D = DP',Q · For 
each ({) E s ( Q) and X E } r of the same arity n, define 
r m,x ={µED I (Vj :( n) [µ (cp j ) E Xj {==> ,Pj E Xj] }. 
Lemma 8.9. {r ~,x I t;> E S ( Q), x E rr, cp and x have the sa,ne arity } can be ex-
tended to an ultrafilter U. 
Proof That each r :;o ,x is non-empty can be seen directly from Lemma 8.8, so it 
is sufficient to show that for cp, x and '1/J, y there is a X: z so that r cp,x n r w,v ~ 
r x,z· Let x = cpr-,w and z = xr-, y and suppose that µ E r x,z · We have two 
verifications: 
Case µ E f ,:p,x 
Thus, for all j < length ( --P) , 
Case µ E f 1/J,fl 
Similar. 
µ (tpj) E Xj {=::=;> µ (cj) E Zj 
{=::=;> .p j E X j . 
Theorem 8.10. For } r C _\.Q and P C Q there exists a P', P C P' C Q ·with 
card (P' ) :( max (card (}/ ) , card (P ), card (Cnct ) ,w) 
so that there is an ultrafilter embedding 
hu : Fp, ----t FQ 
·with hu (y n S (P' )) = y for nll y E } · and so range (hu ) ~ 1 ·. 
• 
Proof Let O be as given at the start of this section and U as given by the 
previous lemma. All that remains to be shovvn is that hu (y n S (P' )) = 
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y for each y E } 7 • So let cp E S (Q). We know by definition that 
(\/µEr cp, y) [µ (cp) E y {=? cp E y] and so 
cp E y =;, (\/µ E ·r cp,y) [µ(cp) E y] 
=;,µ (cp) E y U a.e. 
=;,µ (cp) E y n S (P') U a.e. 
From which we conclude that y C hu (y n S (P')) and maximal consistency 
then gives us our result. D 
8.6 There Are Non-standard Embeddings 
The existence of a non-standard embedding can now be seen through the use 
of an observation of HAJNAL ANDREKA (reported to the author in [30]), how-
ever we must first isolate a class of common logics. 
Definition 8.11. A logic is said to admit arbitrarily many distinguishable alterna-
tives in index i E Idx iff for each n E w there exists a model NI = ( .,Y, R, V) for 
that logic, points x, Yj E .,Y., j < n, and formulae cpj , j < n such that for all 
j , k < n, (x , Yk) E Ri, and Ji.if FYk cpj if and only if k = j. 
Theorem 8.12 (ANDREKA). Suppose that L is a logic which admits arbitrarily 
many distinguishable alternatives in index i E Idx and that card ( Q) > card (P) ) 
w. Then there is a point in .,YQ which is not in the image of any standard homomor-
phism from Fp to FQ. 
Proof Let y E X Q be a maximal consistent extension of 
{ • i (p I\ -, q) I p' q E Q' p # q} . 
Because L admits arbitrarily many distinguishable alternatives this set is in-
deed consistent. 
Assume that y = g+(x) for some x E .,,,yP and some g : S (Q) ---+ S (P). 
Since card (Q) > card (P) ) w, g (q) = g (p) for some p, q E Q. Thus 
f- L , (g (p) /\ ,g ( q)) and so by necessitation f- L ,Di (g (p) I\ ,g ( q)). This tells 
us that f- L ,g (Di (p I\ ,q)), giving g (Di (p I\ ,q)) i x, and we can then conclude 
that Di(P /\ ,q) i g+(x) = y, a contradiction. D 
Since our construction shows that for most logics there is an ultrafilter em-
bedding which will hit the y constructed in our proof above, we know that 
such an embedding will indeed be non-standard. 
I:· 
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The reader should be reminded that these ultrafilter embeddings are by no 
means homomorphisms and to the author's knowledge the existence of non-
standard homomorphisms is still a big question-answered only in very spe-
cific cases in this thesis. However, these non-standard ultrafilter embeddings 
will sometimes be the best we can do. 
Consider this extension of ANDREKA's argument: Suppose that 2carci (Q ) > 
2 carci( P) holds2 and that L is a logic which admits arbitrarily many distinguish-
able alternatives in index i E Idx. Set y to be a maximal consistent extension 
of 
{ • (-,koPo I\ ··· I\ -,kn- lPn-1) I (ko, ... , kn-1) E 2n, TIE w, Po , ···, Pn-1 E Q} 
where we take -,o = -,-, and -, 1 = -,_ 
As with ANDREKA's argument the above set is clearly finitely consistent 
and y must have 2 card (Q) many alternatives because for each subset vV of Q 
there must be a y alternative which affirms only the variables of vV and no 
others. In this case, there is no way that y could be in a standard or non-
standard frame homomorphic image of Fp (since 2 card (Q) y-alternatives will be 
in that same image) and so if we are really intent on hitting y, the ultrafilter 
embedding may well be the limit of what we can hope . 
8.7 Logics of Bounded Alternative 
In this section we will see that we can actually get homomorphisms if we are 
dealing with logics of bounded alternative. This will allow us to conclude, 
in the next chapter, that there are a host of non-standard frame homomor-
phims and even non-standard frame isomorphisms and automorphisms for 
these logics. 
While we have so far taken great pains to point out that ultrafilter maps 
are not frame homomorphisms, and that this can sometimes be unavoidable, 
there is a notable exception where the logic Lis of bounded alternative: 
Theorem 8.13. Suppose that Alt~ (p) E L for some n E w and i E Idx. Then 
hu : Fft ---t Ft is a frame homornorphism in index i. 
Proof We already have that x R~iY ===} hu (x) R ~ihu (yt so we are left with the 
second condition of Definition 3.35. 
Suppose that hu (x) R~iy . Let {xj I j < n} = R~i (x) (since Lis a logic of 
bounded alternative in index i we can do this without any trouble) and take 
2 Again, we have the question of whether anything special happens when card ( Q) > 
card (P) but 2ca rd (Q) = 2ca r <l ( P ) . See Chapter 9. 
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y # hu (xj) for all j < n or else we would be done. Since { hu (xj) I j < n} is 
finite we can find a cp E S (Q) so that cp E y and (Vj < n) [cp t}. hu (xj)]. Thus 
•icp E hu (x) and ,cp E hu (xj) for all j < n, giving 
uj := {µ I µ ( ,cp) E Xj} E u for j < n, and 
Un:={µ I µ(•cpi) Ex} EU. 
By U having the finite intersection property U : = U0 n · · · n Un E U and we can 
conclude that there is a µ0 E DP,Q so that µ0 E U. We know that µ0 ( ,cp) E Xj for 
allj < n and µ0 (•icp) Ex, so ,µ0 (cp) E Xj for allj < n and •iµo (cp) Ex. But 
xR~ix' ~ (3j < n) [x' = xj] and so • ,µ0 (cp) E x, contradicting •iµo (cp) E 
X. • 
It is worth noting that our proof really relies on the fact that we can separate 
the closed set { hu (xj) I j < n} from the point y, and so if hu [ R~i (x)] were 
guaranteed to be closed then we could get the same result. We then get the 
following corollary to the proof: 
Corollary 8.14. The function hu is a frame homomorphism if it is a closed map. 
We include the next result since it is an easy consequence of our develop-
ment so far. This result was suggested by GOLDBLATT in [30] and implies that 
all logics of bounded alternative have the property that canonicity in any infi-
nite cardinal proves canonicity in all infinite cardinals. The conclusion is not 
so astounding as it is known that all logics of bounded alternative are canoni-
cal (see FABIO BELLISSIMA's [5]), but the result below does highlight a success 
of the approach of relating canonical frames of different cardinality. 
Corollary 8.15. For L a logic of bounded alternative in each index i E Idx, and 
for each ,,\ < "'1 there is a disjoint union of copies of Ff which has Ff: as a frame 
homomorphic image. 
Proof For each y E X f, let (Ff, y) be a disjoint copy of Ff and huy : 
(Ff, y) -+ Ff: be an ultrafilter embedding which hits y. By Theorem 8.10 
such a map can be found. By Theorem 8.13 each such map is a frame homo-
morphism (in each index i E Idx). Let F be the disjoint union of the (Ff, y), 
y E Xf and h the disjoint union of the huy. Then h is a frame homomorphism 
onto Ff:. • 
1•· 
Chapter 9 
Isomorphisms Between Canonical 
Frames 
9.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter we looked at a basic type of map between canonical frames 
and saw that there are many non-standard relationships between canonical 
frames of different cardinalities. In this chapter we will go further and look at 
the question of which conditions ensure that Ff and F"'L are isomorphic. We 
know from Proposition 2.37 that these canonical frames have cardinalities 2>-
and 2"' respectively and so the only way that they can be isomorphic is to posit 
that 2>- = 2"'. We will look at what happens when we make this assumption 
to see if we can actually have the isomorphism hold and we will look at some 
relatively simple systems to see what is happening there. 
Section 9.2 will show that canonical frames really are complicated, and are 
full of complicated subcomponents. Section 9.3 will show us that this has im-
portant consequences for the logic S5 and logics below it, Section 9 .4 will pro-
vide a start to the characterisation of logics which admit these non-standard 
isomorphisms, and the last section, 9.5, will show that for the friendly logics 
of bounded alternative we can have little difficulty in finding non-standard 
automorphisms and isomorphisms. 
9.2 Disjoint Generated Subframes and Closed Sets 
Our first goal will be a look at the possibility that F!; rv F!;1 , and to see that 
this cannot possibly hold for logics 'below' S5; this will follow clearly from 
the possible sizes of certain generated subframes of the canonical frame. Log-
ics which are contained in S5 (and thus have canonical frames which contain 
the canonical frame of S5) are natural for this because of the simplicity of their 
equivalence classes and inspection of the upcoming proofs will show that we 
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rely heavily on this simplicity · to the point where the S5 properties seem al-
most necessary. 
Before looking at S5 though, we need a few easy but general results about 
generated subframes and closed sets. 
Lemma 9.1. F!( contains 2K: pairwise disjoint generated subframes isomorphic to F;. 
Proof Write F = F;, X = .,,Yf. Let K = E 1 U E2 where E 1 n E2 = 0, card (Ei) = 
card (E2 ) = K witnessed by the bijection g : E 2 -----+ K. For each~ C E 1 define 
g6 : K -----+ s (K) by 
g (a) if a E E2 
g
6 (a) = ~ T ifo E t. 
1- if a(/_~ 
Now, g 6 is onto K since g 6 r E2 = g. Thus g~ : F -----+ Fis into._ Also, g~ is a 
frame homomorphism so g~ [.,,Y] is a generated subframe of F isomorphic to 
F. 
For 61 -/- 62, g~ 1 [X] n g~ 2 [X] = 0. 
Without loss of generality let a E ~ 1 - ~ 2 , so a E E 1 . Thus g6 1 (a) = T, 
g62 (a) = 1-. Thus 
(Pa HT) E ng~ 1 [X] (Pa H 1-) E n g~ 2 [X] 
Assume that g~ 1 [_,,Y] n g~ 2 [X] -/- 0. Thus there is an x with 
(Pa H T) , (Pa H 1-) E x . So, T H 1- E x a contradiction. 
Thus we have established that these are all disjoint generated subframes. • 
Corollary 9.2. If G is a generated subframe of F; then there are 2K: many pairwise 
disjoint generated subframes of F; each isomorphic to G. 
Lemma 9.3. Suppose that A is a cardinal with w < >. < 2w. Then there is no closed 
subset of xi of size A. 
Proof Firstly, we need only consider the case where A is a regular cardinal. In 
the case that A is a limit cardinal we just note that this implies that there is a 
regular cardinal between w and A with which we can work. 
Assume Y is a closed subset of xi of size greater than or equal to A. We 
will show the following: 
Let cp be a formula so that card (Yr n ll cpll) ~ >., then there is a formula 1/J so 
that both 
card (Yr n llcp /\ 1/J II) ~ A ~ card cv n llcp /\ , 1/J II). 
J 
,,, 
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This will give our result since it will mean that } T can be sectioned into succes-
sively finer parts and each of the 2w many descending chains of successively 
finer sections has the finite intersection property and so has a non-empty in-
tersection in :v ( distinct from other sections) and so ·v must have size 2w. 
So, suppose}/ n llcpl/ is of a size greater than or equal to A. Assume that for 
each VJ , one of 
card (Y- n llcp /\ 7/JII) < ,\ or card (}T n Jlcp /\ , ?/JII) < A. 
Let ('1/Jj I j E w) be so that {'1/Jj, , 7/Jj I j E w} exhausts1 all of S (w) , and for each 
J, 
card (Y n llcp /\ 7/Jj II) < A so card (} r n llv I\ 1 '1/Jj II) ? A. 
Thus we have that 
Since 
LJ (1r n llcp A wjll) u n (I ' n 11-P A ,wjll) 
. . 
J J 
= 1- n llc,:,11 n ( y ll1,1;ill u ~ ll•vjll) 
= Y n llc,:,11 n ~ ( 1! • 1/!111 u y llukil ) 
= } T n llcpll n n X/; = }' n llcpll -
J 
1. (Vj ~ w) [card (} r n llcp /\ '1/Jjll) < A], 
2. card (Y- n llcpll) ? A, and 
3. ,\ is a regular cardinal 
we have that card ( nj (Y n ll'P A • 1,/Jj II) ) ) A. But { 1/;j' • 1/;j IJ E w} exhausts all 
of S (w) and so this intersection must have cardinality at most 1. • 
This result is really just a result of set theoretic topology (see, e.g. , 
I. JUHASZ's article [46, Theorem 4.4 p. 84], which gives a slightly more gen-
eral result). In [55] K. KUNEN2 asks if this topological result can be general-
ized to the cardinal w 1 and he reported that such a conclusion, while implied 
1Modulo the equivalence of <p and ''y• 
2See [ 46] for a presentation of this work. 
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by certain large cardinal hypotheses, can be falsified in some models of ZFC.3 
This work tells us that our result above, and the conclusions about systems 
contained in S5 which follow, cannot be generalised to higher cardinals. 
9.3 Implications for the logic S5 
Here we will see that the previous two Lemmas identify all the possible sizes 
of generated subframes of canonical frames associated with S5 and this will 
allow us to conclude that F!; rv F!;
1 
does not hold in general. 
Since our formalism is based around multi-modal logics we will deal with 
a logic that we will know as super S5, or s85 for short. It has axioms (where 
the i and j range over all of Idx): 
1. Di T, 
2. D-i (P-+ q) -+ (Dip-+ Diq), 
3. Dip-+ p, 
4. Dip-+ DiDip, and 
5. Dip H DjP· 
The first four axioms say that each modality is S5-like and so its frames have 
equivalence relations as their accessibility relations, and the last axiom is ex-
tremely severe, requiring that all accessibility relations are identical. Thus a 
typical frame for s85 is (Y, Y x Y), where ·v x :v is the sequence of relations 
whose components are uniformly equal to Y x 1,,,. . 
This logic may seem highly specialised and restrictive, however for our 
purposes this does not matter as Lemma 9.5, and so the results of this sec-
tion, are about logics which are contained in s85, so specialisation of this upper 
bound cannot make our result any less general. 
Lemma 9.4. If (Y'", Y x Y'") is a generated subframe of F; then Y is a closed subset of 
X f. 
Proof Let y0 E Y'" be any point and let i E Idx. Then}_,. == ll{<p I Di<p E Yo} II- D 
Lemma 9.5. Suppose that L C s85 and that,\ is a cardinal ·with,\ ~ "'· Then there 
is a generated subframe of F; of size A, and thus 2;,: n1any generated subframes of size 
A. 
3This top ological analysis, it turns out, can be reduced to an analysis of trees, and in par-
ticular it red uces to a question about the existence of Jech-Kunen trees. 
nl 
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Proof Consider the following set of formulae: 
~ = s85 U {Di('Pa--+ p13), •i(Pa /\ ,p13) I a#- f3 < A, i E Idx} 
U {DiPa I A ( a < K,, i E Idx} . 
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The set ~ is (s85-consistent and hence) L-consistent since (>., >. x >., v) is an 
s85 model of~ where v (Pa) = A - {a}. 
Let y0 E 11 ~11, within the canonical frame F"', and let 1-r be the subframe of 
F"' generated by y0 . Let R = Y x -y_ Thus (1,,., R) is a generated subframe of 
F"'. Now, -y n II 'Pa II has cardinality 1 for if Y1, Y2 E Y n II 'Pa II for distinct Y1, Y2 
we have that there is a propositional variable p13 which distinguishes them 
(remember that this is an sSS equivalence) so (3 < >., but 'Pa E y1 n y2 so 
P/3 E Y1 n Y2. Clearly 
y = ( y (}' n ll•Pall)) u ( 0 (Y n IIPall) ) . 
Since 1 r is an sSS-equivalence class each element is determined solely by its 
propositional variables so card (l/r n n a IIPall) = 1. Thus, card (1,r) ( >. + l == A. 
But, A ( card (Y) since { •i (Pa /\ 'P f3) I a #- (3 < A} C ~, giving card (Y) 
>.. • 
Remark 9.6. This result might hold for more general logics but the author is 
unable to see how this could be shown. Certainly the approach adopted here 
will not work as it relied heavily on two points being distinguishable by a 
propositional variable and this can only be guaranteed when those points are 
in a 'super' equivalence class of the frame. 
Theorem 9. 7. For any logic L C sSS, F!; '£ F!;
1
• 
Proof If 2w 1 > 2w we are done so assume 2w 1 = 2w. By Lemmas 9 .1 and 9 .5 F!;1 
contains a generated subframe of size w1 and so w < w1 < 2w. By Lemma 9.3, 
F!; does not contain such a generated subframe (or else, by Lemma 9.4, Xf; 
would have a closed set of that size) and so they cannot be isomorphic. • 
Applying Scroggs's theorem (a result of SCROGGS's paper [71]) we see 
quite quickly that, S5 is an upper limit and the desired result can go through 
above it. 
Theorem 9.8. Suppose that Lis a mono-modal logic, i.e., card (Idx ) == 1. If L ~ S5 
then F;; r-v F!;
1 
in the presence of 2w = 2w1 . 
Proof By Scroggs' s theorem L must be a logic whose frames have equivalence 
classes of size n or less, for some finite n . Thus, for each m ( n the canonical 
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frames F!; and F,!;
1 
must each have 2w and 2w 1 equivalence classes of size m 
respectively. Since we are dealing with such a simple structure and 2w = 2w1 
we have that F!;l rv F!;. • 
Remark 9.9. The above theorem suggest that a similar result holds for logics 
of bounded alternative and in Section 9 .5 we use the theory of ultrafilter em-
beddings to deduce just that. 
We will leave S5 for the moment returning to it when we investigate auto-
morphisms. 
9.4 Non-Standard Isomorphisms and Automor-
phisms 
When the author originally approached the question of whether F!; rv F!;
1 
it 
was clear that if it holds, then it must be witnessed by a non-standard isomor-
phism. In this section we show that such non-standard maps are often not 
present in logics satisfying the condition given below, not only allowing us to 
conclude that F!; ~ F!;
1 
yet again, but also the stronger result that such logics 
have no non-standard automorphisms. 
Definition 9.10. We say that L exhibits all consistencies in index i, for some i E 
Idx iff, for each propositional variable, p E w 
{Dip} U { •icp Ip I\ cp E S (P) is L-consistent} 
is consistent. 
Note that by a logic being closed under substitution we can conclude that, 
as long as it is infinite, the exact nature of the underlying set of propositional 
letters, in this case w, is irrelevant to this definition. 
Example 9.11. The logic S5 does not exhibit all consistencies asp I\ •·Pis S5-
consistent, however • p I\• (p I\ • ·P) is not consistent with S5. 
Remark 9.12. A (stronger) condition which will guarantee that L exhibits all 
consistencies is that in any model l\lI = (X, R, v) for Land for any Y C X there 
is a new model M' = (..,,Y' , R' , v') for L such that !VI is a generated submodel of 
NI' and (=lx' E X ' ) [R~(x') = Y]. Some non-iterative logics such as K, and Tare 
immediate examples of logics satisfying this condition. 
Example 9.13. KMcK satisfies all consistencies but is not contained in S5. 
.,1 
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Proof We use a modification of the condition mentioned above. Let lvI == 
( .. X, R, v) be the canonical model for KMcK. We suppress the super and sub-
scripts assuming that it is the canonical model over w. Let p E w and let x' ~ /\. 
Define 
)(' == 1\ LJ { X} , 
R' == R U { ( x' , y) I y E /y , p E y} , and 
I 
V == V. 
Set NI'== (X', R', v'). If we can show that NI' is a model for KMcK we are done 
with the first part as p/\cp consistent implies (x', y) E R for any y with p /\cp E y, 
so NI' Fx' •cp. Also, it is clear that NI' Fx' • p. Since AI is a generated submodel 
of !VI', the only place where a problem might occur is x' so we just need to test 
whether McK holds at x'. Suppose NI' Fx' • Ocp. We have, 
NI' Fx' D•cp ===> (Vy E 1Y') [(x',y) ER'===> •cp E y] 
===> (Vy E X) [p E y ===> •cp E y] 
===> (Vy E X) [p-+ •cp E y] 
===> p -+ •cp E KMcK. 
Now, assume NI' ~x' •Dcp, thus NI' Fx' • O-,cp . So, using the same argument as 
above we get that p -+ •-,cp E KMcK. 
The singleton reflexive frame ( {0} , { (0, 0)}) is a frame for KMcK. Put a 
model on this frame which hasp holding at 0. So this model must then satisfy 
•cp and •-,cp, so cp and -,cp hold at 0-a contradiction. Thus, NI' Fx' • Dcp . 
We are left with the requirement to show that KMcK ~ S5 but this is 
straightforward for consider the model A1 == (X, R, v) , X == {O, 1}, R == )( x /Y, 
and v (p) == {O}. Then J\1 F0 D•p and NI ~o •Op . • 
Theorem 9.14. If L exhibits all consistencies in some index i E Idx and if f : F""L --t 
Ff is an isomorphism then there is a g : >. --t S ( K:) such that J == g+, i.e., every 
isomorphism between the canonical frames for such logics is standard. 
Proof Let p E K: be a propositional variable. Let x E .)Cf be a maximal consis-
tent extension of 
{Dip} U { •icp I p I\ cp E S ( K:) is £-consistent} . 
(x, y) E R""i {=::::}YE IIPII-
(===>) Suppose that (x, y) E RKi· Since Dip E x , p E y. 
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(¢=) Let y E IIPII- We want to show that 
(\:/ ep E y) [ • i ep E X] . 
But y E IIPII , sop /\ ep is consistent for all ep E y. Thus for all ep E y, 
•iep EX. 
l [IIPII] = l [{y I (x, y) E RKi }] 
= {y I (l(x) ,y) E R>- i } 
= {y I { ep I Diep E l (x)} C y} 
= II { ep I Diep E l (x)} II . 
Now, let x' be a maximal consistent extension of 
{Di--,P} U { •iep E S ( K,) I --ip /\ ep is £-consistent} 
(which is consistent via a simple substitution argument). Again, we have that 
(x' , y) E RKi {==} Y E 11--,PII- Thus l [11--,PII] = ll{ ep I Diep El (x')}II- But IIPII U 
11--,PII = )[K, sol [11--,PII] U l [IIPII] = X>,. Also, l [11--,PII] n l [IIPII] = 0. Now, both 
l [11--,PII] and l [IIPII] are the intersection of clopen sets and so closed. Since they 
are the complements of each other, they must also be clopen. Proposition 2.35 
tells us that the only clopen sets in a Stone space are those induced by elements 
of the underlying algebra (formulae), sol [IIPII] = llepll for some formula ep . 
In this way we see that l can be thought of as a map from the algebra At 
to the algebra A£. Since 1- 1 also induces such a map (which is in the reverse 
direction and undoes the effects of l), we see that l is essentially an S-algebra 
isomorphism. Setting g (p) to be the least (in the lexicographic sense) ep such 
that 1-1 [IIPI I] = llepll gives us our desired g. D 
Remark 9.15. It is impossible to sharpen this result so that g can actually be 
taken to be a map from ,,\ to K, since there are many maps which accomplish 
such S-algebra isomorphisms without being of this form. Trivially, consider 
g: A --+ S (,,\) given by g (p) = --ip. Or, for a more involved example, consider 
g given by: 
g (p) = { (P1 /\ P2) V (--ip1 /\ --ip2) ~f P = P1 
p 1£ p # Pl· 
It is easy to check that g2 = id. Thus 9+ is an automorphism of Ff, but it is not 
of the form g: ,,\ --+ A. 
Question 9.16. Can this result be extended so that it encompasses arbitrary 
~ 
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frame homomorphisms? Not by the proof given here since if f : Ff: --+ F/: is 
a frame homomorphism and 1-1 [ { x}] is infinite then 
1- 1 [R(x)] = {z I (3x') [/ (x' ) = x and (x' , z) E Ri] } , 
and this need not be a closed set. 
Corollary 9.17. For logics L which exhibit all consistencies, Ff: 1£:_ F/: for all cardi-
nals A, max ( { w , card (Idx)}) ~ ,,\ < r;,. 
Proof Any such isomorphism would induce a one-one map g 
which would contradict r;, > A. 
r;, --+ S (A) 
• 
We see that this result also limits the possibilities for automorphisms of the 
canonical frame itself. 
Corollary 9.18. For logics L which exhibit all consistencies, Ff: has no non-standard 
automorphisms, for all cardinals A ? max ( { w, card (Idx)}) 
However, there is a distinction between the approach we have used here 
and that of the previous section: 
Example 9.19. S5 does not exhibit all consistencies and FKSS does have non-
standard automorphisms. This is because it has 2K many equivalence classes 
of each allowable size which means that there are 22" many automorphisms, a 
number far greater than 2K, the number of standard automorphisms. 
This is suggestive: 
Conjecture 9.20. L exhibits all consistencies iff Fj: has no non-standard auto-
morphisms. 
9.5 Logics of Bounded Alternative and Granular 
Maps 
This section highlights a type of isomorphism which we call 'granular.' These 
maps capture the idea that we could use 2>- = 2K to guarantee a bijection be-
tween P (A) and P ( r;,) which we then use as a base on which to build an iso-
morphism between Fj: and Ff:. 
Our development will rely on the machinery of ultrafilter maps introduced 
in Chapter 8. While that chapter concerned itself mostly with ultrafilter em-
beddings constructed in a rather restricted way, we will allow a wider class of 
ultrafilter maps which we will then specialise in a new way. 
Recall that O P,Q := {µ I µ: Q --+ S (P ) }. We now set: 
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Definition 9.21. ni,Q := {µ I µ : Q ----0 So (P)} 
The ultrafilter embeddings, hu for U an ultrafilter over DP,Q, which were 
introduced in Chapter 8 generalise standard frame homomorphisms and like 
standard frame homomorphisms there are maps which we call stable (that re-
sult from functions which send propositional letters to Di-free or degree zero 
formulae) and maps which we call unstable. More formally: 
Definition 9.22. A standard frame homomorphism f : Fft ----0 FJ is stable 
iff for each q E Q, 1-1 [llqll] = llcpll for some intensional operator free cp, and 
unstable otherwise. 
An ultrafilter U on DP,Q is stable iff ni,Q EU, and unstable otherwise. In the 
case of U being stable, hu is also called stable. 
From now on, fix U as a stable ultrafilter and consider hu : X fe ----0 X~. 
Since stable maps do not interfere with the modal depth of formulae we 
can analyse their action by seeing how they behave with respect to pairs of 
points which are equivalent up to formulae of some bounded modal depth. 
Definition 9.23. For any set Q of propositional variables, and n E w, define 
rvn, an equivalence relation on X~, by 
X rv n y ~ X n Sn ( Q) = y n Sn ( Q) . 
Proposition 9 .24. 
(Vn E w) (Vx, y EX~) [x rvn y ===? hu (x) rvn hu (y)]. 
Proof Suppose that X rvn y. Let cp E Sn ( Q), then 
cp E hu ( x) ~ {µ I µ ( cp) E x} E U 
~ {µ E n~,Q Iµ (cp) Ex} Eu 
~ { µ E n~,Q I µ ( cp) E y} E u since µ ( cp) E Sn ( Q) 
~ cp E hu (y). 
• 
Because hu is a stable map we can be assured that it will be kind to the 
number of i-successors of a point and this will be the crux of our proof that a 
logic need only be of bounded alternative for Ff to have non-standard auto-
morphisms. 
Unfortunately to achieve our goals we cannot simply talk about the num-
ber of i-successors a point has, but we must modify the concept to talk about 
the number of Sn ( Q)-distinct i-successors that the point has. 
''i 
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Definition 9.25. We say that a point x E .,Y fe has exactly (at most) m/ rvn i-
successors, for i E Idx iff R~i (x) / rvn has size exactly (at most) m. 
Proposition 9.26. A point x E X fe has at nzost m/ rvn i-successors, for i E Idx if and 
only if Alt~ (cp) Ex for all cp E Sn (P). 
Proof We prove the if and only if parts separately. 
(===?) Suppose that Alt~ (cp) ~ x for some cp E Sn (P ). Thus •icpo/\ · · · /\•iCfm E 
X and vj <k~m •i (cpj I\ Cfk) ~ X . Let Yo, ... ' Ym be in R~i (x) so that Cfk E Yk 
for all k ~ m. 
j < k ===? Yj fn Yk· 
Suppose that j < k, then •i (rpJ I\ cpk) (/. x and so cpj I\ Cfk (/. Yj U Yk· 
But cpj E Yj and Cfk E Yk, so Cfk (/. Yj and cpj (/. Yk and we conclude 
that Yj fn Yk· 
Thus R~i ( x) / rvn has size > rn . 
( ¢:=::) Suppose that R~i ( x) / rvn has size greater than m . So there are Yo, ... , Ym 
in this set which are pairwise rvn -inequivalent and we get that there are 
formulae cp0 , ... , Cfm E Sn ( Q) which form a disjoint cover of the whole 
space with a unique cover element to each Yj· In particular we have: 
1. (\/ j < k ~ m) [r- L , ( cpj I\ Cf k)], 
2. r- L V j~m cpj, and 
3. (\/j ~ m) [cpj E Yj]-
Thus •icpo I\ · · · I\ •iCfm E x. But by 1 (above) we have that for all j < k ~ 
m, , •i (cpj I\ cpk) Ex, establishing that Alt~ (cp) is not in x. 
• 
Corollary 9.27. Let i E Idx. If x E X fe has exactly m/ rvn i-successors and x rvn+ 1 y 
then y has m/ rvn i-successors. 
Proof Assume that there is a case where x has exactly m/ rvn i-successors, and 
y has exactly k / rvn i-successors, for k > m. Thus 
1. Alt~ ( cp) E x for all cp E Sn (P ), and 
2. Alt~ (cp) (/. y for some cp E Sn (P). 
But we can clearly see that Alt~ ( cp) is in Sn+i (P) allowing us to conclude that 
X fn+l y. • 
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Having established the properties of the concept of m/ rvn i-successors we 
can now go on to prove that stable maps leave these numbers unchanged. 
Proposition 9.28. Let i E Idx. If x E X fa has exactly m/ rvn i-successors then hu ( x) 
has at most m/ rvn i-successors. 
Proof Suppose that x has m/ rvn i-successors. Then we have that 
(V cp E Sn ( P)) [Alt~ ( cp) E x] 
and so we will have the result if we can show: 
(Vcp E Sn (Q)) [Alt~ (cp) E hu (x)]. 
Let cp E Sn ( Q). Forµ E Di,Q, 
µ (Alt~ (cp)) =Alt~(µ (cp )) Ex 
sin~e degµ ( cp j) = deg cp j ~ n. But we require that n~,Q E U giving 
Alt~ ( cp) E hu ( x ) . 
• 
With the m/ rvn i-successor preliminaries out of the way we can show that 
for L a logic of bounded alternative (in all indices), the action of hu is essen-
tially determined by how it acts on sets of propositional variables. 
Definition 9.29. For Pa set of propositional variables and a C P, let z; be the 
propositional calculus closure of the set au {--,p Ip E P - a} within S0 (P). 
We will drop the superscript P in z; since throughout the rest of this chap-
ter there will be no ambiguity introduced by such a move. 
Definition 9.30. A map f : ./y fe --+ X~ is called granular if£, for all a C P, 
there is ab C Q so that f [Jl zall] C ll zbll- In the case off a granular map define 
G (!) : P (P) --+ P ( Q), the granularity of J by . 
G (J) (a)= {PE QI p En f [ll zalll}. 
An immediate consequence of this definition is that if f : ./Yfe --+ ./y~ is 
granular then J [llzall] C ll zc(J)(a) 11 · 
Whereas standard maps have, at their very essence, a mapping of propo-
sitional variables, granular maps are less constrained and only have maps 
between sets of propositional letters. Clearly the standard maps induced by 
maps of the form q r-+ ±p are granular maps. 
l'J 
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Proposition 9.31. If Lis a logic of bounded alternative (in all indices) and- if hu (U a 
stable ultrafilter) is a granular ,nap ·with G (hu): P (P)--+ P (Q) an injection then 
hu : X fe --+ _)<.8 is also an injection. Moreover, in this case zue have that 
(Vn E w) (Vx, y E _Yfe ) [hu (x) rvn hu (y) ===> X rvn y] . 
Proof We will prove the second conclusion of the proposition by induction on 
n and this will give us the first conclusion. For the base case, note that if x rfo y 
then there are distinct a , b E P (P ) with x E llzall and y E llzbll , thus by G (hu ) 
one-one, c :== G (hu ) (a) and d :== G (hu ) (b) are distinct with hu (x) E llzcll and 
hu (y) E llzdll , allowing us to conclude that hu (x ) rfo hu (y) . 
Our inductive hypothesis is that the result holds for n and we now try to 
prove the result for n + 1: 
Suppose that hu (x) rvn+l hu (y) . By Corollary 9.27 we have that hu (x) and 
hu (y) have exactly the same number of rv n i-successors modulo rvn for each 
i E Idx. We now show that, for each i E Idx, x and y then have the same 
number of R~ i-successors up to rvn -equivalence: 
(Vi E Idx ) (Vx' E R~i (x) ) (3y' E Rii (y) ) [x' rvn y' ]. 
Let x ' E Rii (x) and assume that x ' rfn y' for all y' E R ~i (y) . From the 
inductive hypothesis we must then conclude that hu (x') rfn hu (y') for 
all y' E Rii (y) . Theorem 8.13 tells us that hu (x' ) is distinct from all the 
R ~i successors of hu (y ), and this can be witnessed by some cp E Sn ( Q) 
(cp E hu (x' ), , cp E hu (y' ) for all y' E Rii (y) ). Using the fact that hu is a 
frame homomorphism again we get that Di, cp E hu (y) . But cp E hu (x ' ), 
so •icp E hu (x) , contradicting hu (x) rvn+i hu (y). 
Let (f) E Sn (P ), we want to show that, for each i E Idx, 
•icp EX ¢=} •icp E y 
which will establish that x rvn+i y . So suppose that i E Idx, then 
•icp E x ===> (3x' E R ~i (x)) [cp E x 1] 
===> (3x' E R ~i (x) , y' E R~i (y)) [x' rvn y' and cp E x'] 
===> (3y' E R ~i (y)) [ cp E y1] 
===> •i~ E y. 
The converse follows by symmetry. • 
Recall the comment that granular frame homomorphisms are essentially 
determined by their granularity. This is basically due to the frame homom or-
phism theorem (a.k.a. the p-morphism theorem). Take for example this result. 
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Lemma 9.32. Let L be a logic 4 and h 1 : Ff --+ FJ, h2 : FJ --+ Ff be frame 
hornomorphisms so that G (h2 ) o G (hi) = id. Then h1 o h2 = id. 
Proof This result is an immediate consequence of the frame homomorphism 
theorem (see e.g., [13, p. 98]). We have that h2 o h1 is a frame homomorphism 
and h2 o h1 is a mapping between canonical models which leaves the intensions 
of propositions fixed. In particular: 
(Vx E .1Yfe) (\/p E P) [p Ex¢==} p E h2 o h1 (x)] 
We will prove the if and only if parts side by side. Let x E .1Y fe and 
suppose that p Ex (,p Ex). Let a C P be such that x E llzall- Then 
h2 o h1 (x) E h2 ° h1 [llzall] 
C h2 [llzc(ht)(a) II] 
C II 2 G(h2)(G(h1)(a)) II 
llzall 
and sop E h2 o h1 (x) (,p E h2 o h1 (x)). 
From this the frame homomorphism theorem allows us to conclude that 
(\/cp Es (P)) [1vife Fx cp ¢==} Jvife Fh2oh1(x) cp]' 
(where JVIfe is the canonical model over Ff) giving our result. • 
We next note that any type of granularity can give rise to a map between 
canonical frames. 
Lemma 9.33. For f : P (P) --+ P ( Q) there is a stable U such that G (hu) = f. 
Proof We will work within the Stone space ( Z , T) where Z = { zt I a C P}, 
and Tis the topology with clopen basis 
{llcpllo I cp E Sa(P )}, (llcpllo := {z E Z I cp E z}). 
We now need to construct the ultrafilter U and we will show that the natu-
ral definition does indeed work: For .6 C P (P) finite, let U 6 be the set 
{ µ E o~,Q I (Va E 6) (\/ q E Q) [µ ( q) E Za ¢==} q E f (a)]} . 
Clearly U 1:::. 0 n U 61 = U 60 u61 so to meet our goal of showing that the natural 
v7 : = { U D. I .6 C P ( P) is finite} 
4Not necessarily of bounded alternative. 
'~ 
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is a basis for an ultrafilter U we must show that U 6 f 0 for all finite .6. C P (P). 
So let .6 C P (P) be finite. We must define aµ : Q --, S0 (P). Take an arbitrary 
q E Q. Say 
q E J ( ao) n · · · n J ( am- 1 ) , 
q (/_ J ( bo) n · · · n J ( bn- 1) , and 
6 = {aj,bklj<m , k <n}. 
We take it that these {aj , bk} were chosen so that they are all distinct and so 
give rise to distinct points Z aj j < m, zbk k < n. Since T is a Stone topology we 
can find basic open IJ cp llo, for some cp E So (P), so that ZaJ E ll cp llo for j < m and 
z bk (/_ llcpllo fork < n. Chooseµ (q) to be this cp . Now suppose thatµ (q) is so 
defined for all q E Q. We must check that this meets our requirement: 
(\/ a E .6) (\/ q E Q) [µ ( q) E Za ¢==} q E f (a)]. 
Let a E .6, q E Q, and {aj, bk I j < m , k < n} be as before. 
(====}) Suppose that q (/_ J (a). Then a = bk for some k < n. Thus z bk (/_ 
llcpllo givingµ (q) = cp (/_ Z bk = Za. 
(¢::::::::) Suppose that q E f (a). Thus a = aj for some j < m and so Zaj E 
llcpllo givingµ (q) = cp E Zaj = Za. 
Thusµ E u~ showing that U6 -j. 0. 
Having completed this verification we can now proceed to show that U, 
any ultrafilter which extends V, gives rise to a granular hu satisfying G (hu) = 
J. In particular we show: 
(\/a E P (P)) [hu [llzall] ~ ll 2J(a) II]· 
Let a E P (P), and x E ll zall, so Za C x. 
Let q E J (a). For allµ E U{a}, µ (q) E Z a C x, so q E hu (x). 
Let q (/_ J (a). For allµ E U{a}, ,µ (q) E Z a C x, so ,q E hu (x), as desired. 
• 
We are now able to tie all these results together into theorems that are able 
to address the main points of this chapter. 
Theorem 9.34. In the event that Lis a logic of bounded alternative, there are (2 1'\: ) ( 
2
,\) 
many frame homomorphisms from Ff to F/:. 
Proof There are (2/-\:/2,\ ) maps from P (A) to P (K), each one giving rise to a 
distinct hu which must be a frame homomorphism. • 
156 Isomorphisms Between Canonical Frames 
We note that there are A"' many standard maps between Ff and Ff (assum-
ing that card (Idx) :( A) and so in cases where (2"') (2>-) > A"' (e.g., where r;, < A) 
there are non-standard frame homomorphisms between Ff and Ff. 
We can now conclude the section and the chapter with the answer to the 
question about the number and type of automorphisms and isomorphisms 
between canonical frames for logics of bounded alternative. 
Theorem 9.35. For La logic of bounded alternative (in all indices): 
1. If 2>- == 2"' then Ff rv F/:. 
2. The frame Ff has 22 >- many automorphisms, some of ·which must be non-
standard. 
Proof For 1: Suppose that 2>- == 2"'. Then there is a bijection f : P (A) --+ P ( r;,). 
By Lemma 9.33 there are hu : Ff --+ F/: and hu-1 : F/: --+ Ff so that 
G (hu) == f and G (hu- 1) == 1-1, and by Lemma 9.32, hu-1 o hu == id and 
hu o hu-1 ==id.Thus hu is an isomorphism between Ff and F/:. 
For 2: Each bijection f : P (A) --+ P (A) corresponds to a distinct automor-
phism. There are 22>- many such bijections and hence 22>- many such automor-
phisms. There are only 2>- many maps from A to S (A), hence only 2>- many 
standard automorphisms. • 
9.6 Conclusion 
We have seen that there are a number of interesting questions which arise 
vvhen we look at the isomorphisms over and between canonical structures, 
and we have highlighted the classes of standard and non-standard maps. We 
have looked at logically simple systems like S5 and have seen that while we 
can make many interesting observations, even here some difficult set-theoretic 
questions can arise. 
By using the technique of ultrafilter embeddings we have investigated the 
isomorphisms and automorphisms over logics of bounded alternative and 
have seen that this is one realm in which we can tell a relatively complete 
story. 
We have only scratched the surface of the questions that arise from the in-
quiry f/ Does F/: have any non-standard automorphisms?" It is the author's 
hope that this work will stimulate interest in this area and that it will en-
courage researchers to refine our understanding of canonical frame automor-
phisms (or even frame homomorphisms). 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusions 
This thesis has looked at the big canonicity problems in modern intensional 
logic from a number of different points of view. The approaches associated 
with these points of view have: 
1. Led to new results which may well lie on the road to solutions to these 
problems. 
2. Had a common thread so that by highlighting and homing in on this 
thread we ·can try to acquire a better understanding of underlying mech-
anisms. 
3. Led us to new and interesting questions which are deserving of attention 
in future work. 
10.1 Points of View 
The canonicity questions were attacked from three points of view. The first 
was in terms of algebraic semantics. Even though these semantics were not 
able to capture the definitions of canonicity they were a constant reminder 
of where power set boolean algebras were important (see, e.g., Theorem 6.8 
which worked for any boolean algebra B). 
The second point of view was that of relational semantics. While this is also 
a traditional means of analysing intensional logics, it was necessary because it 
allowed us to pose and answer questions about maps between Stone spaces-
Chapters 8 and 9. When we tried to do without the direct use of relational 
semantics in Chapter 7, we got a better idea of what was going on, and an 
appreciation of how important an accessibility relation can be. 
The final point of view was that of neighborhood semantics. We have seen 
how this approach forces us to think algebraically yet with reference to the 
underlying powerset behaviour. We were able to get canonicity results even 
though the relational semantics was not there to help. This did highlight the 
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fact that, as with completeness; neighborhood semantics properly sits between 
algebraic and relational semantics-giving us a useful, but not perfect tool, 
in approaching the long standing canonicity questions, which, after all, were 
about relational canonicity. It also gave us new questions on canonical exis-
tence to ponder. 
10.2 Specific Questions Answered 
By taking these three approaches we have been able to make the following 
discoveries: 
1. All non-iterative logics are neighborhood canonical. 
2. All even logics which have the finite model property are neighborhood 
canonical. This means that all uniform normal modal logics are neigh-
borhood canonical and so, through the McKinsey logic, we have that 
neighborhood canonicity is more general than relational canonicity. 
3. All logics below S5 do not have non-standard isomorphisms between 
F!,; and F!,;
1
, yet they may have non-standard automorphisms of these 
stru ctures . 
4. All logics w hich admit all consistencies cannot have non-standard iso-
morphisms or automorphisms. 
5. All logics of bounded alternative have many non-standard isomor-
phisms and automorphisms. 
10.3 Unifying Thread: Ultrapowers 
Throughout this work we have blatantly and frequently made use of ultrafil-
ters, yet it might not be immediately clear that we have, in some form, always 
been using ultrapow ers. In Chapters 5 and 6 qur use -of ultrapowers was in 
our expansion of the Lindenbaum algebra into something that included the 
canonical frame. The use here was blatant because we openly used ultrapow-
ers. Note here that each element of the canonical algebraic frame, that is, each 
subset of the canonical space, was represented as some element of the ultra-
power. 
In Chapter 7 we introduced our ultrafilter semantics which purported to 
represent each subset of the canonical Stone space as a formula in a suitably 
large language. Even thou gh we did not make it explicit, each of the formulae 
in the suitably large lan gu age could, again, be thought of as elements of an 
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ultrapower of the original language. After alt ll cp llu really was just the inverse 
image of the element [cp'] ~u under the Los function, where cp : D --t S (P ) is 
defined by cp (µ) = µ( cp). Chapter 7 showed the remarkable ability of ultrafilter 
semantics-and hence the ultra powers hanging around in the background-to 
recreate a significant subset of known canonicity results. 
In Chapter 8 and its dependent Chapter 9, we also made use of ultrapow-
ers in that each hu ( x ) is the projection of a point in the ultra power of the canon-
ical frame back down into a canonical frame of different cardinality. 
10.4 New Questions 
In each chapter the underlying ultrapowers did not drive our analysis so there 
is an opportunity to determine the exact role that ultrapowers can play in 
canonicity questions. 
Also, our analysis of ultrafilter semantics in Chapter 7 may not exhaus-
tively cover all the known cases of relational canonicity so it is important to 
determine whether this technique can be extended or if it is inadequate for the 
task, and if so, why. 
Even given the level of attack presented in Appendix A, the canonicity 
question for the logic EK4 remains open. This lack of success puts the neigh-
borhood completeness of this logic into doubt. Any form of completeness re-
sult would provide invaluable information on how iterativity affects semantic 
truth. 
While we now have some idea of which logics will admit non-standard 
isomorphisms, we still have a large class of logics which are not covered by 
our theorems. Is it possible that the existence of non-standard isomorphisms 
is related to the realisation of all consistencies as conjectured in Chapter 9? 
What about non-standard frame homomorphisms? Apart from simple logics 
of bounded alternative, we have been able to say nothing here. 
And finally, there are still the major problems of "Does elementarity imply 
canonicity?" and "Does canonicity in one cardinal imply canonicity in higher 
cardinals?" which this thesis has not been able to solve. 
These are difficult problems! Hopefully the reader now has a few more 
ideas on how they could be tackled and an appreciation of the new approaches 
presented here. 
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Appendix A 
EK4, a case study 
A.1 Introduction 
The results of Chapter 5 naturally suggest the question of what happens when 
we move to logics which are iterative: Which iterative logics are canonical and 
which are not? Of course, for the normal modal logics this question is well 
understood for a host of interesting iterative logics, but this is entirely because 
we have the accessibility relation to work with. In the region which is well 
removed from the logic K it is not clear how to proceed. 
As we saw in Chapter 4 some classical iterative logics are quickly shown to 
be canonical and so complete, namely those logics which have axioms that do 
not mix propositional variables. An example is the simple iterative logic E4. 
This is trivially complete because it satisfies the criteria of BENT0N's result, 
however 'Does the logic E4 have the finite frame property?' remains an open 
question (see W0LTER's paper [105]). 
When thinking of iterative logics for which completeness is unknown, the 
simplest _logic that comes to mind is the logic EK4-which is the classical 
mono-modal logic with axioms: 
1. D(p-+ q) -+ (• p-+ • q), 
2. • p-+ •• p, and is closed under the rule 
3. from cp H 1jJ infer • cp H • ?jJ . 
The following questions are currently unanswered: 
Question A.1. Is the logic EK4 canonical? 
Question A.2. Does the logic EK4 have the finite frame property? 
Of course, in the light of our work in Chapter 6, a positive answer to the 
second question will give an in1mediate positive answer to the first. While 
this work is unable to answer these two questions, some progress has been 
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made in understanding EK4 itself and this appendix is presented as a brief 
introduction to the behaviour of the system so that other researchers can take 
up the cause. 
Throughout this appendix we will mostly work with neighborhood seman-
tics rather than algebraic frames and our logics are mono-modal so we will 
suppress the subscripts on the Os and the N s. Also we will take our set of 
p ropositional letters to be fixed as P which we take to be w . 
A.2 K Frames 
We will start by looking at the underlying EK logic and all EK, and thus EK4, 
frames . Since the EK part of the logic is non-iterative it is only necessary to 
look at how the neighborhoods at each point behave: 
If (X, N) F EK then each JV(x) will be a set which, in essence, "satisfies" K 
all by itself. This motivates the following definition. 
Definition A.3. Let .A. be a boolean algebra. A neighborhood set is any subset of 
A . We say that the neighborhood set V is K-like iff 
(\la, b EA) [,a V b EV and a E V =* b E V]. 
Now, to make our analysis a little easier let us introduce a concept based 
on simple graph theory.1 
Definition A.4. For A a boolean algebra define graph (A) = (A, E (A)) to be the 
K-graph of A with an edge set defined as follows: 
E (A) = { { a, a'} I a /. a' , ,a ~ a'} . 
Now, each graph is divided up into its connected components: 
Definition A.5. Let 9 = (G, E ) be a graph, and let g E G. then 
[g] = {g' E G I g' E* g} where 
E* = {(g, g') I (3n E w) (3go, ... , gn E G) 
[g = g0 and g' = gn and (vi< n) [{gi, gi+1 } E E]] } . 
This is called the g-component of 9 . 
1 We take BELA B OLLOBAS's book [8] to be our basic graph theory reference. 
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Lemma A.6. Let A be a boolean algebra and 11 a K-like neighborhood set on A. Let Q 
be the subgraph of graph (A) formed by restricting graph (A) to 1/ . Let (a0 , ... , an ) 
be a path through Q, i.e., (Vi < n) [ ,ai ~ ai+i]. Then 
(Vb E A) [ao I\ ··· I\ an ~ b ~ an =? b E t1 ]. 
Proof We proceed by induction on n, the length of the pa th. 
Base Cases: n = 0. Then a0 ~ b ~ a0 =? b = a0 E 1/ . 
Inductive Hypothesis: Assume that the result holds for paths of length n. 
Inductive Step: Suppose that (a0, ... , an , an+i ) is a path through Q. Let c 
(ao I\ ··· I\ an) V ,an+l · Thus 
ao I\ ···I\ an ~ C ~ an V ,an+l ~ an Van = an, 
so c EV. Now, 
,c = ,(ao I\ ... I\ an) I\ an+l ~ an+l E \ ', 
thus (Vb E A) [c /\ an+L ~ b ~ an+i =? b E VJ . (This follows because if c I\ 
an+l ~ b ~ an+l then an+l ;;? ,c V b ;;? ,c V (c /\ an+1) = ( ,c V c) I\ (an+l V , c) = 
T /\ an+l = an+l, so ,c V b E 1, and c E 11, sob E 11 'by' K. ) But 
c I\ an+l = ((ao I\ ··· I\ an) V ,an+1) I\ an+l 
= (ao I\ .·. I\ an I\ an+1) V (,an+l I\ an+1) 
= ao I\ ··· I\ an+l· 
• 
Theorem A.7. Let A be a boolean algebra and Va K-like neighborhood set on .A .. Let 
Q be the subgraph formed by restricting graph (A) to 11. Let [a] be a component of Q. 
Then 
(V n E w) (V ao , ... , an E [a]) (\/ b E A) [ ao I\ · · · I\ an ~ b ~ ao =? b E il ] . 
Proof Let n E wand let a0, ... , an ~ b ~ a0. There must be a path (a~, ... , a~J 
through [a] which visits each ai and ends at a0. Thus 
a~ I\ . . . I\ a'm, ~ ao I\ ... I\ an ~ b ~ ao = a'm, 
so by Lemma A.6 b E t ' . • 
Thus we see that a K-like neighborhood set, and hence the neighborhood 
sets in an EK frame are "flower like" in the sense of Figure A.1. 
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Any set containing 
the inner core and 
contained within an 
outer set must also 
be a neighborhood. 
Outer Set/ 
Petal 
Inner Core/ 
Central Seed 
Figure A.l: A conceptualisation of a K-like neighborhood set. 
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The neighborhoods must include a central 'seed' but then they are free to 
include anything between that and the outer edge of one of the petals. 
This whole result means that we can simplify our understanding of an EK-
neighborhood set by horning in on that central kernel while keeping some 
outer petal in mind. In the same way that a normal K-neighborhood set is 
closed under intersection, we have that the members of the neighborhood that 
are contained in one of these 'outer sets' (petals) form a set that is closed un-
der intersection. So we could construct an accessibility relation for each of the 
outer sets. But this would not help us deal with the canonicity of iterative ax-
ioms as there is no clear prescription for how to combine relations-something 
we do with the single relation of normal modal logic. [Suppose that we have a 
relation R 11 <p11 based on some outer set ll<pll and another relation R lll/J II based on 
11 1/J IJ. Will R 11cpll o R lll/JII have any semantic meaning? After alt this is no longer 
relative to a single outer set.] 
Note that if we look at the worlds with IITII = )( E JV(x) in an EK4-frame, 
we have only one component as all -v C .,Y will satisfy-,}-' C II TII - This sug-
gests that by restricting ourselves to worlds in ll • TII we wilt in some sense, 
get a generated subframe of (.,Y, N). 
To show that this is indeed the case we must first introduce two minor 
pieces of notation: For (_,.Y, N) a frame, let ll • TII = {x E _y I .ty E N(x) }. For 
!VJ= (-.X , N, v) a model and <p E S (P) let 
1  <p I I J\I[ = { X E X I NJ F X cp } . 
Proposition A.8. Let (.,Y, N) F EK4 and let v be a valuation on (.,Y, JV) . Set 
N'( x ) = rv n ll• TII I y- E N(x)}. Let v' be a valuation on (IIDTII, N ' ) defined 
by v'(p) = v (p) n IIDTII -Let !VJ== (_,,Y, N , v) and let A1' = (II DT II, JV' , v' ). Then 
('efrp E S (P)) [l l'P II M n ll• TII = ll'PIIM' ] . 
Proof This proposition is proved by induction on the complexity of cp . The 
base and boolean cases are immediate so we must show that for cp E S (P ), 
ll • cp llM n ll • TII = ll • cpllNI': 
IIDrpllAI n II DTII = IIDTII n { x EX I ll'PIIM E N(x) } 
= { x E II DT II I IIYIIM E N(x) } 
= { x E IIDTII I ll'PIIM' E N(x) } 
= ll• cp lJ1\I ' . 
The third equality is justified as follows: 
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!VI !VI' /VI (C) Suppose that x E IIDTII and llcpll E N(x). Thus llcpll = llcpll n 
IIDTII E N'(x) by definition. 
!VI' (:>) Suppose that x E IIDTII and llcpll E N'(x). Thus there exists a Y E 
N(x) such that 
y· n IIDTII = llcpllM' = llcpll n IIDTII -
Without loss of generality we can assume that Y = v(q) for some propositional 
letter q not appearing in cp . Thus x E IIDqllJ\,1 and so qADT H cpADT E Th (iv!). 
Claim: DT • (Dq H Dcp) E Th (lvf). 
Proof of claim: 
We provide a derivation sequence: 
1. T H (q A DT • q) E Taut. 
2. DT H (D(q A DT) • Dq) EEK- applying K to 1. 
3. TH (q • (DT • q !\ DT)) E Taut. 
4. DT • (Dq A DDT • D(q A DT)) E EK - applying K to 3. 
5. DT • DDT E EK4. 
6. DT • (Dq • D(q A DT)) E EK4 - 4,5 and PC.2 
7. DT • (Dcp H D( cp A DT)) E EK4 - 2,6 and the substitution [q/ cp] . 
8. cp A DT H q ADTE Th (NJ). 
9. D(cp A DT) H D(q A DT) E Th (NI) - 8 and equivalence. 
10. DT • (Dq H D cp) E Th (NI) - 6,7,9 and PC. 
End of proof of claim. 
Hence by x E IIDTII and x E IIDqllAI we see that x E IID<fllM, so llcpllM E 
N(x). D 
While things work smoothly in this case it is unfortunate that we do not see 
a precedent here for obtaining a 'generated' subframe. In generat the truth 
of a boxed formula really depends on global properties of the whole frame. 
For instance, it may happen that (_/Y, N , v) Fy DDp and (X, N, v) Fy DDq and 
the only reason this happens is because (.,Y, 1V, v) Fz Dp H Dq holds only at 
this particular z . Hence, this particular z, which could be anywhere, becomes 
important to the notion of truth at the point y. 
2The Propositional Calculus . 
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A.3 Horn Logics 
We now move on to prove some purely syntactic features of a class of logics 
that includes EK4. Our principal tool is the notion of a metavaluation. The 
idea behind metavaluations is that we think of D-ed formulae as being basic 
building blocks and so we try to assign them truth values. We then hope that 
this is somehow consistent with the underlying logic. 
Definition A.9. Let JE = PU {Dcp I cp E S (P ) }. A metavaluation is a map v 
JE ----t {T , j_}. Each metavaluation extends uniquely to a map v : S (P) ----t 
{T, j_} using the usual requirements that v (cp I\ 1/J ) = v( cp ) I\ v('l/J ) etc., except 
that we do not need to give the truth condition for • cp. 
Definition A.10. We say that a metavaluation v verifies L iff v( cp ) = T for all 
cp EL. 
We note that any metavaluation will verify all tautological formulae, so 
verifying that a metavaluation verifies a logic is quite straightforward: 
Proposition A.11. Let L be a classical logic defined by an axiom set ~ and sole rule 
of inference cp H 'ljJ / • cp H • 'lj; . Then a metavaluation v verifies L if! 
1. (Vcp E ~) (\/substitutions er) [v(cpcr) = T], and 
2. if cp H 'ljJ E L then v (• cp) = v (• 'lj) ). 
For this reason we will assume that all axiomatisations given in this chapter 
have cp H 'ljJ / • cp H • 'lj; as their only rule of inference (apart from modus 
ponens). 
Before we properly embark on our study of Horn logics we make the fol-
lowing observation. 
Lemma A.1~. Suppose that cp (/_ L, then there is a metavaluation v which verifies L 
and v ( cp) = J_. 
Proof Since cp (/_ L, there is an 5-algebra A and a valuation v' on A such that 
v' ( 1/J ) = TA for all 1/; E L and v' ( cp) # TA. Let u C A be an ultrafilter in A which 
includes -iv' (cp ), then define the metavaluation v by 
v(q) = { = if V ( q) E u, otherwise. 
This can readily be shown to be a metavaluation which verifies L because 'ljJ E 
L ===> v'( 'l/J ) =TA===> v('l/J ) = T . Also, v' (cp ) (/_ u so v( cp ) = J_ _ • 
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Now we can close in on our syntactic class of logics: 
Definition A.13. We say that a formula is a Horn clause iff it is of the form 
Dwo /\ · · · /\ D <pn-1 --+ D?j; , n ? 1. 
Using the name 'Horn' is a slight abuse of the established terminology, for 
a Horn clause usually allows arbitrary members of JE however we are demand-
ing that all components be boxed formulae. 
Definition A.14. We say that a logic Lis a Horn logic iff it can be axiomatised 
by a set of Horn clauses (in addition to the collection of tautologies). 
Horn logics turn out to have two defining characteristics, those of being 
additive and unintensional. We will establish this relationship here. 
Definition A.15. Let • S (P) == {Dcp I cp E S (P)} [ OS (P) == { • 
the set of boxed [lozenged] formulae respectively. 
E S (P)}] 
Definition A.16. We say that a logic is unintensional iff we can never have 
• coo V · · · V D cpn-1 E Lor •yo V · · · V •cpn-1 E L. 
Definition A.17. We say that a logic Lis additive iff for all sets { Vo: I 0: < re} of 
metavaluations which verify L, the meta valuation v + defined by 
+ (q) == min{vQ(q) I i < re} 
verifies~. 
We can now verify the first half of the equivalence between Hom and un-
intensional additive logics. 
Lemma A.18. Suppose that Lis a Horn logic. Then Lis an unintensional and addi-
tive logic. 
Proof First let ~ be a set of Horn clauses which axiomatise L . We show that 
the two properties hold: 
Lis additive 
Let { vQ I a < re} be a collection of meta valuations which verify L, and set 
• - 'JI t . \l\fe must show that v verifies Land this means that v(xa) = T 
for all '( E ·I: and all substitutions a and that <p +--+ u E L ====> v (• <p) == 
(• ·<;!}) . 
(VA E ~) (\/substitutions a) [v(xa) = T). 
Ii 
ii 
I 
I 
I 
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Let x E ~ and let a be a substitution. Thus 
xa = • cpo I\ · · · I\ Dcpn-1 • D?j; 
for some cp0 , ... , 4?n-l, ?jJ E S (P) . Thus va(xa) = T for all a < K. 
Now suppose that v(• cp0 I\ ···I\ Dcpn-d = T, i.e., v(Dcp0 ) = · · · = 
v (Dcpn-l) = T. Then v0 (Dcp0) = · · · = v0 (Dcpn- l) = T for all a < K, 
and so v0 ( • cp0 /\ · · · /\ Dcpn- l) = T for all a < K, telling us that 
v(• ?j;) = T. We conclude that v(xa) = T. 
cp H ?jJ E L ===? v(• cp) = v(• ?j;) . 
Suppose that cp H ?jJ E L, so • cp H • ?j; E L. Thus 
(Va< r;,) [v 0 (• cp) = v0 ( • ?/J)]. 
We then have the following sequence of equivalences: 
L is unintensional. 
v(• cp) = T ¢:==?(Va< K) [v 0 (• cp) = T) 
¢:==?(Va< K) [v0 (D?j; ) = T] 
¢:==? v (• ?j;) = T 
Assume not. Thus we have 2 cases: 
Case Dcp0 V · · · V Dcpn-l E L. 
Define v : IE ---r {T, _i} by v(q) = l_ for q E IE. We show that v 
verifies L. 
(Vx E ~) (\/substitutions a) [v(xa) = T]. 
Let x E ~ and let a be a substitution. Thus 
xa = • cp~ I\ .. . I\ • cp~_ 1 -t • ?j) 
forsome cp~, ... ,cp~_ 1,?j; E S(P). Thus v(• cp~) = l_ fori < n, 
and so v (• cp~ /\ · · · /\ • cp~_ 1 ) = _i which tells us that 
v(• cp~ I\ · ·· I\ • cp~_ 1 • D q'.; ) = T. 
We can then conclude that v(xa) = T . 
cp H 1/J E L ===? v(• cp) = u(• ?j;) . 
v(• cp) = l_ = v(• 'lj; ). 
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Thus 
v(Depa V · · · V Depn_i) = 1- V · · · V l_ = l_ 
so Depa V · · · V Depn- l ~ L, a contradiction. 
Case •epa V · · · V •cpn-1 E L. 
Define v : IE --t {T , 1-} by v(q) = T for all q E IE. We will show 
that v verifies L. 
(\/x E E) (\/substitutions a) [v(xa) = T]. 
Let x E E and let a be a substitution. Thus 
xa = • ep~ I\ · · · I\ • ep~_ 1 --+ D'lj; 
for some <p~, ... , ep~_ 1 , 'ljJ E S (P). Thus v(D'lj;) = T which tells 
us that 
u(• ep~ I\ ··· I\ • cp~_ 1 --+ D'lj; ) = T. 
We can then conclude that v(xa) = T. 
ep +--t 'ljJ EL==> v(• cp) = v(• 'lj;) . 
v(Dep) = T = v(D'lj;) . 
Thus 
v( •cpa V · · · V •epn-i) = , TV · · · V, T = l_ 
so •epa V · · · V •epn-i ~ L, a contradiction. 
• 
Proving the converse of this lemma is a little more tricky and we must 
detour through some technical lemmas. 
Lemma A.19. Suppose that the folloiuing formula is in L, an unintensional, additive 
logic: 
X = V Pk V V ,ql V V ,De.pi V V D'lj;j 
k < r l<s i<m j<n 
where the Pk E P, k < rand qj E P, j < n are all distinct. Then m # 0 and there 
exists a j < n such that 
Depa /\ · · · /\ Dcpm-1 --+ D'lj;j E L. 
Proof We know, by rewriting x E L, that 
I\ • epi --+ V Pk V V ,ql V V • 'lj;j E L 
i<m k<r l<s j <n 
There are then 6 cases and we will show that the following 5 cannot hold. 
.1 
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Case n = 0, r = 0, and s = 0. 
Thus m # 0 and /\i<m • cpi • l_ E L. Thus V i<m • , cpi E L contradicting 
the unintensionality of L. 
Case /\ i<m • cpi • • ?J;j E L for some j < n . 
Then we are done. 
Case /\ i<m • cpi • Pk E L for some k < r . 
Then by making the substitution T = [Pk/ l_] we get that /\ i<m • cpiT • 
l_ E Land we return to the argument of the first case. 
Case /\ i<m • cpi • ,qt E L for some l < s. 
Make the substitution T = [qt/T] and proceed as in the first case. 
Case /\ i<m D cpi • p (/_ L for all 
p Er := {• ?,Uj, Pk , 'ql I j < n,k < r,l < s}. 
Let a= [qo/,qo, ... , qs-1/,qs-d , and so /\i<m D<pi • p tf_ L for all 
p Er'=: {• wj a ,pk, Ql I j < n,k < r,l < s} C JE. 
(Otherwise, by applying a again we would get back to our original for-
mula.) 
Thus, there is a meta valuation vp , for all p E r', such that 
Vp ( _/\ • <pi a • p) = l__ 
i<m 
Let V = min { Vp I p E r'}. Thus V (/\i<m • cpia) = T, as Vp (/\i<m • cpi a) 
T, and v( p) = 1_ for all p E r', as vp( P) = 1_ for all p E r'. 
Hence v ( /\i<m • ,pier--+ V pEf'' p) = 1- and thus 
I\ • cpi a • V p tf_ L. 
i<m pEf' 
But, this is a substitution instance of a x equivalent so x (/_ L, a contra-
diction. 
This case analysis has shown that the remaining case must hold . That is 
j\ • cpi • • ?,Uj E L 
i<m 
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for some j, and we conclude that m # 0 since otherwise D?j}j E L, a contradic-
tion to the unintensionality of L. D 
Corollary A.20. Let cp be a conjunction of ele1nents of or negated elements of 1E. 
Suppose that 
ep --+ D?/Jo V · · · V D?/Jn-1 E L , 
an unintensional additive logic. Then, for some j < n, 
ep --+ D?j}j E L. 
Proof Say that 
ep = I\ 'Pk I\ I\ Ql I\ I\ Depi /\ /\ ,D?j}j' · 
k<r l<s i<m j' <u 
Thus ep • D ?/Ja V · · · V D?/Jn- i is tautologically equivalent to 
V Pk V V ,ql V V ,Depi V V D?j};-,. V V D?j}j 
k <r l <s i<m j'<u j<n 
which is in L. So by Lemma A.19 either 
Depa /\ · · · /\ D epm-1 --+ D?j}J' E L 
for some j' < u, in which case , ep E L so ep --+ D?j}0 E L holds trivially, or 
Depa /\ · · · /\ D epm-1 --+ D?j}j E L 
for some j < n, and, since ep is stronger than the antecedent of this, we are 
done. D 
The following lemma is a straightforward consequence of the definition of 
unintensionality 
Lemma A.21. Let L be an unintensional logic. Then L can have no theses of either 
of these forms: 
D epa /\ · · · /\ Depn-1 --+ •?/Jo V · · · V •?/Jm- 1, and 
•?/Jo I\ · · · I\ •7/Jm- l --+ Depa V · · · V Depn- 1. 
Lemma A.22. Let L be an unintensional logic. Then DS ( P ) and • S ( P) are both 
L-consistent. 
Proof Assume not. Without loss of generality we take • S (P) to be inconsis-
I'' 
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tent. Thus there exist cpa , . . . , cpn-l such that 
•cpa I\ · · · I\ •cpn-l --+ J_ E L. 
Hence D,cpa /\ · · · /\ D,epn-l E L contradicting the unintensionality of L. 
We are now in a position to state and prove the converse of Lemma A.18 
Lemma A.23. Let L be an unintensional additive logic. Then L is a Horn logic. 
Proof First note that Lis unintensional, so L i- S (P), and so Lis consistent. 
D 
Now, for each x E L we can tautologically rewrite x into disjunctive normal 
form, so 
X H /\ Xi E Taut , 
i< k 
where each Xi is a disjunction of elements or negations of elements of IE. Set 
DN(x) = {Xi I i < k} and then set ~1 = U xEL DN(x) , so ~ 1 axiomatises L. 
We can assume that each x E ~ 1 contains no redundancies so write 
X = V Pk V V 1 Qs V V ,Dcpi V V D t/Jj 
k <r l <s i<m j <n 
where Pk, Ql E P, and, since x is non-tautological, no Pk = Ql• 
We can immediately apply Lemma A.19 to this to get that m i- 0 and that 
there is some j < n such that x' = Depa /\ · · · /\ Dcpm-i --+ • ?j)J° E L. But 
x' --+ X E Taut, so 
{x' I x E ~1} 
axiomatises Land it is a set of Horn clauses. • 
Corollary A.24. A logic L is Horn if! it is unintensional and additive. 
Horn logics actually have a very simple derivation structure as the following 
definition and lemma reveal. 
Definition A.25. Let ~ be a set of Horn clauses, let L be a logic, and let r c 
DS (P). Then we define rz, the set of E-consequences of r with respect to L, 
to be the closure of r in DS ( P ) under the rules: 
Depa, ... , D epn- L/ D t/J for Depa/\···/\ D epn-L--+ D ?j} E sE 
Dcp/D?b if ep H t/J E L, 
where sE = {xa I x E ~ and a is a substitution}. 
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Proposition A.26. Suppose that L is a Horn logic. Then • <p0 I\ · · · I\ D<pm-l ---+ 
• ?jJ EL if! 
• ?jJ E {D<po, ... , D<pm-1} Z 
where ~ is a Horn clause axiomatisation of L. 
Proof Without loss of generality take ~ to be closed under substitutions. 
( <==) We prove this by induction on the derivation of • ?jJ from 
{D<p0 , ... , D<pm-i } using the rules induced by~ and L. 
Base Cases: Suppose that D1µ E { • <p0 , ... , D<pm- l}. Thus D1µ = • <pi so 
• <po I\ · · · I\ D<pm-1 ---+ • ?jJ E L trivially holds. 
Inductive Hypothesis: Suppose that • ?jJ follows by application of a rule 
to • x0 , ... , Dxn-i of which the results hold. 
Inductive Step: We have two cases 
Case The rule is • x0 , ... , Dxn-1/D?jJ E ~ 
But (\:/i < n) [D<po /\ · · · /\ D<pm-1 ---+ • xi E Lt so • <po I\ · · · I\ 
D<pm-1 ---+ • ?jJ E L. 
Case The rule is • x0 / • 1/J where xo H ?jJ E L. 
Thus • xo H • 1µ E L and D<po /\ · · · /\ Dcpm- i ---+ Dxo E L by the 
inductive hypothesis, so D<p0 /\ · · · /\ Dcpm- 1 ---+ • '0 E L. 
(===?) Suppose that • ?jJ (/:_ {• <po , ... , D<pm-1}z . Define a metavaluation V 
JE -t {T, j_} by v(q) =Tiff q E {D<po, ... , D<pm- 1}z. 
Claim: v verifies L. 
Proof of claim: 
We need to check that v ( <p) = T for each <p in the Horn clause axiomatisa-
tion E and that if <pH ?jJ E L then v(• cp) = v(• zt; ). But each Horn clause 
in E is clearly verified and the equivalential condition is also immediate 
from the definition of rf. End of proof of claim. 
Thus v (• 1µ) = J_ and v (• <pi) = T for all i < m, so v (• <po I\ · · · I\ D<pm-1 ---+ 
• ?jJ ) = J_, allowing us to conclude that Ocp0 /\ · · · /\ D<pm-l ---+ 01/J (/:. L. 
• 
A.4 Amenable Logics 
Now we move on to a more specialised class of logics which still contains EK4, 
and about which we can come to even more conclusions. 
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Definition A.27. We say that a Horn clause x = • <p0 I\ · · · I\ D<pn-l . • • ?jJ is 
amenable in a logic L iff 
x EL===? (3i < n) [1/J • ((Ji EL] or (3x ES (P)) [1/J • • x]. 
We say that a logic Lis amenable iff all Horn clauses are amenable in L. 
We say that a set of formulae ~ is amenable in Liff each x E ~ is amenable 
in L. 
We say that a logic L has an anzenable axiomatisation iff it is axiomatised by 
a set of Horn clauses and that set is amenable in L. 
Proposition A.28. A logic L is additive, unintensional and amenable if! it has an 
amenable axiomatisation. 
Proof We prove the if and only if parts separately. 
(===?) Suppose that L is additive, unintensional and amenable. Thus L has 
a Horn axiomatisation by Corollary A.24. Since Lis amenable each ele-
ment of the Horn axiomatisations amenable and we are done. 
(¢:==) Suppose that L has an amenable axiomatisation. Call this axiomatisa-
tion ~ a set of Horn clauses which, without loss of generality, we assume 
to be closed under substitution. Thus by Corollary A.24 Lis additive and 
unintensional. It remains to show that each • <p0 I\ ··· I\ • <;?n -l • • ?jJ E L 
is amenable. So, suppose that this formula really is in L. Hence • ?jJ E 
{D<p0 , · · · , D<t?n-i}z. We will prove by induction on the derivation of • ?jJ 
that either 
(3i < n) [1/J • <t?·i E L] or (3x ES (P )) [1/J • • x E L]. 
Base Cases: • ?jJ E {D<p0, ... , D<pn- l} . thus 1/J = <pi for some i and we are 
done. 
Inductive Hypothesis: Assume that • ?jJ results from an application of a 
rule to the formulae D1j;0 , ... ,01/Jm-l E {D<p 0 , ... ,D<t?n- 1 }Z and that the 
result holds for these. 
Inductive Step: We have two cases. 
Case The rule applied results from • '00 /\ · · · /\ D1/Jm-l • • 'l,U E ~ -
Thus we have two subcases: 
Subcase (3i < m) [1/J • ui EL] . 
The Inductive Hypothesis tells us that we have a further 2 sub-
subcases: 
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Subsubcase (=lj < n) [?/Ji • cpj E L]. 
Hence 1/J • cp j E Land we are done. 
Subsubcase (=l x E S ( P) ) [ ?fi • Dx E L]. 
Hence 1/j • Dx E L and we are done. 
Subcase (=l x ES (P)) [1/J • Dx E L]. 
And we are done instantly. 
Case The rule applied is D?jJ0 / D?jJ where ?/Jo +--+ 1/J E L. 
Here we know that either 
(=li < n) [?/Jo • cpi EL] or (=l x ES (P)) [?/Jo • Dx EL] 
so by replacing provable equivalents in this we get that 
(=:Ji< n) [1/J • cpi E L] or (=lx Es (P)) [1/J • Dx EL] 
and we are done. 
D 
Thus we are able to tell almost instantly if a logic is additive, unintensional, 
and amenable as the first two conditions follow if we have a Horn axiomatisa-
tion and the amenability condition can frequently be obtained by inspection. 
Often we can detect amenability because it follows almost tautologically. 
Definition A.29. A Horn clause Dcp0 /\ · · · /\ D<pn-i • Dt/J is patently amenable 
iff 
(=l i < n) [t/J • cpi E E] or (=lx Es (P)) [t/J • Dx E E] 
A logic is additive, unintensional and amenable if it is axiomatised by a 
collection of patently amenable Horn clauses. 
Example A.30. The following formulae are all patently amenable: 
1. K: D(p-+ q) • (Dp • Dq), as q • (p • q) E Taut. 
2. 4: Dp -+ DDp, as Dp • Dp E Taut. 
3. Dp • DDnp for n > 1, as Dnp • DDn- lp E Taut. 
4. Depa/\ ··· /\ Dcpn- i • D(?/J /\ Dx:) , as 1/) I\ Dx • Dx E Taut. 
5. De.po/\ ··· /\ Dcpn-l • D(cpo /\ p) , as 'Po I\ p • <po E Taut. 
We are now able to draw two interesting conclusions about amenable, ad-
ditive, unintensional (AAU) logics. The first of these speaks for itself: 
I 
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Proposition A.31. Suppose that Lis AAU. Then 
Di/Jo/\ ··· /\ 1Pn- l -t OT E L ===? (3i < n) [cpi E L]. 
Proof We know that either (3i < n) [T -t cpi E L] and we are done, or 
(3x E S (P )) [T -t • x E L ] 
and hence • x E L, a contradiction to the unintensionality of L. 
177 
• 
Now we prove a result which may be relevant to the question of whether 
EK4 or similar logics have the finite model property. 
The idea here is that we may start with a bunch of consistent formulae 
{ cpi I i < n}, say. Th us (Vi < n) [ -icp i ~ L] . The set { cpi I i < n} may we 11 be in-
consistent, but if we are trying to build or force unusual models that have the 
potential to be counter examples to the finite model property, we may want a 
model which satisfies each cpi in a possibly different place. 
Define EBi<n cpi = -i• O J_ /\ /\. .i<n D04Ji. 
Proposition A.32. Suppose that Lis an AAU logic, and that each cpi is consistent in 
L. Then EBi<ncpi is L consistent. 
Proof Assume not. Thus /\. i<n • Ocpi -t DOJ_ E L. Hence either 01_ -t • x E L 
for some x (but this cannot happen) or there exists an i < n such that 
0 1_ • Ocpi E L. Thus 0-icpi -t • T E Land hence by Lemma A.31 -icpi E La 
contradiction to each cpi being L consistent. • 
Proposition A.33. Suppose that JV! = ( ... Y- , JV, v) Fx EBi<ncpi . Then 
(Vi < n) ( 3 Yi E .,\'." ) [ JV! F y cp i] . 
Proof Let i < n. Thus J1;f Fx -i• (Oj_ ) /\ D(Ocpi) and so IIO J_ IIM ~ N(x) and 
IIOcpillNI E N(x). Hence IIO_l_llNI # IIOcp.illJ\l and so 0 == IIJ_IIM # llcpill 'H. Thus 
we can conclude that there is some Yi E )( such that y E llcpillM, i.e ., fv1 Fy 
cpi . • 
A.5 A Syntactic Result on EK4 
We can say a few more things about EK4 which may be germane to the ques-
tion of whether EK4 has the finite model property. We list these here. 
For this section set L = EK4 and recall that EK4 is an amenable, additive, 
unintensional logic. 
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Lemma A.34. Suppose that rp H • n'ljJ E Land 1/J H • mrp E L for some n, m E w. 
Then 3 1j) H '{) E L. 
Proof Take m, n > 0 otherwise we are done. By n applications of the equiva-
lence rule we get that • n1j) H • m+nrp E L. Thus rp H • m+n rp E L (1). Now, 
1/J • • mrp E L (2) by hypothesis and • mrp • • m+nrp E L (3) by n applications 
of the 4 axiom. So '1/J • rp E L by (lt (2) and (3) together. · 
The implication rp • 'ljJ E L follows by symmetry. D 
Lemma A.35. Suppose that • rpa I\ ··· /\ D rpk-l • D1/) EL. Then if •<pi • • mrpj (/_ 
L for all i, j < k and each m E w, iue have that there is some n E w and i < k such 
that 1/J H • n<pi E L. 
Proof Suppose that , rpi • • mrpj (/_ L for all i, j < n, m E w . We proceed by 
induction on the derivation of • 'ljJ in {Depa, .. . , • cpk-i} Z, where 
~ = {D(x • p) I\ • x-+ • p, • x -+ •• x I x, PE s (P)}. 
Base Cases: If D'ljJ E {Depa, ... , • cpk-i } then the result is immediate. 
Inductive Hypothesis: Suppose that the result holds for 
• x, • 77 E {Depa, .. . ) • rpk-1 } z. 
That is, X H • n 1 ((Ji1 E Land 77 H • n 21Pi2 E L for some n1) n2 E w and i 1) i2 < k. 
Inductive Step: Suppose that D'1/i follows from • x, • 77 via one application of 
a rule derived from ~- We have 3 cases: 
Case 77 = x • '1/i , so • x I\ • 77 • D'1/i E L. 
Thus · X • 77 E L and so ,Dn1 rpi 1 • • n2 rpi2 E L by replacement by 
provable equivalents. Hence by L being unintensional either n 1 = 0 (in 
which case -,IPii • • n2 rpi 2 EL) or n 2 = 0 (in which case , cp 12 • Dn 1 cpi 1 E 
L). Each possibility leads to a contradiction to our hypothesis, so this 
case cannot happen. 
Case '1/i = • x, so we are using • x • •• x E L. 
But X H oni ((Ji1 E L so • x H oni +1rp-i1 E L and we are done. 
Case 1/J H x E Land the equivalence rule is applied. 
Thus '1p f---t oni ((Ji 1 E L. 
• 
3This lemma actually holds in any extension of E4. 
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Theorem A.36. Suppose that Ocp H 0 7/J E L. Then cp H 7/J E L. 
Proof We prove the following claim: 
Claim: 7f H om cp E L for some 7Tl E W . 
Proof of claim: 
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Assume not. Thus by Lemma A.35 and the fact that Ocp • 0 7/J E L we 
have that -i cp • Ok cp E L for some k E w . But 0 7/J • Ocp E L so by L being an 
amenable logic we have two possibilities: 
Case cp • • x EL for some x ES (P). 
Thus -i cp v cp • Ok cp v Ox E L, so Ok cp v Ox E L and so by the fact that 
L is unintensional k = 0. Thus -i cp -+ cp E L, so cp E L telling us that 
Ox E L, a contradiction. 
Case cp -+ 7/J E L. 
Use Ocp -+ • ?j) E L and a1nenability to get the following two subcases. 
Subcase 7/J • cp E L. 
And we are done. 
Subcase 7/J • Ox E L for some x E S (P ). 
Since we have already narrowed down our consideration to the 
case where cp -+ 7/J E L we get that cp -+ Ox E L. But this brings us 
back to our first case, which is contradictory. 
End of proof of claim. 
By symmetry we have also established that cp H • n?j) E L for some n E w . 
Thus by Lemma A.34 we are done. • 
Note: In the light of Lemma A.35 it might be thought that -icp • • mcp E L 
form> 0 could never hold. This is not the case for consider cp = -i(DT /\ 01_). 
Thus -i cp • • T /\ 01_ E L. But it is almost immediate that OT /\ D_l_ • • cp E L 
(T H (1_ • cp) E Taut), so -icp • Ocp EL. 
A.6 EK4 and Ultrafilter Semantics 
In this section we will consider one possible approach to proving the canonic-
ity of EK4. Again, set L = EK4. 
The problem we encounter when trying to take our approach of Chapter 5 
and apply it to EK4, is as follows: We may choose Z C )( L to be represented 
by some c in the larger algebra, and so determine J (c) by finding out what 
l( (c) represents. Unfortunately, our procedure already determined that J (Z) 
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was represented by some c' E -C and there was no guarantee that c' was K ( c) 
or some other member of the range of 1(. So we could not use the fact that 
K(c) C K(K(c)) to conclude that J(Z) = c' C J((c'). 
In the terminology4 of ultrafilter semantics given in Chapter 7 (we will use 
the results and definitions of that chapter without reference) it is even clearer: 
It may be that JJd(Z) llu = Z and so by definition J(Z) = Jl • d(Z) Jiu yet in all 
probabilityµ (d(J(Z))) -f. µ (• d(Z)) almost everywhere and hence we cannot 
argue that 
J(Z) = ll• d(Z)llu C ll •• d(Z)llu 
= Jl • d(J(Z))llu 
= J(J(Z)) . 
However if we could guarantee that each set Z, which can be represented 
as some JJ • cpJJv for some <p E 5 (Q) and ultrafilter V, has the property that 
µ (d(Z)) E • 5 (P) U a.e. with respect to our fixed ultrafilter, then we would 
have, by J(Z) == JJ • d(Z)llu, that d(J(Z)) E • 5 (P) U a.e. Thus 
J (Z) · IJd(J(Z)llu 
C JJ • d(J(Z))llu 
= J(J(Z )), 
where this follows simply because 
d(J(Z)) E • 5 (P) ==* d(J(Z))-+ Dd(J(Z)) EL. 
So, sets which can be represented as ll• cpllv are of special interest. 
Definition A.37. We say that Z C ./y Lis a possible interior iff there is a <p E 5 ( Q) 
and an ultrafilter Von D such that IJ • cp llv = Z. 
This whole approach would fail if we had the possibility that an effable set 
was a possible interior yet was not an actual interior. That is IJ • cplJu == 11?/JII for 
?J; not equivalent to an element of • 5 (P). We do not want to have this .because 
our ultrafilter semantics approach to canonicity demands that JJ • d(Jl?/JII) llu = 
JJD?j;JJ and so we do not want to have to deal with the complication of making 
d(l!?fJII) anything other than ?j; or one of its £-equivalents. 
The next two results show that we have no concerns on this score. 
4We will use the substitutions µ of that chapter in their "functional form," that is, we will 
write ~ µ ( c.p)' rather than 'c.p C µ 7 ) '. We also drop the modifier r 7 
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Lemma A.38. Let Ube an ultrafilter on D, ip ES (Qt and 'ljJ ES (P ). Then 
111/JII C IIDvllu ==> 1/J • µ (•(()) E LU a.e. 
Proof Suppose that 1/J • µ (• 9) (/_ LU a.e. Say that 1/J is in conjunctive normal 
form and that w = V i<n 'I/J i vvhere each ?!Ji is a conjunction of members of lE. 
Thus 
(3i < n,) [ w.i • µ (• (j)) (/_ L ] U a.e. 
and so by U an ultrafilter and n, finite there is some i such that 'I/Ji • µ (•(()) (/_ L 
U a.e. 
Now set 
U = {µ E O I ~·i • µ (Dy1) (/_ L} E U and 
E = { t;)i , ---ip (• y~) Iµ E U} . 
Claim: E is L-consistent. 
Proof of claim: 
Assume not. Thus there are J-Lo . ... , µk- l E L- such that 
'I/Ji I\ ---iµo(D-;) /\ · · · /\ ---iJ_lk-1(Dv) -t J_ EL. 
Hence 'I/Ji • • µ 0 ( cp) V · · · V • µk- i ( '-?) E L. Since 'l/Ji is a conjunction of members 
of lE we can apply Lemma A.20 to get that there is some j < k such that 
Ui • • µj( (()) EL. 
But this is a contradiction to µj E U (by the definition of U) . End of proof of 
clainl. 
So let x be a maximal L-consistent set extending E. We then have that 
x E li e/Jill C !lull and (v'J-L EU) [J-l (Dy) (t x] 
and so x (t ll • cpllu• Thus x witnesses the fact that 11~11 Cl ll• cpllu• 
Theorem A.39. Let U be an ultrafilter on D, cp E S ( Q), and w E S ( P ). Then 
111fJII = 11• -;llu ==> w H µ (Dv) E LU a.e. 
Proof Suppose that llvll = 11• -;llu and assume that 
u H f-L ( • cp) (/_ L U a. e. 
• 
(A.1) 
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By Lemma A.38 we then note that 
?jJ • • µ ( cp) E LU a.e. 
One of the following must hold: 
(=l x E S (P )) [µ (cp) • • x EL] U a.e. 
or (Vx E S (P )) [µ (cp) • • x ~ L] U a.e. 
So take U0 E U to witness that 
(A.1) and (A.2) and ((A.3) or (A.4)) holds. 
(VU E U) [ {• µ ( cp) , , 7/J I µ E U} is £-inconsistent ]. 
(A.2) 
(A.3) 
(A.4) 
Let U E U and assume that {• µ ( cp), , 7/J I µ E LT} is £-consistent. So take 
x to be a maximal £-consistent extension of this set. Hence , 7/J E x and 
µ (Dcp) = • µ (cp) E x U a.e. allowing us to conclude that x E 11 7/J II, x ~ 
ll• cpllu a contradiction. 
Claim: There are ,o, ... , r n-l E S (P) such that 7/J H •, 0 /\ · · · /\ D, n-l E L. 
Proof of claim: 
By the £-inconsistency of {• µ ( cp) , , 7/J I µ E U0 } we get that there are 
µO,···,µn-1 E UasuchthatDµo( cp)/\ · .. /\ Dµn-i (cp)/\ , 7/J • 1- E L,soif 
we put ri = µi( cp) for i < n, we get that • , 0 /\ · · · /\ D,n-i • 7/J EL. 
However 'ljJ • µ (Dcp) E L for all µ E U0 so we have that 'ljJ • • ,i E L 
for all i < n, giving us the other direction in our biconditional. End of proof of 
claim. 
Thus we can conclude that, for allµ E U0 , 
D,o /\ · · · /\ D,n-1 • • µ( cp) E L . 
We then have two cases to consider 
Case (3i < n) [,i H µ (cp) EL] U a.e. 
Thus (3i < n) h1i H µ (cp) EL U a.e.], so let U EU, UC U0 be such that 
(V µ E U) [ ri H µ ( cp) E L] 
and so by the equivalence rule 
(Vµ EU) [• ,i H • µ (cp) EL] . 
But {,'I/J,Dµ(cp) Iµ EU} is inconsistent so there are µ 0 , ... ,µm-1 EU 
I 
I 
I 
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such that 
Dµo ( cp) /\ · · · /\ Dµ m-1 ( cp) • 1/; E L. 
Again, 1/; • • µ 0 ( cp) /\ · · · /\ Dµm-1 ( cp) E L holds by U C U0 and using 
Ori H ·• µ j(cp) E L we then get that 1/J H • µ 0 (cp ) E L . (Since the µj(cp) 
are pairwise equivalent, we can collapse the conjunction down to a s ingle 
conjunct.) 
But this contradicts our assumption that 1/; H • µ ( cp) ~ L holds over all 
of U0 . 
Case (\Ji< n) [ri H µ (cp)) ~ L U a.e. 
In this case suppose that this condition holds over U1 E U, U1 C U0 . 
Thus by the same argument as in the previous case we see that there are 
µo, ... , µ m- 1 E U1 such that 
Dµo (cp) /\ · · · /\ Dµ m-1(cp) H Dro /\ · · · /\ • '"'/n-1 E L . 
Claim: We have the following two conditions: 
1. For each i < n there is a T(i) < m and a k(i) E w such that ri H 
• k(i) µ T(i) ( cp) E L, and 
2. For each j < m there is a v(j) < n and a k' (j) E w such that µj(cp) H 
• k'U)rv(j) E L. 
Proof of claim: 
We proceed by considering 2 subcases-recall conditions (3) and (4) on 
our choice of U0 . 
Subcase (\/µ E U0 ) (\Jx E S (P )) [µ (cp) • • x ~ L ]. 
Using the fact that Lis amenable, and our condition on µ ( cp) • • x 
we get instantly that for each j < m there is a T(j) < n such that 
µj ( cp) • ( T(j) E L 
and for each i < n there is a v( i) < m such that ri • flv(j) ( cp) E L. 
Now put k(i) = 0, k' (j) = 0 uniformly, and we are d one. 
Subcase (\/µ E U0 ) (3x E S (P )) [µ (cp) • • x E L). 
Thus for all j < m there is a Xj E S (P ) such that µJ (-P) • • xj E 
L. Hence --, µj(cp) • • kµl(~) ~ L for each j , l < m and k E w . 
(Otherwise: if k > 0 we would have • k µj ( cp) v • xJ E L, and we 
can eradicate the case of k = 0 by noting then that --,µj ( ~) • Dxt E 
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L and so Dx t v • x j E L. Both these possibilities contradict the 
unintensionality of L.) 
Since each ri == µ ( cp) for some µ E U0 we get by the same argument 
that ' ri • • k , t r/- L for each i, l < n , k < w . So by applying Lemma 
A.35 we have our desired result. 
End of proof of claim. 
We now note that v o T : n ~ n so it must cycle somewhere. That is, 
there is some i < n and an r E w such that (v o TY( i ) == i . Set j == T(i). We 
now know that 
ri H o k(i) µj ( cp) E L 
so to apply Lemma A.34 we must show that 
k" 
J.-l j ( cp) H • ri E L. 
To this end, we have the following claim: 
Claim: (Vr' E w - { 0}) (:lk" E w) [µJ ( <p ) H ok" l( voT)"' (i) E L] . 
Proof of claim: 
By induction on r'. The base case follows if we set k" == k' (j), so suppose 
that the result holds for r': 
( ) 
k" 
µj cp H D f( v oTt ' (i) E L (A.5) 
We will now show that it holds for r' + 1. First set i' == ( v o Ty' ( i ). By the 
properties of the functions v and T we have that 
ri1 H ok(i') µT (i ' ) ( cp) E L 
( ) • k'(T (i ' )) L µT (i') cp H r( v oT)(i' ) E 
(A.6) 
(A.7) 
and applying the equivalence rule k" times to (A.6) and k" + k( i ) times 
to (A.7) gives 
k 11 k"+ k (i') • '"'( i' H • µT (i' ) ( cp) E L 
• k 1' +k(i1) ( ) • k"+k (i ')+ k 1 (T(i1 )) . L µT (i') cp H r( v oT)(i1 ) E . 
(A.8) 
(A.9) 
By applying the propositional calculus to (A.5), (A.8), and (A.9) and by 
noting that (v o T)(i') == (v o Ty'+L(i) we get 
k"' 
µj(cp) H • l'(voTv'+l(i) EL 
where k"' == k" + k( i') + k' ( T( i' )) . End of proof of claim. 
} 
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Set r' = r in the above claim and we see that µj ( cp) H • k" Ti E since 
(v o TY (i) = i. We are then able to apply Lemma A.34 to get that 
µj(cp ) H Ti EL 
a contradiction to the case we are in. 
• 
Now we will show that the set of possible interiors can be realised as pos-
sible interiors with respect to one uniform ultrafilter U. 
Proposition A.40. There is an ultrafilter U such that for all possible interiors Z, 
lld(Z) ll u =Zand d(Z) E OS (P) U a.e. 
Proof For each Z a possible interior let cpz E S ( Q), and Vz be such that Z = 
IJ• cpz llvz. For each finite set F of possible interiors, and v : F ----+ UzEF Vz 
satisfying v ( Z) E V z, call the pair ( F 1 v) acceptable and let 
U(F1 v ) ={µED I (\/ Z E F ) (~µ' E v (Z)) [µ (d(Z )) = µ' (Dcpz )]}. 
It is then relatively easy to show that for each acceptable (F, v), U(F, v) # 0 
and that for each acceptable (F1 , vi) and (F2 , v2 ), 
U(F1 , vi) n U( F2, v2) :J U(F' , v' ), 
where F' = F1 U F2 and v is defined by 
V1 (Z ) 
v'(Z) = ~ v2( Z ) 
if Z E F1 - F2 
if Z E F2 - F1 
v1( Z ) n v2( Z) if Z E F1 n F2. 
So take U to be an ultrafilter which extends 
{ U ( F, v) I ( F, 1/ ) is an acceptable pair} . 
Z = lld(Z)llu-
Let z E _)( and let Z be a possible interior. Then 
z E Z <¢=} z E IJ Dcpzl lvz 
<¢=} {~/ I µ'(D cpz ) E z} E Vz 
<¢=} { ~l I µ ( d ( Z)) E z} E u 
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. <===} z E jjd(Z)llu• 
Where the third line can be obtained as follows: 
(~) Set F = {Z}, v( Z) ={µ'I µ'(O cpz ) E z} E Vz and so 
('vµ E U(F, v)) (3ft' E v( Z)) [µ (d(Z)) = µ'(Ocpz) E z] . 
Thus ('vµ E U(F, v)) [µ (d(Z)) E z]. 
(¢=) Suppose that{µ' I µ'(O cpz) E z} tf_ Vz. So set 
F = {Z} , v(Z) ={µ'I µ'(O cpz) tf_ z} E Vz. 
This then gives us that 
('vµ E U(F, v)) (3µ' E v( Z)) [µ(d(Z)) = µ'(Ocpz) tf_ z]. 
Th us ('v µ E u ( F, V) ) [µ ( cL ( z) ) tf_ z] . 
('vZ a possible interior)[µ (d(Z)) E OS (P) U a.e.]. 
Let Z be a possible interior and let µ E U ( { Z} , { (Z, D)}). Thus 
µ ( d( Z)) = µ' (Ocp z) for some µ' E D. Hence 
µ (d(Z)) = Oµ'(cpz) E OS (P). 
• 
Unfortunately this proposition highlights a gaping hole in our progression 
so far: How can we ensure that our modifications still respect K? That is, how 
can we ensure that 
('vZ, y C .1Y) [l!Dd(-iZ u Yr)llu n ll• d( Z)llu C l!Od(Y)llu]. 
This author is currently unsure how to resolve this problem in this style 
of argument and so leaves the work at this point. His hope is that an astute 
reader can see how to bring these arguments to the desired conclusion. 
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Appendix B 
An Error in Grove's Proof 
Graham Priest 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Queensland 
With 
Koji Tanaka 
and Knowledge Representation and Reasoning Unit 
School of Computing and Information Technology 
Griffith University 
Nearly a decade has passed since GROVE [36] gave a semantics for the ACM 
postulates. The semantics, called sphere semantics, provided a new perspec-
tive of the area of study, and has been widely used in the context of theory or 
belief change. However, the soundness proof that GROVE gives in his paper 
is fallacious as it stands. In this note, we will point out the error and give two 
ways of repairing it. 
We follow GROVE in matters of notation. To make this appendix self-
contained, we start by rehearsing the notation we need. Let L be a proposi-
tional language. Let !VIL be the set of all maximally consistent sets of sentences 
of L. 1 If A is any sentence, jAj is the set of all members of ML containing A. 
If)(_ C !VIL, t( ./Y) is the theory n .Y. If E is a set of sentences, Cn(E) is the set 
of logical consequences of E. If T is a theory in L, c(A) is a certain subset of 
!VIL-intuitively, the smallest "sphere" containing all extensions of T, some of 
which contain A-and T + A is defined as t(jAj n c(A)). For future reference, 
T / A, the expansion of T by A, is Cn(T n {A}). 
We can now state the mistake in GROVE's proof. On p. 161, in verifying the 
postulate +7 two successive lines of the proof are: 
jAj n !B l n c( A) c IA! n jBj n c(A n B) 
jBj n jT + .-l j c ICn( {A , B} )In c(A n B) 
The left-hand side of this step relies on the fact that: 
IT + Al c IA! n c( A) 
1 Alternatively, l\/I L can_ be taken as se t of all models of the language, but we follow GROV E 
here. 
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i.e.: 
It (IA I n c ( ~4)) I c I A I n c (A) . 
But in general jt(X) I i ./y. Let )( be the class of all maximal consistent sets 
minus any one of them. t()() is the set of all tautologies, for any non-tautology 
is not in at least two maximal consistent sets. Hence jt(_.,Y) I = lvf L· A similar 
problem besets the verification of +8. 
A simple solution to this problem is to require that every sphere in lvf L be 
elementary, i.e., of the form I B I for some sentence B. In this case, all the sub-
sets of ML appearing in the argument are elementary, and for any such set, 
./Y, lt(X)I = X,2 so the argument goes through. This is the approach taken in 
TANAKA's [96]. The constraint means, in effect, that every sphere represents a 
theory that is finitely axiomatisable. Depending on how, exactly, one concep-
tualises spheres, this may or may not be a reasonable constraint. 
Alternatively, GROVE' s proof may be repaired through the following se-
quence of observations. 
Lemma B.1. Suppose that (T + A.)/ Bis consistent. Then c( A) = c(A I\ B). 
Proof The left to right inclusion follows by the minimality of the sets picked 
out by c. To show the reverse inclusion it is enough to show that c(A) n 
IA I\ Bl # 0. Assume not. Thus lrv(A /\ B ) I => c( A) => c( A) n IAI, which gives 
us that rv(A I\ B) E t(c(A)) C t(c(A) n IAI) = T + A. But A ET+ A by postulate 
+ 2, so rv B E T + A contradicting the consistency of (T + A) / B. • 
We now observe how an expansion of a theory t ( ~Y) is related to the under-
lying set X. 
Lemma B.2. For X C !VIL, t( ..-Y)/ B = t(..-Y n IB I) . 
Proof For the (C) part, let C E t( ... Y) / B which means that B • C E t( ./Y), i.e., 
(\/x EX) [B • CE x]. Then it is immediate that (\/x E X n IB I) [CE x] giving 
c E t(X n IBI). 
For the reverse inclusion, let C tf_ t()C) / B which tells us that B • C tf_ t(X) 
and so (3x EX) [B • C tf_ x]. By maximality of x we get that x E IBI and 
Ct/:. x, so x EX n IBI and C tf_ x . Thus C tf_ t(.,Y n IBI). • 
We can now get at the desired result through the following theorem which 
is proved by a simple derivation. 
Theorem B.3. If rvB tf_ T + A then (T + A)/ B = T +AI\ B. 
2See, e.g. BELL and SLOMSON's [4, p. 141] . 
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Proof Suppose that rvB (/_ T +A.Then (T + A)/ Bis consistent. So by Lemma 
l, c(A I\ B) == c(A). 
(T + A)/ B == t(c(,4) n IAJ)/ B 
== t(c(,4) n IAI n IBI) 
= t(c(A) n IA/\ BJ) 
= t(c(,4 /\ B) n IA/\ Bl) 
= T +A.I\ B. 
• 
Postulates +7 and +8 are now simple corollaries of the result already in 
hand. 
Corollary B.4. +7: T +AI\ B c (T + A)/ B. 
Proof If rv B r/:. T + A then the theorem gives us full equality and if rv B E T + A 
then (T +A)/ B is inconsistent so the result holds trivially. • 
Corollary B.5. +8: If rvB (/_ T + .4 then (T +A)/ B c T +AI\ B. 
Proof Trivial. • 

Appendix C 
Revising Some Basic Proofs in 
Belief Revision 
ABSTRACT: This appendix reobtains GROVE's results [36] through means 
which are hopefully clearer and more illustrative of the underlying notions. 
Also, the proofs are worked through in enough detail that possible errors in 
GROVE's proof are clearly avoided. The paper concludes with a discussion 
on elementary (or closed) systems of spheres and it notes that each revision 
function can be given by such a system. 
C.1 Introduction 
In 1988 ADAM GROVE [36] published his paper which gives the sphere seman-
tics for simple belief revision. His approach was to start with the conditions 
mandated by the earlier paper of ALCHOURR0N, GARDENFORS and MAKIN-
SON (AGM) [1] and then to show that these are equivalent to his system of 
spheres modeling. Once he had that he went on to show that the notion of an 
epistemic entrenchment relation also gives rise to a notion of revision which is 
equivalent to that given by the AGM postulates. 
To prove that the epistemic relation notion is equivalent to a belief revi-
sion operation GROVE showed that it was naturally equivalent to a system of 
spheres. Unfortunately the proofs he gave vvere long and involved and hence 
difficult to follow. Moreover, the central proof of the 'completeness' of the 
sphere semantics with respect to +, the notion of revision, is obscure to the 
point that it is impossible to follow-for this author anyway. In particular in 
[36, p. 162] he writes: 
Let S' be the class of all nonempty subsets [J of jf L satisfying 
1. \/u E L-, 3.-l E F: u E IT+ .-1 1 
2. If 1.-11 n G- # 0 for any A E F then IT+ .-11 C T r 
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Let S, the system of spheres, be S' u { lvfL} ... 
Then he makes the statement: 
It is quite straightforward to show that S is indeed a system of spheres 
centered on ITI. 
This is quite a strong statement because it means that the linearity and min-
imality properties can be derived quickly. Linearity by itself is complex and 
the only way it could possibly be shown is by appealing to the properties of 
+, and in effect, the author suspects, we would have to prove that underlying 
it all is an entrenchment relation on F. 
Certainly the author sees no way that we can straightforwardly show that S 
is a system of spheres. 
The idea that there has to be an entrenchment relation underlying GROVE's 
proof suggests that maybe it would be easier to first prove that entrenchment 
is equivalent to the AGM notion of +, then use that to produce systems of 
spheres. Thankfully, this turns out to be the case and we get a development 
which is, in the author's opinion, clean and elegant and the purpose of this 
paper is to present this development here. We will see the proof in full detail, 
taking in the result of an earlier paper by GRAHAM PRIEST, KOJI TANAKA and 
the author [ 65] which corrects an error in GROVE' s proof of the soundness of 
his sphere semantics. 
We will finish off the paper by making a few comments on Closed Systems 
of Spheres where each sphere is a closed set in the Stone space, or, more reveal-
ingly, is a set defined by a set of formulae-an 'elementary' set. 
C.2 Notation and Basic Definitions 
We will follow GROVE [36] almost entirely here. Let F be the set of all formulae 
over some (countable) language and, at least, the usual binary connectives of 
/\, V, •, rv, H, T, and 1-. We use A, B, C, D to represent elements of F. Let L 
be a logic over F, (i.e., L C F) which we take to be classical (all propositional 
tautologies are in L, and it is closed under detachment (from A • B E L and 
A E L infer that B E L)) and compact (having no infinitary rules of inference).1 
We choose KC F to be the set of consistent formulae-namely { A I rvA ~ L }. 
We then take T c F to be a fixed consistent theory; that is: T is closed 
under detachment and L C T. Set 1I' = {T' c F I T' is a theory} . If T' is a 
1 For the results of this paper it would be enough for L to just be a theory ( over some 
classical compact logic) which all other theories 1nust extend. 
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theory and A E F then T' / A is the result of adding A to T' and closing under 
logical consequence, i.e., T' / A = Cn (T' n { ~4}) .2 
Definition C.1. A revision function3 + for a theory Tis a function+ : F --+ 1r 
which satisfies (where we write T + A for +(A)): 
(+2) A ET+ A, 
(+3) rvA(/_T=}T+A=T/ A, 
( +4) A E J( =} T + A is consistent, 
(+5) AHB EL=}T+A=T+B, 
(+7) T+A /\ B C (T+A )/ B,and 
(+8) rvB(/_T+A=} (T+A )/ B C T+A /\ B. 
Note that if rv B E T + A then (T + _-1. )/ B = F so we can rewrite ( +7) and 
( +8) as 
(+7,+8) rv B (/_ T +A=} (T + A )/ B = T + ri /\ B. 
In this paper we will also be looking at the canonical Stone space of L, 
namely the set 
~IL = { x I x C F is a maximal L-consistent set} . 
Of course, this space has some topological structure but this will not become 
important until Section C.6. 
As GROVE points out, [36, p. 158], each theory gives rise to a subset of lvf L 
and each subset of l\ J L gives rise to a theory. Formally: 
Definition C.2. We define the functions l·I : 1r U F --+ P (i"\IL) and t 
P ( iVIL) --+ 1r as follows: 
1. For T' E 1r and .A. E F set 
IT' I = { x E JI L I T' C x} , and 
IAI = {x E JIL I --!. E x}. 
2P is the powerset function and Cn : P (F) -----t P (F ) is the function which closes sets 
under L-conseq uence. 
3Whereas GRO V E [36, p. 175] takes the revis ion function + to be a function of all theories 
T, we take the no more restric ted view that each theory T can have its own re vision function. 
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2. For Sc NIL set 
t(S) = {14 E FI (VI) ES) [A Ex]}= ns. 
GROVE gives the following useful, ye t straightforward results [36, p. 158]: 
1. (VT' E 1r) [ t (IT' I) = T'] , 4 
2. (VS C NIL) [S-/- 0 ====} t (S) is consistent),5 
3. (VA E F) (VS C NIL) [t (Sn 1141) = t (S) /~4],6 
4. (VS, S' C NIL) [SC S' ====} t (S' ) C t (S)], and 
5. (VT', T" E 1r) [T' c T" ====} IT" I C IT' I] . 
One final point of notation, we take w to be the first infinite ordinal and 
for the purposes of this appendix we are using it only as the set of all natural 
numbers. 
C.3 Entrenchment Relations and A-consistency 
C.3.1 Entrenchment Relations 
We are now ready to look at the first of the 'equivalents' of the revision func-
tion and, unlike GROVE [36], we start with the entrenchment relation. 
Definition C.3. Let ~ be a relation on F. We say that ~ is an entrenchment 
relation starting at T iff 7 
( ~ 1) ~ is connected: 
(VA, B E F) [A ~ B or B ~ A], 
4GROVE points out that the logic must be cornpact for this to hold, a fact which we already 
assume. 
5Compare this with the proof of ( +4) given in Theorem C.40. 
6This result is actually restated and proven in full in Lemma C.39. 
7 GROVE points out that ( ( 1) is redundant, being derivable from ( ( 2) and ( (3): To see this, 
note that A • (AV B) VB E L so either B ( A and we are done, or AV B ( A. So take 
AV B ( A. Also, B • (AV B) v A E L so either A ( Band we are done or AV B ( B. So 
take AV B ( B. Now, AV B • 1--!. v B E L so either A ( AV Band we are done (together 
with AV B ( Band ((2) this gives us .--!. ( B) or B ( AV Band we are done again (together 
with AV B ( A and ( (2) this gives B ( A.) . 
I 
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( ~ 2) ~ is transitive: 
(VA, B E F) [A ~ B and B ~ C ==> A ~ C] , 
(~3) For all.A. , B , CE F: 
A. --+ B v C E L ==> (B ~ A or C ~ A. ) 
195 
( ~ 4) The formulae A E F such that rv A {/_ Tare precisely the ~-minimal 
formulae: 
(VA E F ) [(VB E F ) [B ~ ,-1] <==> rv_-1 {/_ T], 
( ~ 5) The elements of F - I<8 are precisely the ~-maximal formulae: 
('v'.-1 E F) [(VB E F) [ A ~ B ] <==> A {/_ I< ] . 
We write .-1 < B iff B f A (since then A ~ B ). 
With this definition in hand we will prove a few simple properties of these 
types of relations. Take ~ to be an arbitrary entrenchment relation starting at 
T. 
Proposition C.4. For all A. , B. C E F: 
.-1 v B ~ C ==> .-1 ~ C or B ~ C. 
Proof Let .4 , B , C E F and suppose that .-1 V B ~ C . Since L is classical we 
have that A. V B --+ AV B E L so A ~ A V B or B ~ .4 v B by (~3) and so by 
(~2) either .-1 ~ C or B ~ C . • 
Proposition C.5. ('v'.-1 E F ) [.-1 ~ A]. 
Proof Let .-1 E F. We have that A --+ .-1 v A E L, so by ( ~ 3) either .-1 ~ .4 or 
A~ A. • 
Proposition C.6. (V.4 : B E F) [A--+ B E L ==> B ~ .,-1]. 
Proof Let .-1 , B E F and suppose that .-1 --+ B E L. Hence .,-1 --+ B v B E L so 
B~Aby(~ 3). • 
Using transitivity we get an immediate corollary to this result: 
Corollary C.7. If .-1 --+ B E L nnd B ~ C then .-1 ~ C. 
8For .Y. and 1, two sets, we take .\" - 1 · to be the difference of the two se ts, namely 
{ X E .\ I X rf_ l '}. 
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C.3.2 A-consistency 
In the next section we will show that ~ gives rise, in a natural way, to a revision 
function. The basic intuition is that we use a formula A, and its position in 
the entrenchment relation, to beef up our notion of consistency and, thus, our 
notion of consequence. 
We start by making precise our new ( or extended) notion of consistency. 
Definition C.8. Let E C F and let i l E J\.-. We say that Eis A-consistent iff 
(VB E C n (I:) ) [ B ~ A] . 
Note that this notion extends our standard notion of consistency. 
Proposition C.9. If E C Fis A-consistent for A E J( then Eis consistent. 
Proof Suppose that E is inconsistent. Then 1- E Cn (E) so 1- ~ A so by ( ~ 5), 
A(/_K. • 
Since elements of F - J( are inconsistent to begin with we make an exception 
for them: 
Definition C.10. Let E C F and A E F - !{. We say that Eis A-consistent iff I: 
is consistent. 
We can now derive a few straightforward results about consistency, where 
we let E range over subsets of F. 
Proposition C.11. Suppose that A ~ B. If E is A-consistent then it is also B-
consistent. 
Proof Let I: be A-consistent. We will show that it is B-consistent. 
The cases where A or B are inconsistent are straightforward. 
(VC E Cn (E)) [C ~ B]. 
Let CE Cn (I:). Thus C ~ A by I: A-consistent and so C ~ A ~ B giving 
C~ B. 
• 
Proposition C.12. Suppose that E 1 C F is A-consistent and suppose further that 
E2 C E1 . Then E2 is ~4-consistent. 
Proof In the case were A E F - J(, A.-consistency is just consistency and so the 
result is immediate. So take A. E J(. We must show that every B E Cn (E2) 
satisfies B ~ A. But this is immediate from the A-consistency of E 1 and the 
fact that Cn (E2) c Cn (E2). • 
1•· 
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We say that I: c Fis A-inconsistent iff it is not A-consistent. 
Lemma C.13. Suppose that~ u {B 1, ... , En} is A-inconsistent for A E K, then 
there exists a C E Cn (I:) such tlznt 
C I\ B L /\ · · · /\ Bn f;:. A. 
Proof We have that there exists a 
DE Cn (ru {Bl , ·· . ,En}) 
such that D f;:. A. The deduction theorem for classical logic then tells us that 
there exists a C E Cn (I:) such that 
C I\ B1 I\ ··· I\ E n ~ D E L 
so then by Proposition C.6 we have that 
D ~ CI\ B1 I\ · · · I\ En· 
By ( ~3) we then conclude that 
C I\ B 1 /\ · · · /\ E n f;:_ A. 
C.3.3 A-consequence. 
• 
So with this notion of inconsistency we can define a notion of consequence by 
taking our cue from the indirect deduction theorem. 
Definition C.14. For ~ an entrenchment relation and A E F we define f- A, the 
. A. -consequence, as follows : 
I: f-.4 B iff ~ u { rv B} is A-inconsistent . 
Remark C.15. This definition highlights the need to treat elements of F - K 
separately for if we took a set\' to be -1 -consistent iff each B E Cn (I:) satisfied 
B ~ -1 then every set would be -1 -consis tent and so nothing would' 1_-follow' 
from any set. 
This is a very natural concept corresponding to our usual conceptions of a 
f- as we see below: 
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Proposition C.16. For E 1 C E2 C F 1 and A, B E F, 
E 1 f-.4 B ==} E2 f- A B. 
Proof Suppose that E 1 f- A B. Then E 1 U { rvB} is A-inconsistent and so E2 U 
{ rvB} is A-inconsistent by the contrapositive of Proposition C.12. Hence E2 f- A 
B. • 
Proposition C.17. For A E F, B E I: C F, E f- A B. 
Proof In the case where A (j. J( the result is immediate. So take A E K. 
Assume not, i.e., E fiA B. Thus I:u { rvB} is A-consistent and so B /\rvB ( A 
which tells us that J_ ( A and we can conclude that A (j. K, a contradiction. • 
Proposition C.18. For E C F, and A. , B , C E F, 
E f- A B -+ C <===} Eu { B} f- A C. 
Proof If A (j. J( then this corresponds to the usual notion of consequence and 
the result holds. So take A E l\-. 
(==}) Suppose that E f- A B -+ C. Thus EU { rv(B-+ C)} is A-inconsistent, 
so 3D E Cn (I:) such that D I\ rv(B -+ C) 1 A by Lemma C.13, i.e., 
DI\ BI\ rvC 1 A. Hence EU { B} U { rvC} is A-inconsistent. We can then 
conclude that I: U { B} f- A C. 
(<===) Suppose that I: U { B} f-A C. Thus EU { B} U { rvC} is A-inconsistent, 
so by Lemma C.13 3D E Cn (E) such that D I\ B I\ rvC 1 A. Hence 
D I\ rv(B -+ C) 1 A, telling us that E u { rv(B -+ C)} is A-inconsistent, 
and we conclude that I: f- A B -+ C. 
• 
We include the following results to indicate that we really are dealing with 
the full notion of a f-. 
Proposition C.19. Suppose that E f- A B. Then there exists a 6 C E, ivhich is finite 
and .6 f- A B. 
Proof As usual, we need only look at the case where A E !{. 
We have that EU { rvB} is A-inconsistent. Hence 3D E Cn (E) such that 
DI\ rvB 1 A, but D E Cn (.6. ) for some finite 6 c E. Thus 6 u { rvB} is 
A-inconsistent and so 6 f- A B. • 
Proposition C.20. If E f- 8 C and _-l ( B then E f- A C. 
I~, 
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Proof Suppose that 2 I- B C and _-l :::; B. Thus I: U { rvC} is B-inconsistent so 
by Proposition C.11 = u { rvC} is _-l-inconsistent, allowing us to conclude that 
~ I- A C. • 
Since _L is an ~ -maximal formula and since I-1- is just the usual I-L we get 
the following corollary: 
Corollary C.21. If= I- L B then = I- .-1. B. 
Proposition C.22. For = c F nnd _-l : B ) C1 E F , 
= l---_-1. B • C nnd ~ l---_-1. B ====? ~ 1---,-i. C. 
Proof Suppose that= l---_-1. B • C and = l--- _-1. B. Thus ~ U {B. rvC} is ~-1 -
inconsisten t and= U { rvB} is _-l -inconsistent. Hence there are D 1 l D2 E Cn (~ ) 
such that 
D1 /\ B I\ rvC I _-{ and D2 I\ rvB I _-{, 
Set D = D 1 /\ D 2 E Cn ( S:: ) and note that 
D 1\ rvC' (D1 /\ B I\ "-'C) V (D2 /\ r-vB) E L l 
so by ( ~3)r D 1 /\ B 1\ ~c :::; D I\ ---vC or D2 I\ rv B ~ D I\ rvC, and then transitivity 
i;,vill tell us that D I\ rvC I _-{_Hence~ I-_-\. C . • 
This shovvs then that 
Proposition C.23. For s= C F and _--l E F , 
{ B C F I = I--_-\. B} 
is a theory. 
Now we have our fir1.al result sho1iAring the }- nature of f---,-1. 
Proposition C . .24. Suppose that :S , ~ C F , _--l E F and that (VB c ~ ) [I: 1-- A B ] 
and 6. I-A C, then :S 1---.-l. C. 
Proof Without loss of generality we can take ~ to be finite-Proposition 
C .19- i .e ., 
~ = {D1 .... , Dn} l--.4 C. 
and so by our version of the Deduction Theorem, Proposition C .18, 
f--_-1 D 1 /\ · · · I\ Dn -+ C. 
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so by Proposition C.16 we have that 
E ~ A D1 /\ · · · /\ Dn -t C. 
But, D1 , ... ,Dn E {E E FIE ~A E} which is a theory, so C E 
{ E E F I E ~ A E} so E ~ A C. • 
Now we will note a result which will be useful in our sphere construction of 
Subsection C.5.3. This result is little more than the Lindenbaum construction 
of basic logic. 
Lemma C.25. Suppose that E C Fis A-consistent and E E F. Then either EU { E} 
or EU {rvE} is .A-consistent. 
Proof Assume not, i.e., E ~ A rvE and E ~ A E. But { rvE' E} ~ L J_ so 
{ rvE , E} ~ A J_ by Corollary C.21. Thus by Proposition C.24 E ~A _l_ , so E 
is A-inconsistent, a contradiction. • 
Lemma C.26 (Lindenbaum). Let A E F. Every A-consistent set E can be extended 
to a 1rzaxinzal cons is tent set x iuhich is also A-consistent. 
Proof Let {EiLEu.1 be an enumeration of F. Define a sequence {EiLE~ of sub-
sets of F as follows: 
~ _ ~ and Lio - Li, 
{ 
{En} 
~n+l = ~n U { ~En} 
if En U {En} is A-consistent, 
otherwise. 
Thus each En, for n E w, is A-consistent (appealing to Lemma C.25) and so 
X = u ~n 
nEw 
is A-consistent (by Proposition C.19) and also maximal consistent since for 
each n , one of En or rv En is in X. • 
C.4 Entrenchment Relations and Revision Func-
tions 
Now that we have the basic properties of entrenchment relations and their 
attendant notions of consistency in hand, we can move on to showing how 
entrenchment gives rise to revision functions and vice versa. 
:i: 
1 
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C.4.1 Soundness 
Suppose that we are given an entrenchment relation ( on F. How then could 
we construct a revision function? More precisely, given some A E F, how can 
we revise T by _--i to create T +~ A? A reasonable starting point is { .--i} itself 
and then we must somehow decide what has to be in our theory. Our natural 
definition is then: 
Definition C.27. T +~ _--i ={BE F I {A} ~AB}. 
We imn1ediately have that this is indeed a theory (Proposition C.23) and 
the other properties follow with little work. 
Theorem C.28. The function + ~, ns defined above, satisfies ( +2) to ( +5) and 
( +7,+8). 
Proof Let A. B E F. 
( +2) A E T +< _--i. 
--..-: 
{---i} ~A _--1. by Proposition C.17 so the result follows. 
( + 3) rv_--l (/_ T ==> T +~ A = T / A. 
Suppose that ~A (/_ T. Then we have the follo,Ning sequence of equiva-
lences: 
B E T + ~ _ --1_ ¢==} B E { C E F I { _ --1_} ~ .-l C} 
¢==> {A} ~ .-1 B 
¢==> 0 ~.-1 _--1. • B 
¢==> rv (---i • B ) 1. _--1. 
¢==> rv( A. • B ) is not (-minimal 
¢==} rvrv (A • B ) ET 
¢==> _--1_ • BET 
¢==>BET/ A. 
( +4) . --1. E I{ ==> T +< _--i is consistent. 
--..-: 
Suppose that T +~ _--1. is inconsistent and assume that A E I{. Consider 
the follovving deri \'a tion: 
J_ E T +~ A==> {---i} ~.-l J_ 
==> 0 r-.-l _--1_ • -
==? 0 ~ .-1 rv _--1_ 
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==} rvrv A 't A 
==}A -:/ "'4 
The first of these conditions holds by T + ~ A. inconsistent and so the last 
condition holds but this contradicts Proposition C.5. 
(+S) AH B E L===? T + ~ A= T + ~ B. 
Suppose that A H B E L. Then the following sequence of equivalences 
es tablishes the equality of the two sets T + ~ A and T +~ B: 
D E T + ~ i -l ~ {A} f- .-t D 
~ 0 f- .-t A -+ D 
~ 0f-B A -+ D 
~ 0f-B B -+ D 
~ {B} f-a D 
~D E T +< B 
'--: 
The third line follows by .A. ~ B, B ~ .4 and Proposition C.20, and the 
fourth line by Proposition C.23. 
(+7,+8) rv B (j_ T + ~ A ==} (T + ~ A) / B = T + ~ _-l /\ B. 
Suppose that rv B tf_ T + ~ .4, and so {A} ffA rv B. Hence 0 ff A A-+ B, so 
rv( A -+ rv B ) ~ A which tells us that A /\ B ~ A, but trivially _4 ~ A /\ B (by 
A I\ B -+ A E Land Proposition C.6). We then get the following sequence 
of equivalences which establishes the equality of the sets (T + ~ A)/ Band 
T+ < A/\ B . 
'--: 
D E (T +~ 14)/ B ~ B-+ D E T +~ .-1 
~ {A} f- _-t B -+ D 
~ 0 f- ,-t _-l -+ (B -+ D ) 
~ 0 f- .-t A I\ B -+ D 
~ 0 f-A /\ B A I\ B -+ D 
~ { AI\ B} f-.-l /\ B D 
~ D E T + < .-1 /\ B 
'--: 
The fi fth line follows by .A ~ A I\ B ~ A. and Proposition C.20. 
• 
We should mention that our notion of + ~ corresponds exactly to that given 
by GROVE [36, p . 164]: 
l 
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Proposition C.29. For A E F, 
T +~ r l = { B E F I (A /\ B) < (A I\ f"'s.lB ) }. 
Proof We have the following series of equivalences: 
BET+~ A¢=? {A} r-A B 
This last line is derived as follows: 
¢=? A I\ f"'s.lB f;_ A 
¢=? A < A. I\ f"'s.lB 
¢=? A /\ B < A/\f"'s.lB 
( ==}) Suppose that A < A I\ f"'v B. Consider the following derivation: 
A ( A==} A l\ (B v f"'s.lB) ( A 
==} (.-l /\ B ) V (fl /\ f"'s.lB) ( A 
==} .-l /\ B ( .-l or A. I\ f"'v B ( .-l 
==} .-l /\ B ( .4. < l-1 I\ f"'v B 
The third line follows by Proposition C.4 and the last line follows because 
we have supposed that A < .-l /\ ""'B and so the second disjunct cannot 
hold. 
Since A. ( A. holds we must have .-l /\ B ( A < A I\ f"'s.lB. 
(¢=) Suppose that A I\ B < A I\ f"'v B. Now, A ( A I\ B by .-l /\ B -+ .-l E Land 
Proposition C.6, thus A < A I\ f"'v B. 
• 
So, in a natural ,tVay we have established the soundness of our modelling. 
C.4.2 Completeness 
Demonstrating completeness is a slightly more tricky task as we must show 
not only that a revision function gives rise to a natural entrenchment but also 
that this entrenchment corresponds to the revision function through the con-
struction of Subsection C.4.1. 
How will we define our (? Consider two formulae .-l. B E F. The formula 
A will be more entrenched than B if we are more likely to believe it when 
given the opportunity and the ideal opportunity is when we are forced to 
believe one or the other. Formally: 
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Definition C.30. Given a revision function + , we define (+ on F as follows: 
A < B <===>ctf -{ 
T + A V B C T + A if A. E J( , 
'-::+ B ~ I< if A~ K. 
Where unambiguous throughout this subsection, we will suppress the + in 
(+ · 
We had to take the special case of A ~ J{ since otherwise T + .4. would be 
inconsistent and so T + AV B C T + A. would trivially hold. 
We must verify that ( really is a relation of the appropriate type. 
Lemma C.31. If .-l , B E F then either A ( B or B ( A. 
Proof If A~ J\. then T + Av B = T + Band so B ( A, and similarly for B ~ l\·. 
So take A., B E J{ . 
Claim: A or Bis consistent with T + .-l v B. 
Proof of ~laim: 
Assume not, i.e. , r-v B , r-v A E T + A V B. Thus r-v A I\ r-v B E T + A v Band 
so r-v(A V B ) E T + .-l V B, giving T + A V B inconsistent which contradicts 
~4., B E K and ( + 4). End of proof of claim. 
Without loss of generality take rl to be consistent with T + .rl V B. Thus 
(T + A V B )/A = T + (.--\. v B ) I\ A= T + A , 
by (+ 7,+8) and (+ 5). Hence T +A v B C T + A. 
Lemma C.32. If /1 ( B and B ( C then A ( C1 • 
• 
Proof The cases where any of A, B , C ~ J( are straightforward so suppose that 
A ( B, B ( C , and that A , B , C E J(. By Lemma C.31 one of A ( B v C or 
B V C ( A . 
Case A ( B v C . 
Thus T + A v (B v C1) C T + i -l, and so 
So A ( C. 
Case B V C ( A. 
Thus 
T +Av C = (T + .--1 V B v C )/A. V C 
C (T + A)/A V C 
= T + A. 
T +A V B V CC T + B V CC T + B , 
:1111 
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with the last inclusion following by B ~ C. So B (and hence ri V B) is 
consistent with T +A V B V C. Thus 
T + A V B V C C (T + _--t V B V C) / A V B 
=T+ i-!. V B 
C T+A , 
with the last line following because A ~ B. We can now conclude that 
A ~ B V C and we are left back in our earlier case which showed that 
A ~ C. 
• 
Theorem C.33. The relation (+, as defined, is an entrend11nent relation starting at 
T, i. e., it satisfies conditions ( ( 1), ( ( 2), ( ( 3), ( (4), and ( ( 5). 
Proof The conditions (( 1) and (( 2) are just Lemmas C.31 and C.32 respec-
tively. 
(( 3) .--t-+ B v C ===? B ( A or C ( A. 
Suppose that A -+ B v C E L. 
Case _--t (j_ 1(. 
Thus by definition B ( .--t (and C ~ A). 
Case _--t E J( (so B V C E K). 
Assume that B f;_ .--t and Cf;_ rl, so A (Band A ( C . 
Claim: Bis consistent with T +A.VB or C is consistent with T + .--t vC 
Proof of clainz: 
Assume not, i.e., 
rv B E T + )i V B C T + _--!., and 
rvC E T + A V C C T + _-t 
Hence rvB /\ rvC E T + A or more succinctly rv( B v C) E T + _--t. But 
_--t E T + .--t so B V C E T + _--t telling us that T + _--t is inconsistent, a 
contradiction to ( + 4) . End of proof of clainz. 
Without loss of generality take B to be consistent with T + _--t V B . 
Hence, by ( + 7,+8), 
(T + .--t V B ) C (T + A V B )/B 
= T + (rt V B )/\ B 
=T+B. 
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So, B ( A as required. 
(( 4) (VA E F) [(VB E F) [A ( B ] ¢=} rvA ~ T]. 
Let A E F. If A ~ I( the result is immediate since A f T and rvA E T. 
(===>) Suppose that rvA E T and we want to show that rv A < A. Assume 
not. Thus A. ( rvA and so T +Av rvA c T + A. Hence 
T = T/A v rv.4 = T +A V rv.4 = C T+ .-1 
and so rvA ETC T+A and A E T+A by (+2) so 1- E T+A. Hence 
A ~ I(, a contradiction. 
(¢=) Suppose that rvA ~ T. 
(VBEF)[A. ( B] 
Let B E F. Since A is consistent with T, Av Bis consistent with 
T and so by ( +7,+8) 
That is: A ( B. 
T+ Jl V B=T/Av B 
C (T/A V B )/A 
= TI ( A V B ) /\ .'1 
=T/A=T+A. 
(( 5) (VB E F) [B (A]¢=} rvA EL. 
Let A E F. 
(===> ) Suppose that (VB E F) [B ( A]. Thus 1- ( .-1. Hence by Definition 
C.30 A ~ J{, i.e., rv~.-1 E L. 
(¢=) Suppose that rvA E L. Then (VB E F) [B ( .-l ] holds by Definition 
C.30. 
• 
Now that we have established that (+ really is an entrenchment relation it 
remains to show that + = + ~+ which allows us to justifiably conclude that + 
and( + are 'equivalent'. 
Theorem C.34. For all A E F, T + A = T + ~+ A. 
I 
"I 
~ 
I 
I 
'11 l.1 
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'I 
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Proof Let A. , B E F. If A (/_ K then T + A = F = T + ~ A trivially so take .-l E /\·. 
Then 
B E T + ~ A ¢==} {A} ~ .-t B 
¢==} A/\ r-vB 1 A 
¢==} T + (.-l /\ r-vB) v A~ T +A /\ r-vB 
¢==} r-vB is not consistent with T + .-l 
¢==} BET+ A. 
The second to last equivalence is derived as follows: 
(==?) Suppose that r-vB is consistent with T +A. Thus 
(T + A) / r-vB = T +A /\ r-vB , so 
T + ( A /\ r-v B) v .-l = T + A C T + i l /\ r-v B. 
(<===) Suppose that T + A C T +A /\ r-vB . Thus A /\ r-vB, and hence r-v B, are 
consistent with T + A. 
The above sequence of equivalences establishes the desired equality. • 
C.5 Systems of Spheres 
In this section we introduce the Systems of Spheres of GROVE [36] and show 
that they easily emerge from the entrenchment relations of the previous sec-
tion. 
C.5.1 Grove's Definitions 
Grove [36, pp. 158-159] defines a system of spheres as follows: 
Definition C.35. A collection S of subsets of Ai L is a system of spheres centered 
on _/y C l\lIL iff it satisfies: 
(S1) S is totally ordered by C; that is 
(\JU, \/ E S) [li C , .· or \l C [I ], 
(S2) .Ly is the C-minimum of S; that is 
(vU E S) [.\" C U], 
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(S3) Af L E S, and 
(S4) For A E F, if there is a sphere in S, which intersects !Al, then there is 
a smallest sphere in S intersecting 1~41, or more precisely 
(VA E F) [(3U E S) [Un IA! f- 0] ===} 
(31/ E S) [\; ' n !Al f- 0 and 
(Vl '' E S) [l ·' ' £: l ' ===} \l ' n IA!= 0 ]]]. 
This last condition will sometimes be referred to as "The Minimality Condi-
tion." 
Then GROVE goes on to define a revision function +s for each each system 
of spheres S as follows: 
Definition C.36. If S is a system of spheres and A E I( then The Minin1al Inter-
section Function for S evaluated at A is 
c( A) = 111in {U E S I [J n !,,qi f- 0 } , 
C 
and if A E F - I{ then c(A) = NIL . 
When we are dealing with more than one system of spheres, we subscript 
c by its appropriate system. 
Since NIL E S and because of condition (S4) we see that c(A) is defined for 
all A E F. Then we can go on to give the revision function induced in this way. 
Definition C.37. If S is a system of spheres centered on !Tl then +s is defined 
as follows: 
T +s A= t (c(A) n IAI). 
As before we must show that this system is both 'sound' and 'complete' 
with respect to the class of valid revision functions. 
C.5.2 Soundness 
GROVE's original proof of this [36, Theorem 1] was found to be in error by 
GRAHAM PRIEST and KOJI TANAKA and this subsection reiterates the contents 
of their paper [ 65] 9 where the problem and solution are presented. Throughout 
this section take+ to be + s for some sys tem of spheres S. 
9 Also our Appendix B. 
I 
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We can now state the mistake in GROVE's proof. On p. 161 in [36], in 
verifying the postulate ( +7) (and by similarity of proof ( +8)), two successive 
lines of the proof are: 
!Al n !B l n c( /1) c IA.In IB I n c( A /\ B) 
jB jnjT+A j c jCn({A, B} )jnc(A A B) 
The left-hand side of this step relies on the fact that: 
IT+ rl. j c !Al n c( A) 
i.e.: 
it (IAI n c(_-1) )1 c !Al n c(A). 
But in general It ( _.Y) I ct _)(. Let .,Y be the class of all maximal cons is tent sets 
minus any one of them. Then t (.,Y) is the set of all tautologies, for any non-
tautology is not in at least two maximal consistent sets. Hence It (_Y)I = JJL. 
A similar problem besets the verification of ( + 8). 
A simple solution to this problem is to require that every sphere in JI L be 
elementary, i.e., of the form IT' I for some theory T'. In this case, all the subsets 
of J'vf L appearing in the argument are elementary, and for any such set, .Y., 
jt (.,Y) I = .,Y, so the argument goes through. A similar approach is taken in [96] 
where the spheres are actually taken to be the points 'in' finitely axiomatisable 
theories-i.e., a sphere is of the form jA. j for some A E F. 10 
Alternatively, GROVE's proof may be repaired through the following se-
quence of observations where we take A , B , C to range over formulae in F. 
Lemma C.38. Suppose that (T + A )/ Bis consistent. Then c(A) = c(A. I\ B ). 
Proof The left to right inclusion follows by minimality and to show the reverse 
inclusion it is enough to show that c(-4) n j.-1 /\ B l -# 0 . Assume not. Thus 
1"-'( i 1 /\ B )I => c(--1 ) => c(.4) n IAI, which gives us that ""(A./\ B ) E t (c(A)) C 
t (c(i1) n IA !) = T + ,-L But A E T + A by postulate ( +2), so ""B E T + A 
contradicting the consistency of (T + .-1 ) / B. • 
We now observe how an expansion of a theory t ():) is related to the under-
lying set _.Y. This is just a restatement of one of GROVE's original observations. 
Lemma_C.39. For ;y C l\JL, t (): ) / B = t (_\" n jB j) . 
Proof For the (C) part, let C E t (.,\" ) / B which means that B -+ C E t (_\'"), i.e. 
(Vx E .,Y) [B -+ C' E x) . Then it is immediate that (Vx E X n IB I) [CE r ] giving 
c Et (.,,Y n IB I). 
10See, e.g., [4, p. 141] for a similar use of the term 'elementary'. 
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For the reverse inclusion, let C ~ t ()() / B which tells us that B -+ C ~ 
t (.,Y) and so (3x E .,Y) [B-+ C ~ x] . By maximal consistency of x we get that 
x E /Bl and C ~ x, so x E ){ n !Bl and C ~ x . Thus C ~ t (.,Y n /Bj). • 
We can now get at the desired result of soundness. 
Theorem C.40. The function +s, as defined, is a revision function, i. e., +s satisfies 
conditions ( +2), ( +3), ( +4r ( +5) and ( +7,+8). 
Proof Let .4, BE F 
(+2)AET+A. 
Let x E c(.--1) n j.-tj, thus .4 E x . So A E T + A. 
(+3) "-'.4 (/_ T ===> T +A= T/A. 
Suppose that r-vA ~ T. Thus /Al n /Tl # 0 and so c(A) = IT /. Thus 
T + .4 = t ( c (A.) n I A I ) = t ( IT I n I /1 I ) = TI. -t. 
( +4) A E I( ===> T + .4 is consistent. 
Suppose that .-t E K. Thus JvILn IAI # 0 , so by minimality c( A) n JAi # 0. 
So let x E c(-4) n !Al. Thus T + A = t ( c(A) n !Al) C t ( { x}) = x so T + A 
is consistent. 
(+5) AH BEL===> T +A= T + B. 
Suppose that .-t H B E L. Thus c(A) = c( B ) and j.A.j = IB I, telling us that 
T +A= t (c(A) n IA!)= t (c( B) n !B l)= T + B. 
(+7,+8) r-vB ~ T +A===> (T + A)/B = T +A I\ B. 
Suppose that r-vB (/_ T + A, so Lemma C.38 tells us that c(.-t /\ B) = c(.-t ). 
(T + A)/B = t (c(A) n /A. /) / B 
= t (c(.-t ) n j.-tj n !B l) 
= t (c(A) n j.-t /\ B l) 
= T + .4 /\ B. 
• 
i~ 
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C.5.3 Completeness 
Now we come to the point in GROVE's paper which prompted this paper. How 
to get a system of spheres out of each revision function + ? This paper adopts 
the approach of constructing a system of spheres out of the entrenchment re-
lation. 
Suppose that we have any entrenchment relation ( on F which starts at T . 
Definition C.41. For A E F define 
s( A ) = { x E l\f L I x is A.-consistent} 
and set S :s; = {s( A ) I A E F}. 
Naturally enough, this is a system of spheres, but before we prove this 
we deduce a few preliminary results on how closely this system tracks the 
underlying entrenchment relation. 
Lemma C.42. (V.rl : B E F ) [s( A ) c s( B ) <===} .-l ( B]. 
Proof Let .4 , B E F. Firstly if B ~ I< then 
s( B ) = {x E JJL Ix is B-consistent } 
= { x E 1"\JL I x is consistent} 
= JVJL , 
so s( A ) C !VIL = s( B ) and A ( B by definition. So take B ~ K, 
( <==) Suppose that A ( B and let x be A-consistent and so by Proposition 
C.11 it is B-consistent. 
(===? ) Suppose that s( A. ) c s( B ). Let x be any maximal consistent A-consistent 
extension of {A} whose existence is guaranteed by Lemma C.26. Thus 
x E s( A ) C s( B ), but A E x E s( B ) so A ( B. 
• 
Lemma C.43. For A E K , s( A ) n /Al -j 0 . 
Proof Let x be a maximal consistent A-consistent extension { ~---t}. Thus A E .c 
and x E s( A ), i.e., x E /Al n s( A ). • 
Lemma C.44. For all .--l. , B E F , s( B ) n l.4/ -j 0 ~ .-l ( B. 
Proof Let x E s( B ) n IAI. Thus A E x and x is B-consistent, hence .-l ( B by 
Definitions C.8 and C.10. • 
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Theorem C.45. The collection S ~, as defined, is a syste1n of spheres centered on ITI. 
Proof We proceed by showing that all the sphere conditions hold for S. 
(S1) S~ is totally ordered by~. 
Let A , BE F. Thus either A ( B or B ( A by condition (( 1) and hence 
s( A) C s(B) or s(B) C s(A) by Lemma C.42. 
(S2) ITI is the ~-minimum of S~. 
Let A E T. Thus rvA (/_Tso A is the ( -minimum of F. Hence by Lemma 
C.42 s( A) is the C-minimum of S~. Now, 
s(~4) = {x E l'vii Ix is .-!.-consistent} 
= { X E j\,{ L I (\/ B E X) [ B ( A] } 
= { X E i~;J L I (\/ B E X) [ rv B (/_ Tl} 
= { X E J\J L I T C X} 
= ITI, 
where the second line follows because Cn (x) = x, the third by .--1 being 
a ( -minimum, and the fourth line since each x E l\J L is maximal consis-
tent. 
(S3) j\JL ES ~. 
TVJ L = { x E J1d L I x is consistent} 
= { x E i\J L I x is 1--consistent} 
= s(1-) ES ~. 
(S4) The Minimality Condition. 
Let .--l E F and suppose that s(A.) n IAI -# 0 . Thus ~--1 E I\.-. 
Let S E S ~ and suppose that S £: s( A). Thus S = s(B) £: s(---1 ) for some 
B. Hence B ( ~4 and A 1:- B, so by Lemma C.44 s(B) n J.--1 1 = 0 . 
• 
Before we move on, note from the proof of the last theorem that in S ~, the 
system of spheres induced by a relation (, c( A) = s(A.) for each A E F. 
What we just produced was a method for finding a system of spheres from 
any entrenchment relation (. Now suppose that we restrict ourselves to the 
(+ defined as per Definition C.30 from a revision function + and take S+ to 
I'' 
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be the system of spheres induced by ~+ (in our earlier notation that would be 
S~+). We are then required to verify that the revision function induced by this 
system of spheres is precisely the original revision function that we started 
with. 
Theorem C.46. + s+ = +. 
Proof Let A E F, we need to show that 
T + .-1 = T + s+ A. 
So let B E F. 11 
B (/_ T +s+ A¢::=? B (/_ t (c(.A.) n IAI) 
¢::=? B (/_ t (s(il) n l,4/) 
¢::=? (3x E s(.4) n IAI) [B (/_ .r] 
¢::=? s(A) n IAI n lrvB/ f 0 
¢::=? s(.-1 ) n IA/\ rvBI f 0 
¢::=? A I\ rvB ~ A 
¢::=? T + ( .,-1 /\ rv B) V L-i C T + .-i /\ rv B 
¢::=? T + A c T +A I\ rvB 
¢::=? rv B is consistent with T + .-1 
¢::=? B (/_ T + .A. 
C.5.4 Correspondence Between Spheres and Entrenchment 
Relations 
• 
We have already seen that if ( is an entrenchment relation starting at ITI then 
S ~ is a system of spheres centered on /T /. As GROVE mentions [36, p. 164]: 
Definition C.47. If we are to have a system of spheres S centered on ITI then 
we can define an entrenchment ( s by 
A ( s B ¢::=? c(A) C c(B). 
Theorem C.48. The relation ( s, as defined, is almost an entrenchnzent relation start-
ing at T, as it satisfies ( ( 1), ( ( 2), ( ( 3), and ( ~ 4). 
11 Note that this proof, in some sense, extends the proof of Theorem C.34. 
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Proof We verify points ( ( 1) through ( ( 4). 
((1) (VA, B E F ) [A ( s B or B ( s A]. 
Let A, B E F. Either c(A.) C c( B ) or c( B ) C c( .4) by the linearity of S. 
Thus A ( s B or B ( s A . 
((2) (VA, B , CE F ) [A ( s Band B ( s C ===> A ( s C] . 
Let .-:-1 , B, CE F and suppose that A ( s Band B ( s C . Then c( A ) c c( B ) 
and that c( B ) C c( C) and so c(.--1 ) C c( Ct so A ( s C . 
((3) (VA., B , CE F ) [A-+ B V CE L ===> B ( s A or C ( s A]. 
Suppose that A., B , CE F and that .4-+ B V C E L. Thus 1---1 1 C IE V Cl 
Hence 
0 # c( A ) n 1---1 1 c c(A ) n IE v Cl, 
so one of 
c(A) n IBI # 0 or c( A ) n IC! # 0, 
hence by minimality 
c( B ) C c( A) or c(C) C c(A), 
and so B ( s A or C ( s A. 
(( 4) (VA E F) [(VB E F ) [A ~ s B] ¢=:::? rvA ~T]. 
Let A_ E F . We prove each direction separately. 
(===> ) Suppose that rv.4 E T. Thus 
IAI n c(T) = IAI n !T l C !A l n lrvAI = 0 . 
which tells us that c(T) £; c( A) and so c(A) ~ c(T) . Thus A f;_ s T . 
(¢=) Suppose that rv A ~ Tl so j.Aj n !T l # 0 . Hence c(.,--1 ) C !T l/ 
the C-minimum of S1 so c(-4) = IT ! C c( B ) for all B E F. Thus 
(VB E F) [A. f;_ s B]. 
• 
However, GROVE is incorrect when he says that ( s satisfies all the en-
trenchment conditions, as the following example shows. 
j"' 
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Example C.49. Let D E J{, with rvD E J(, and let S = {IDI, 1 /L}. Thus Sis 
trivially a system of spheres centered on Cn ( { D} ), however 
rvD is :(5-maximal ¢==> c(rvD) = AIL 
¢==> jrvD j n !DI = 0 . 
This last line trivially holds, so rvD is :( 5 -maximal, but rvrvD tf_ L, so :( s does 
not satisfy ( :(5). 
This is really only a technical complaint, an artifact of our formalism which 
requires that inconsistent formulae be explicitly taken account of in the :( -
relation, whereas they are taken care of in the background by the system of 
spheres formalism. 
The operation of moving from a system of spheres to a :( -relation and then 
back again does not necessarily get you back to where you started as we will 
see in the Section C.6 when we show that S~ is always closed yet an arbitrary 
system of spheres need not be. 
However, the other full circle, namely that of starting with an entrench-
ment, moving to a system of spheres and then returning to an entrenchment, 
does complete. 
Theorem C.50. Let :( be an entrench1rzent relation starting at IT I and let S ~ be the 
system of spheres induced by:(. Then :( s ~ =:(. 
" 
Proof Let A , B E F. Then 
A :(s~ B ¢==> c(A) C c( B) 
' 
¢==> s(A) C s(B ) 
¢==>A_:( B , 
where this last line is just Lemma C.42. • 
C.6 Closed Systems of Spheres 
Certainly it is nice that we have a formalism that is able to deal with systems 
of spheres which can have arbitrary makeup, but it would be equally nice if, 
when we so choose, we could work with "closed" or "elementary" systems of 
spheres. That is when each sphere within the system is a closed set within the 
Stone Topology or more revealingly when each sphere is jT' I for some theory T'. 
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C.6.1 Some Basic Topology 
Since we will be using the terminology of basic point set topology here and 
some results well known to topology students may not be well known to those 
who study belief revision, it will be worth going over some basic results about 
the topology of our Stone spaces and, in particular, those to do with closures. 
Definition C.51. The Stone Topology on J'\,f L is the topology with basis 
{IA I : A E F}. 
This means that the open sets of this topology are those sets which are 
arbitrary unions of IA.ls. Note that the collection of open sets, as well as the 
basis, are closed under finite intersections and unions. The collection of open 
sets is trivially closed under arbitrary unions. 
Definition C.52. A se t [I C J1lf L is closed iff JI L - U is open. 
Notice that each se t !Al is closed as AIL - 1--11 = Irv Al is open. Since it is both 
open and closed, we refer to this set as being clopen. Note also that the collec-
tion of closed sets is closed under finite unions and arbitrary intersections. 
Proposition C.53. A set U C lvf L is closed if! [J = I ~I for some set~; and I: can be 
taken to be in 'Jr. 
Proof Suppose that U is closed in !VIL . Thus 
u = }/IL - u !Ail, 
iE I 
for some arbi trary collection of formulae~ = { rvAi I i E I} C F. Hence by the 
De Morgan laws, 
u = n ( 111 L - , _ -1i , ) , 
iEI 
so by I· I properties, 
u = n lrv_4i l = 1~1-
iE I 
We then have that [,' is of the desired form, and if we put T' = t (I I: I) we then 
have that l~ I = IT' I, so we might as well have taken~ E 1r to start with. • 
With ' closed sets' comes the notion of' closure': 
Definition C.54. The closure, cl ( ..,Y-), of a set .,'( C J'\if L is defined to be the small-
est closed set in JI L which contains X. 
i~ 
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Since the collection of closed sets is closed under arbitrary intersection and 
since l'vii is closed (!VIL = !VIL - 0 = J1;f i - IJ_I), the notion of closure is well 
defined. Note that the closure of a closed set is, naturally, closed. 
A more useful test for being in the closure of )( is the following: 
Proposition C.55. An ele1nent x E l'vii is in cl()() for a set_\' C J1Ii if! 
(\-/A E F ) [x E IAI ==> li l l n . x· # 0]. 
This alternate definition says that x is in the closure of _\" if no matter what 
neighborhood we take around x , that neighborhood will intersect ~Y. 
Proof Let x E Jvii , and let_)( c Af L· 
(==> ) Suppose that it is not true that 
(\-/ A E F) [ x E I A I ==> I A I n .\' # 0] . 
That is 
(3A E F) [x E 1---1 1 and IA.In _y = 0] . 
Thus _,y C lrvAI and X (/. lrvAI. Since lrvAI is a closed set larger than 
.,Y. and since x (/. lrvAI we know that cl (./Y) is smaller than lrv,4.I and so 
~r (/. cl ( _,y ) . 
(¢=) Suppose that x (/. cl (.,Y). Thus x is in the open set J1I i - cl (./Y). Hence 
by the definition of open sets there is some A E F such that x E I.A.I C 
AIL - cl (_,Y). So, x E IAI and 
I A I n _,y c 1-4 I n c 1 ( ): ) = 0. 
Th us establishing that 
(\-/A E F) [x E IAI ==> IAI n .,Y # 0] 
does not hold. 
• 
C.6.2 - Systems of Spheres 
With this small smattering of definitions and results from elementary topology 
we are ready to proceed with our discussion on closed systems of spheres. 
218 Revising Some Basic Proofs in Belief Revision 
Definition C.56. A system of spheres S is said to be closed iff 
(VS E S) [ S is closed in JV! L] . 
If S is a system of spheres, then its closure is defined to be 
cl (S) = {cl(S) Is ES}. 
Note that a system of spheres is closed iff each of its constituent spheres 
represents a full theory; that is elementary in the sense of Subsection C.5.2. 
Let us note that not all systems of spheres are closed: 
Example C.57. Let x 0 be some point in JVJL. Then S = { l\IL - {x0 } , JVIL} is a 
system of spheres which is not closed as clearly cl (JvIL - {x0 }) = i"\IL. 
Our next observation is that the systems of spheres we constructed out of 
entrenchment relations are nice and elementary/ closed. 
Theorem C.58. S·uppose that ( is an entrenchment relation. Then 
s~ = { s( A) I A E F} 
defined as in Subsection C.5.3 is closed. 
Proof Let .A. E F. We will show that cl (s(A)) C s(A) (since, trivially, s(A. ) C 
cl (s (A )), this gives us our result). So let x (/_ s(A). Thus x is not A-consistent, 
which means that there is a B E x such that B f;. A. 
IBI n s( A. ) = 0 . 
Assume that there exists a y E !Bl n s(A). Hence B E y and y is A.-
consistent, so B ( A., a contradiction. 
Hence x E I BI and I BI n s (A) = 0 , so x (/_ cl ( s (A)). • 
Remark C.59. Here we have another demonstration that the operation of con-
verting a system of spheres into an entrenchment relation is not reversible, 
since any, possibly non-closed, system of spheres will give rise to an entrench-
ment relation which will, in turn, give rise to a closed system of spheres. 
Another way of seeing this result would have been the cruder way of look-
ing at the cardinalities involved. There are at most the cardinality of P (F x F ) 
( = 2w) many entrenchment relations whereas there are at least the cardinality 
of {J : 2w ---1 JVIL I f is 1-1} ( = 22w) many systems of spheres, so something 
must be lost when we move systems of spheres to entrenchments. 
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We thus have a method of taking systems of spheres and deriving closed 
systems of spheres from them: From S, form +s, and from this form S+s .12 
Theorem C.46 then guarantees that this new, closed, system of spheres is 
equivalent to our original system of spheres in the sense that +s+s = +s. 
Actually though, we can strengthen the appearance of this result to state 
that cl (S) is equivalent to S, and this will be the last result of this appendix. 
To get there, however, we will need to verify that cl (S) really is a system of 
spheres and we must prove a small technical Lemma. 
Lemma C.60. Suppose that S is a system of spheres centered on ~Y. Then cl ( S) is a 
system of spheres centered on cl (/Y). 
Proof We verify each of the sphere conditions. 
(Sl) cl (S) is linearly ordered by~-
Suppose that cl (U) 1 cl (1/ ) E cl (S) for some [i , 1'r E S. Without loss of 
generality take UC tr. Then cl (U) C cl (1/ ) by closure properties. 
(S2) cl (/Y) is the ~-minimum of cl (S). 
We know that "'y E S, so cl (.,Y) E cl (S). Suppose that cl (U) E cl (S) for 
some U E S. Thus _,y C U so cl (~Y) C cl (U). 
(S3) Af L E cl ( S). 
NIL E S, so J1lf L = cl ( l'vf L) E cl ( S). 
(S4) The Minimality Condition. 
Suppose that A E F and further suppose that cl (U) n IAI # 0, so there 
exists an x E cl (U) n IAI . Since JAi is an open neighborhood of x , and 
x: E cl (U), by Proposition C.55, Un JAi i- 0 . So by The Minimality 
Condition in S we have that there is a minimal U0 such that U0 n I A j i- 0. 
Claim: cl (U0 ) is minimal in cl (S) such that cl (U0 ) n JAi i- 0. 
Proof of claim: 
Suppose that 1/ E S such that cl (i1 ) C cl (U0 ) and cl (11) n JAi i- 0 . 
Thus, \/ n IA.I i- 0 , and so U0 C V by The Minimality Condition. Thus 
cl (U0 ) C cl (1/ ), telling us that cl (U0 ) = cl (1-), as required. End of proof of 
clai111. 
• 
12Note that S +s is really S ~+s and so is a closed system of spheres. 
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Lemma C.61. Let S be a system of spheres centered on){. Then for all A E J(, 
cl ( cs (A) ) = cc1 ( s) (A) , 
·where cs is the Mininzal Intersection Function for the system of spheres S, and Cct(S) 
is the Mini1nal Intersection Function for the system of spheres cl ( S). 
Proof Letrl E J(. Thus by definition of cs, cs(A) nl AI i- 0 , socl(cs (A. ))n lAI i-
0, and we can conclude that 
Cc1(s)(A) C cl (cs(A)). 
There is a U E S such that Cct(S) (A) = cl (U), so cl ([/ ) n IAI i- 0, so by the same 
reasoning as in the proof of (S4) in Lemma C.60, we have that U n IAI i- 0 , so 
cs (A.) C U. Hence 
cl (cs (A)) C cl (U) = cc1(s)( A.), 
and together with the above inclusion we can then conclude equality. • 
Theorem C.62. Suppose that S is a system of spheres centered on IT I. Then 
+s = +c1(S) · 
Proof Firstly note that by Lemma C.60, cl (S) is a system of spheres centered 
on IT I (since IT I E S, so cl (I T I) = ITI E cl (S)). 
Let A E F. We want to show that T +s A= T + c1(S) A, i.e., 
(\/ B E F ) [ B E T +s A¢:=;> B E T + ct(S) A] . 
So let B E F, and consider cs (A) and Cc1(s)(A) = cl (cs (.A)) . We then get the 
following sequence of equivalences: 
cl ( Cs (A)) n I A I\ rv B I = 0 ¢:=;> Cs ( .,4. ) n I A I\ rv BI = 0 
JJ, 
cl ( Cs ( .-l )) n I A I n Irv BI = 0 ¢:=;> Cs (A. ) n I A I n Irv BI = 0 
JJ, 
cl (cs (.-l )) n IAI C IBI ¢:=;> cs(A) n l,4 J C IBI 
JJ, 
B E t (cl (cs (--l )) n l.,4J) ¢:=;> BE t (cs (--l ) n IAI) 
JJ, 
B E T +c1(S) A ¢:=;> B E T + s ,-l 
The first line is true by closure properties and so the last line obtains. • 
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C.7 Conclusion 
This paper has revisited GROVE's result [36] in close detail and through this 
detail we have seen the usefulness of an epistemic entrenchment as our start-
ing point rather than systems of spheres. Also we have provided a new way 
of looking at the revision induced by an epistemic entrenchment and it is the 
author's hope that this will further enhance our understanding of revision op-
erations. 
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Appendix D 
Combining Finite Model 
Generation with Theorem Proving: 
Problems and Prospects 
With 
John Slaney 
Automated Reasoning Project 
Australian National University. 
ABSTRACT: This appendix is about automated proof search, automatic 
searching for models and the potentially fruitful ways in which these tradition-
ally separate aspects of reasoning may be made to interact. It takes its start-
ing point in research reported in 1993 (Slaney, SCOTT: A Se1nantically Guided 
Theorem Prover, Proc. 13th IJCAI) on a system which combines a high perfor-
mance first order theorem prover with a program generating small models of 
first order theories. The main theorem is an incompleteness result for a cer-
tain range of problems to which this combined system has been successfully 
applied. While the result may not be unexpected, the proof is worth examin-
ing and it is important to reflect on its relationship to the research program in 
combining methods. 
D.1 Proof search, model search and their interac-
tion 
D.1.1 Background 
Traditional theorem provers search without much intelligence. They may rea-
son forwards from the axioms or backwards from the desired theorem or both, 
but in either direction they rapidly find themselves in an exponentially grow-
ing search space of possible proof fragments which they explore in a manner 
at once admirably industrious and remarkably dull. Much good work in au-
tomatic proof search has gone into the discovery and refinement of methods 
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for controlling the explosion of the search space or for reducing the amount of 
duplicated work undertaken in traversing it. At the same time, there has been 
vigorous research on heuristics for directing the search for proofs, but many of 
the most successful ideas in that field are either unexciting suggestions such as 
exploring short formulae first or else mysterious ones such as preferring some 
operator to be nested to the left rather than to the right. 1 The root problem is 
that most powerful theorem provers work only locally, focussing on the spe-
cific formulae being transformed by an inference rather than on global aspects 
of the situation, and more significantly they are based on pure syntax.2 They 
may take into account questions like how many function symbols a formula 
has, which is the first literal in a clause, whether this unifies with that and the 
like, but they do not consider what the inference step is supposed to achieve, 
whether it is establishing a general law for the structures under consideration 
or an accidental property of the case, whether the conclusion of the inference 
says the same thing as one already proved or the like. That is, traditional 
provers do not understand what they are doing. 
Still less do they understand the problems they are attempting to 5olve. The 
contrast with human theorem provers is striking. When we reason, we appeal 
constantly to conceptual structures within which particular problems make 
sense. We are not capable of exploring search spaces of millions of clauses, 
and it seems that we do not need to. What we are able to use is some sense of 
when a proof search is getting closer to the goal. What lies behind this capacity 
is not so much an ability to recognise syntactic patterns in formulae (though 
we importantly have that too) as an understanding of the problem: we know 
what the symbols, theories, axioms, goals and subgoals 1nean, and this puts us 
at an advantage il1. the investigation. 
These remarks may be taken as _ leading to a recommendation that re-
searchers in automated reasoning direct their efforts towards mechanical em-
ulation of human cognitive processes. This, however, would be a mistake, 
certainly in the present state of development of the discipline. In the details of 
what they do-in what they find easy and what hard-computers are quite un-
like us. Without becoming totally discouraged from projects in programming 
naturalistic intelligence, we should recognise that for practical purposes the 
indicated way ahead is to continue to let the machines be mechanical, doing 
1Not all research in the area has been like that. The present appendix is part 0£ a minor-
ity tradition characterised by attempts to direct semantic reasoning for syntactic purposes. 
Plaisted and Ca£erra should be mentioned as important recent contributors to this tradition, 
whose roots go back to very early work by Gelemter and others. The present point is just that 
this is a minority tradition. 
2This is not to deny a semantic basis for the usual rules and methods, but at the level of the 
individual inference step everything is most easily ei11aracterised in svntactic terms . 
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what they do best at the high speeds of which they are capable.3 Algorithmic 
proof search is good for some things anyway; it no more needs pseudo-human 
cognition in order to out-infer a mathematician than a car needs legs to outrun 
an athlete. 
So we do not know how to program understanding, and in any case at-
tempting to do so is likely to lead to inefficient systems. What we may rather 
hope to do is to secure some of the useful effects of understanding in a way 
congenial to algorithmic processes. To understand something is to know what 
it means. While that may be unattainable by means of software of the kind 
we know how to build, it can rather simply be approximated. It remains to 
be seen whether such approximations really pay their way, though the initial 
indications are good. 
What is computationally possible is to interpret a formal language as refer-
ring to objects in a particular domain of discourse. An interpretation in this 
sense is just what we were all told it was when, at our mother's knee, we were 
introduced to model theory. That is, it consists of a nonempty set called the do-
main and a function which assigns to each predicate symbol a relation of ap-
propriate arity defined on the domain and to each function symbol a function 
similarly. Elaborations to allow for possible worlds, impossible worlds, higher 
order structures, multiple sorts or whatever may be pasted into this frame-
work as desired. With an interpretation is associated a notion of truth, fleshed 
out by the familiar inductive conditions for evaluating molecular formulae in 
terms of the values of their parts. Thus an interpretation-any interpretation-
divides the language into the true and the false. That is, it marks a difference 
in meaning between half of what may be asserted and the other half. Even a 
crude interpretation is rich in semantic information of the kind which human 
reasoners may glean from their understanding and which may help automatic 
reasoning systems behave more intelligently. 
D.1.2 Uses of interpretations 
The oldest and simplest way of using an interpretation to help guide the search 
for a proof is to delete unprovable subgoals. In searching backwards from a 
goal, the prover typically looks at the available rules of inference and asks 
how they may have been applied to generate this particular goal (theorem) 
from subgoals (lemmata). Sometimes the rules are invertible, so that if the 
goal is provable then so are the subgoals, but this is not always the case. For 
3 And of course to facilitate the right kind of human-machine interactions. In order to se-
cure the insights of a mathematician, it is more effective to plug in a mathematician at some 
-appropriate point than to try to emulate one in an unsuitable medium like that provided by 
current computer technology. 
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example, if the goal is =l x A then one way to derive it would be to infer it from 
some particular A t, so one possible subgoal would be to derive At. However, 
it is possible that At does not follow from the axioms of the problem even 
if =l xA does. If we have an interpretation which is a model of the theory in 
which the proof is sought (that is, of the axioms of the problem) then we may 
detect the unprovability of some subgoals by testing them against the model 
and finding that they are false. Then there is no point in trying to derive them, 
so the search can immediately backtrack and try another subgoal. Diagrams 
in geometry have this function among others: we do not waste time trying to 
prove two triangles congruent if it is obvious from the diagram that they have 
different shapes. 
In the case of backward reasoning, there is no danger that the formulae 
considered will be irrelevant to the goal, but there is a danger that they will not 
follow from the assumptions. In the case of forward reasoning, the problem 
is the opposite one: all of the formulae considered are derivable, but most 
of them play no part in proofs of the target theorem. Here there is another 
use for interpretations. Given an interpretation, or a set of them, in which 
the goal is false, it makes sense to explore most vigorously the consequences 
of axioms and lemma ta which are also false. This false preference strategy rests 
on the thought enunciated above, that interpretations reveal something of the 
semantic character of formulae. In the context of the question "How does this 
set of formulae entail that conclusion?" it corresponds to saying "Here is a way · 
for the conclusion to be false, and those formulae fail with it, so concentrate on 
them." 
Another strategy, most germane to the technical part of this appendix, is 
semantic restriction of rules of inference. Given an interpretation-usually 
again one in which the target theorem is false-the rules of inference may be 
barred from applying unless one of the premises of the inference is false in the 
interpretation. Sometimes, as in the case of resolution as a refutation proce-
dure with the empty clause as goal, this kind of restriction is complete in that 
if there is a derivation at all there is one obeying the model-based condition. In 
other cases it is incomplete and so may cause proof searches to fail where they 
would otherwise have succeeded. In such cases it may be weakened to be-
come a variety of false preference, assigning weights or the like not to prohibit 
the inferences which violate it but to delay them or render them less likely to 
be selected. 
D.1.3 Dynamic model generation 
It may be that some particular interpretation is known to be apposite for a class 
of problems, in which case it may be given to a theorem prover along with 
1 •. 
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the problem definition or even hard-coded into the prover itself. However, 
in many cases we do not know in advance what interpretation will be use-
ful. One option is then to use an all-purpose interpretation, perhaps selected 
to be such as to make testing for truth value very fast. For example, ordinary 
hyper-resolution uses an interpretation in which all atoms are false. It has long 
been observed [76] that such an interpretation is unlikely to be ideal for any 
particular problem, and that an important project in automated reasoning is 
to find ways of suiting interpretations automatically to problems. Another op-
tion, therefore, is to combine a theorem prover with a program which searches 
for models of theories. This should be done in such a way that: 
1. The models generated are adapted to the proof search in hand. 
2. Testing formulae in the models is fast. 
3. Searching for models does not occupy more time than is saved by using 
them to provide semantic information. 
4. Replacing models by "better" ones as the proof search progresses does 
not compromise the soundness or completeness of the prover. 
Item 1 means that for example, in a case of goal deletion the interpretations 
should falsify a lot of the subgoals encountered in the present proof search 
while remaining models of the axioms. In the case of forward reasoning strate-
gies, the models should not only falsify the goal but make a high proportion 
of the derived formulae true so that they focus the search significantly. Items 
2 and 3 are obvious given that it is a strategic error to put more resources into 
any strategy than are covered by the return from it. Item 4 is an integrity con-
dition. 
One (generic) system capable of meeting these conditions consists of three 
modules: 
Prover. Some form of theorem prover which takes as input a problem (axioms, 
rules, goat ... ) and gives as output either a proof or failure. It can use 
information as to whether individual formulae are true or false in some 
modet but it knows nothing about the content of the model. 
Modeller. A program which takes as input two theories, a background theory 
about the domain of investigation and a set of formulae to be interpreted, 
together with conditions which limit its search to force termination, and 
gives as output a model of the theories if it finds one, or a failure mes-
sage otherwise. It uses formulae from the prover as axioms, but knows 
nothing about inference rules or proof strategy. 
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Tester. A module which mediates between the other two. The prover may 
send a formula to the tester and get back the formula's truth value. The 
tester may send a theory to the modeller and get back either a model of 
that theory or failure if there is no model in the search space. 
The entire system is in one of two states: active or passive. In passive mode, 
the modeller is inactive; the tester has an interpretation in memory and it 
merely tests formulae in that and returns the results. In active mode the tester 
maintains not only the current interpretation JV! but also a current theory T, of 
which NI is a model. During the proof search, a series of formulae arrive at the 
tester to be assigned truth values. With each formula A the tester does: 
If A is false in lvf then 
Call the modeller with theory TU {A} 
If a model N is returned then 
id +--- lV 
Else return FALSE 
Endif 
T+---TU{A} 
Return TRUE 
A 'theory' here is j_ust a set of formulae. Initially T is null and the initial Af is 
obtained by ·calling the modeller with the null theory, thus getting a model of 
the background theory (which may also be null, in which case some dummy 
model is returned). As a result of all this, after a while the tester's theory T con-
sists of formulae which have occurred during the proof search and which have 
been evaluated as true, and its interpretation !VI has been generated specifi-
cally to make true as many as possible of the formulae from the prover. Thus 
!'vi is not arbitrary, but is adapted to the particular problem being addressed 
by the prover and to the particular proof strategy used. 
The theory T is there in order to comply with item 4 on the list of desider-
ata. It ensures that once the prover has been told that a formula is true, that 
formula remains true even when the guiding model is changed. 
Because searching for models is computationally expensive compared with 
checking a formula against a given model, the system should switch at some 
point from active to passive mode. This should happen when it is likely that 
the current model is as good as any within the search space. Of course, the 
ways of recognising when that point is reached are likely to be fallible, but 
then heuristics generally are fallible. A simple way would be to stop gen-
erating after a certain pre-defined n11mber of formulae have been tested, or 
alternatively after a given number of consecutive failures to find models. 
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The generic combined system has been implemented [77, 79]. The pro-
gram SCOTT combines the theorem prover Otter [62] with the model gen-
erator FINDER [78].4 It is worth remarking that FINDER searches for small 
models, so usually testing formulae against them is fast compared with gen-
erating and processing consequences in the prover. The techniques so far im-
plemented are semantic restriction of rules and false preference. The latter 
is effected by assigning weight to each true clause, allowing Otter's normal 
strategy of choosing lightest clauses first to do the rest. 
SCOTT must be regarded as a preliminary essay in combining semantic 
and syntactic methods. Nonetheless, it exhibits some of the pleasing features 
one might expect from such a combination. Otter is powerful and fast, but it 
searches without much intelligence. Its technique is to spray out consequences 
in all directions, remove some dross (such as subsumed clauses) and hope. 
FINDER is capable of extracting rich information from a few axioms, but it is 
powerless to deduce consequences. In the combined system, the two inform 
each other achieving more than either could alone. 
D.2 Incompleteness 
D.2.1 Condensed detachment 
Hilbert systems for propositional logic with an implication connective -t tra-
ditionally take as primitive some axiom schemata and the rule of Modus Po-
nens or detachment: 
A A-tB 
B 
An interesting variant takes individual formulae (rather than schemata) as 
axioms and closes under the more general rule of condensed detachment-
detachment incorporating the substitution required to unify the minor 
premise with the antecedent of the major one: 
C A-tB 
Ba 
where a is the most general unifier of A and C1 • 
Condensed detachment was introduced by Meredith and received a sustained 
investigation in the 1980s [47, 63]. It is clear that condensed detachment and 
4The program is available from ftp: // arp. anu. edu. au / pub / SCOTT / and comes with 
both Otter's and FINDER's sources. Since the system is described in the cited papers, we do 
not repeat the account of it here. 
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resolution are closely related rules, so interest attaches to the question of 
whether proof search strategies and heuristics similar to those usual for res-
olution can be adapted to the case of condensed detachment. 
Condensed detachment is also well known in the theorem proving commu-
nity as a source of maddeningly hard problems for classical first order systems. 
It is easy to represent the formulae of a propositional logic as first order terms, 
the connectives being function symbols, and to add a unary predicate p for ' 
is provable'. The rule of detachment goes over into a clause 
rvp( x ) V rvp( i (x, y)) '! p(y). 
and axioms of the Hilbert systems may simply be asserted as (positive) unit 
clauses such as 
p(i(x,i (y ,x ))). 
p(i (i (x, i (y, z)) , i (i (x, y), i(x , z)))). 
To prove a theorem in the propositional logic, Skolemise its negation 
rvp(i( i (i(a , b) , a) , i (i(a , b), b))). 
and derive the empty clause in first order logic. Since unification is going to 
be applied to the first order clauses, the rule of inference of the propositional 
system is exactly condensed detachment. 
Experiments with Otter especially have made the condensed detachment 
problems into a famous challenge [100].5 SCOTT has been applied to them 
with some success [77]. Its performance on such problems is typically better 
than that of the unaided Otter by a factor of about 2, whether the measure be 
the number of clauses kept, the number given or the time taken. On certain 
problems the false preference strategy enables SCOTT to find proofs two or-
ders of magnitude more efficiently than Otter, and in one case SCOTT solved 
a (minor) open problem in a few seconds after Otter had failed to find a proof 
in several hours. 
It is obvious that where the rule of inference is ordinary binary resolution 
refutation completeness is not affected, because the tester's theory T ensures 
that when the guiding model is changed all clauses marked as true remain true 
in the new interpretation. Where the rule of inference is some other form of 
semantic resolution such as hyper-resolution, it is equally obvious that further 
restriction by arbitrary models in the manner of SCOTT may destroy com-
pleteness. However, the case of condensed detachment appears to lie some-
where between these two "obvious" cas~s. In our previous papers [77, 79] the 
5The challenge of these problems has stimulated other work, for example by the theorem 
proving groups of ICOT in Tokyo [66] and of the Max Planck Institute in Saarbrucken [35]. 
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question of whether semantically constrained condensed detachment is in any 
reasonable sense complete was left open. 
D.2.2 Definitions 
We shall deal with the set of terms over variables (w, x, y, z , ... ) with a binary 
function symbol -+ which we write in infix. To save on excessive formal-
ism we also take a term to represent all instances of itself under substitutions 
which replace distinct variables for distinct variables. We shall denote terms 
by upper-case Roman letters, A, B, C, ... , and we shall take f to range over the 
set of terms. Moreover, when dealing with two unconnected terms we assume 
that they do not share variables. 
These terms are analogs of propositional formulae and we can interpret the 
usual rule of Modus Ponens in its most general form as the rule of Condensed 
Detachment (CD) as stated above, tacitly assuming that .A-+ B and C1 have 
distinct variables. ff-CD A then has its usual meaning, i.e. that it is possible to 
deduce A from the terms inf by applications of CD.6 
Since we have only an attenuated first order language, our semantic struc-
tures or CO-algebras will be those of a generalised propositional implication, 
namely algebras (A ,~,=:), D ) where A is a set on which ~ is a binary relation,7 
D is a subset of A closed under ~ and => is a binary operation on A satisfying 
the condition: 
a=:)b E D <¢==* a ~ b 
The notation f F A will then be able to take on its usual meaning and we have 
a fairly standard (and easy) soundness and completeness result: 
f F B <==? 3A (3a(B = Aa) A ff-CD A) 
It is here that we pay a small price for the generality imposed on the conclu-
sions of our CD inferences. In general there may not be a CD derivation of a 
given semantic consequence off, but there will be a derivation of some term 
which subsumes it. 
Semantic constraint by a specific CD-algebra lvf means that the Condensed 
Detachment inference from A-+ Band C to Ba can proceed only when either 
6Note that we are not capturing all of the conclusions that would normally follow i..n a 
propositional system from the axioms in r. This is because we are not allowi..ng arbitrary 
substitution during our derivations. This issue is i..nteresti..ng from the perspective of logic [ 63] 
but not our present concern. 
7Typically, for i..nteresting logics, ~ is a partial order. However, in general it need not be. 
Our presentation is not n1aximally efficient, since ~ could be defined rather than primitive. 
We have opted for familiarity rather than economy. 
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JVIFA • B or JVIFC. If A follows from r by Ai-constrained steps of this form 
we write ff- NI A. 
We say that ~4 follows from r by Semantically Constrained Condensed De-
tatchment (SCCD) and write rf-sccD A when and only when for every CD-
algebra Jvf, if JVIFA. then ff- 1vI A. Then SCCD is complete iff r f-co A. implies 
r f-scco .A .. Note that when trying to prove a goal term by SCCD we must use 
an algebra which invalidates that term. If this restriction were not imposed, 
there would generally be no semantically constrained proof. At the extreme, 
we could choose an algebra in which all of the axioms were true and so block 
all CD inferences from them. 
D.2.3 The Counter Example 
As promised, we shall give a specific counter example to the conjecture that 
SCCD is complete. To do this, it will be sufficient to find a set r of terms, a 
conclusion .-l which follows from r by usual CD reasoning, and a CD-algebra 
T\;f relative to which we can show that A does not follow from r by SCCD. That 
1s: 
1. ff- co A, 
2. ilIF A, and 
3. r ~ AIA. 
For our example, we first adopt the notation 
C* (A) =ctf (A • V) • V 
JC (A) =ctf V • A 
where v is a variable (say, the earliest in a standard enumeration) that does not 
occur in A . Moreover, we write 
C~(A) =ct£ A 
c:+1 (A) ~df C*( c:(A)) 
Next we define the specific example: 
O'. = X --+ C* ( X) 
(3 = x --+ K (x) 
r = {a,(3} 
A = K (C*(a)) 
j"' 
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Let JV! be the algebra given by the following n1atrix: 
ff:
l 
0 
1 
D = {l} 
a(b ¢==> a=b 
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So JI interprets --+ as the Boolean biconditional, and we can take ad vantage 
of the well known fact that a propositional formula containing biconditionals 
as the only connective is a tautology if and only if the number of occurrences 
of each propositional variable in that formula is even. 
Lemma D.1. J"\,1 F 0:, lllf F/3, and J1f FA .. 
Proof Count the variable occurrences (mod 2). 
Lemma D.2. r~co A 
Proof 
Cl: Cl: 
c* (a) 
A 
• 
3 
• 
Thus we are only left with the requirement that r II 1\,[A, for which we shall 
define a set T which includes the NJ-constrained consequences of r, show that 
T contains only terms of a specific form, and show that .4 is not of this form. 
More specifically let T be the set of CD consequences of r except that we re-
quire that a cannot be applied to itself in the generation of elements of T. This 
condition corresponds exactly to following the set of support strategy with a 
as axiom and (3 initially in the set of support. Note that since a is true in 111, all 
~I-constrained derivations satisfy the condition, so clearly 
Lemma D.3. If r~ Iv! B then B E T. 
It turns out that the converse is also true, but it is not needed for the proof.8 
To describe the form of the terms in T we shall construct T' (which we will 
show to be identical to T) as follows: 
Definition D.4. T' is the smallest set satisfying: 
1. Cl: E T' I 
8a is the only term in T which is valida ted by lvf . This fact is non-trivial but is an easy 
consequence of Lemma 0.6 below. 
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2. c;(/3) ET' for all n ~ 0 
3. If B E T' then c: (iC (B )) E T' for all n ~ 0 
Lemma D.S. A ~T'. 
Proof Assume for reductio that .rl E T'. Clearly A i= n and so it was not 
condition 1 which forced A into T'. Condition 2 does not place A in T' since 
A is of the wrong form, having a single variable as its antecedent. So JC ( C* (a)) 
must be there because of condition 3 with n = 0, and therefore C* (a) E T'. 
However, C*(a) cannot be there in virtue of condition 1 (because C* (a) i= n ) or 
of condition 2 (because a i= ,3) or of condition 3 (because n is not of the form 
JC (~Y) since x occurs in C* (x)) . There being no other way for C* (a) to get into 
T', this is a contradiction. • 
Lemma D.6. T = T'. 
Proof The inclusion from right to left can be obtained simply by applying n 
and 3 to themselves (excluding, of course, a to a) and then repeatedly apply-
ing them to the resultant terms. 
For the inclusion in the reverse direction we proceed by induction on the 
length of the CD proof of B from { n, 6}. The case when B is an axiom (i.e. a 
or 3) is straightforward and so we are left to consider what happens when B 
is the result of applying our restricted CD rule to major premise C and minor 
premise D given our inductive hypothesis that C, D ET'. 
Let us say that a term is of form i (1 :( i :( 3) if it is in T' in virtue of 
condition i of Definition D.4. 
There are several simple cases to be disposed of. We deal first with the 
p ossibility that C is either a or one of the II degenerate" cases of form 2 or 3 
with n = 0. Then we deal with the cases in which Dis of one of those forms. 
1. It is not allowed that both C and Dare of form 1. 
2. If C is of form 1 (i.e. C = a) and Dis of form 2 or 3, then B is just C*( D ) 
which is also of form 2 or 3, so B E T'. 
3. If C is of form 2 with n = 0 then C = /3 and Bis iC (D ) so is of form 3 and 
again B ET' . 
4. If C is of form 3 \,vith n 
B =E. 
0 then C is x • E for some E E T' and so 
For the remaining cases, we may safely assume that C' is C*( C'') and that C'' E 
T'. Under this assumption, there are more simple cases: 
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5. If D is of form 1 (i.e. D = a) then the result of unifying D with C'--+ z is 
C'--+ ((C'--+ y)--+ y) where y is not in C', but in that case Bis just C, up to 
rewriting of variables. · 
6. If Dis of form 2 with n = 0 then Bis K( C'), which is of form 3. 
7. If D is of form 3 with n = 0 then D is K(E) for some E E T', but then 
B =E. 
That concludes the special cases. The remaining case has C = C~1 ( 1 ) and D = 
C!(5) where each of , and 5 is either (3 or K ()() for some .,\" E T'. Now the 
proof proceeds by induction on the product kn. In the base case (kn = O) at 
least one of k or n is zero. These cases have been treated above . Now assume 
for induction that k > 0 and n > 0 and that the result holds for all such pairs 
of formulae C7; (, ) and Ci ( 5) with jm < kn. The result of the CD inference is 
that of unifying D with c~- 1 (,)--+Zn and detaching whatever gets substituted 
for Zn in this process. Evidently, since D is ( c:-1 ( 5) --+ zk) --+ zkt this unifies 
zk with Zn and c;-1 ('·y) with c:-1 (5)--+ zk. Hence B is also tr~e result of CD 
with D as major premise and c:-1 (,) as minor, which is in T' by the induction 
hypothesis. • 
Theorem 0.7. SCCD is incomplete. 
Proof Immediate from Lemmas D.1, D.2, D.3, D.5 and D.6. • 
D.3 Remarks 
We have seen that the set of support (SOS) strategy is incomplete for con-
densed detachment problems even when the subtheory initially excluded 
from the set of support has a model in which the goal theorem is false. This 
means that it is possible for a prover such as Otter to go wrong on these prob-
lems. This incompleteness is not a severe difficulty for Otter, because there is 
always a way of using the SOS strategy which avoids any failure: at worst 
it is possible to put all assumptions except maybe for the detachment clause 
itself into the set of support, thus guaranteeing completeness at the expense of 
some efficiency. For SCOTT, however, the situation is different. Because it uses 
truth values in a modet in effect it constantly re-computes the boundary be-
tween axioms and set of support, and because it chooses models dynamically 
it sets this boundary aggressively, disallowing as many potential inferences 
as it can. We want this behaviour, because we want to extract as much guid-
ance as possible from the chosen modet but it is precisely this feature which 
destroys completeness. Putting everything into the set of support by hand 
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initially avails us nothing if the first thing SCOTT does is to discover the bi-
conditional model which amounts to removing a from the set of support and 
thus losing the proof. 
The situation regarding condensed detachment is but an illustrative ex-
ample of a much more general problem facing combined systems. Semantic 
restrictions imposed on proofs as a result of modelling subsets of the formu-
lae derived may, and perhaps typically will, conflict with other constraining 
mechanisms imposed by the proof strategy. There is no easy general way to 
control such conflicts except by confining the prover to the use of virtually 
undirected methods of inference such as crude binary resolution which are not 
powerful enough for "real" proof search. There are ways out of incomplete-
ness, of course, such as by diluting the semantically directed strategies. Otter, 
for example, allows the user to decide that, say, nine clauses out of ten will be 
subject to the guiding strategy but the tenth will be taken from an unregulated 
breadth-first search just in case it is a bad idea to be over-zealous. These ways 
out are not really what we want, however. We want to be able to trust our 
methods, not to adopt an attitude of limiting the damage by employing them 
less than fully. 
A more satisfying way to keep completeness without sacrificing too much 
of the power of restriction strategies for resolution would be to devise an Otter-
like prover using full semantic resolution, rather than just model resolution, 
with respect to dynamically updated models. Semantic resolution as defined 
by Slagle is like hyper-resolution in being based on a nucleus and satellites, 
each satellite picking up a single literal in the nucleus to form a clash. The 
semantic constraint is that all satellites and the resolvant are required to be 
false in the guiding model. Whether the clauses involved are positive, negative 
or mixed is not significant. This form of inference would remain refutation 
complete, but it is not easy to see how there could be a very fast test for the 
truth value of the resolvant in the general case. 
Another possibility, so far uninvestigated, is to consider ways of detecting 
incompleteness by some kind of analysis of the prover's behaviour. The par-
ticular cases in which incompleteness strikes may not form a decidable set, so 
methods for detecting them should be expected. to be partial. However, there 
may be insights as well as performance gains to be had from the pursuit of 
such methods. 
Other open lines of research in model-guided theorem proving of the type 
considered here include the following: 
• Generalise the results of the present appendix and understand better 
the issues of completeness and incompleteness for semantically guided 
proof search. In particular, characterise classes of problems for which 
SCCD is complete or for which it is incomplete. 
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• Implement and investigate other systems in the style of SCOTT. For in-
stance1 use other model generation methods such as hill-climbing ones 
or those based on tableaux or on extensions of resolution. Examine the 
effects on other kinds of proof search1 for instance on the "bottom-up" 
phase of a prover like SETHE01 and on other types of inference such as 
equational reasoning. 
• Work more on the false preference strategy. This seems to be generally 
effective with a wide range of inference rules, but there is a lack of firm 
mathematical results concerning it. 
• Explore the possibilities for techniques using multiple models. SCOTT 
only uses one model at a time, which restricts what it is able to do. False 
preference in particular offers great possibilities for systems capable of 
working with many models simultaneously. Competitive parallel proof 
search in the manner of [70] is another technique obviously suited to 
guidance by multiple models. 
Finally, it must be stressed that the project of harnessing semantic information 
and putting it in the service of theorem provers is important. The results of 
this appendix are negative for the research program, certainly, but must not be 
seen as destructive of it.9 
9 Among those to whom we owe thanks for their contribution to our understanding of the 
matters of this appendix we would non1inate especially Mark Grundy Ewing Lusk, Bill Mc-
Cune, Bob Meyer and Greg Restall. We also wish to thank those who attended presentations 
of the above proof at the Australian National University, DFKI (Saarbrucken) and the Techni-
cal University of Munich, for helpful comments. The first author also owes much to Ricardo 
Caferra, not only for many discussions of matters germane to this research but also for his 
invi tation to LIFIA (Grenoble) where the present appendix was written. 
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